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JPRS Report

Arms Control

28 AUGUST 1987

ARMS CONTROL

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USSR OFFERS DRAFT TO CONSOLIDATE ABM TREATY

'New Constructive Step'

LD291051 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1020 GMT 29 Jul 87

[Text] Geneva, 29 Jul (TASS) -- The Soviet side has taken a new constructive step of great importance at the plenary session of delegations at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms today -- it introduced a draft "agreement between the USSR and the United States on some measures to consolidate the terms of reference [rezhim] of a treaty limiting antimissile defense systems and preventing the arms race in outer space." At the same time the USSR delegation introduced drafts that affiliate documents -- a protocol and general clauses -- with the agreement. The new Soviet initiative provides a good basis for reaching a full-scale agreement [dogovorennost] for the solution of a complex of questions connected with strengthening the terms of reference of the ABM treaty and preventing an arms race in space. It is dictated entirely by the USSR striving to achieve a decisive breakthrough in the major directions of the talks -- in space weapons and at the same time to open the way for a radical, 50-percent reduction of Soviet and U.S. offensive weapons.

Obukhov Press Conference

LD291711 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1550 GMT 29 Jul 87

[Excerpt] Geneva, 29 Jul (TASS) -- [Passage omitted] At a news conference today for Soviet and foreign journalists, A.A. Obukhov, deputy head of the USSR delegation and ambassador at large, said in particular: The Soviet side is decisively opposed to drawing the world into a new spiral of the arms race, whose combat cost would be unpredictable. Proceeding from the program announced by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, for the phased scrapping of nuclear weapons by the end of this century in conditions where peace in space would be maintained, the USSR is pursuing a consistent policy toward strengthening the terms of reference [rezhim] of the termless [bessrochnyy] ABM Treaty and placing a reliable barrier to the introduction of strike armaments into space.

The Soviet draft documents submitted today envision a precise system of commitments, aimed at achieving this goal.

The Soviet side is proceeding from the unshakability of the ABM Treaty and is proposing that a mutual agreement be made not to withdraw from it for 10 years alongside strict observance of all the treaty's provisions.

Another most important provision of the Soviet draft is a reciprocal commitment to limit work in space-based antimissile defense to research in earth-based laboratories. All activity in antimissile defense in space should be banned. For the purposes of giving concrete form to the corresponding commitments of the sides, the Soviet proposals provide for a coordination of the list of devices that may not be launched into space or sited there.

The Soviet draft agreement also provides that after it goes into effect there will be a continuation without delay of active negotiations on antisatellite systems and space-to-earth class armaments.

The Soviet draft covers succinctly the issue of the inseparable, organic relationship between reductions of strategic offensive armaments and limitations on antimissile defense systems. It says in particular that if any of the sides decides to set about the practical creation [sozdaniye] of an ABM system that goes beyond the framework of the limitations stipulated by the ABM Treaty, the other side will be free from observing the commitments provided for by the treaty between the USSR and the United States on reducing and limiting strategic offensive armaments, which may be drawn up.

Of great significance is the undertaking envisioned by the Soviet draft to start, no later than 2-3 years before the agreement runs out, talks on the whole ABM problem taking into account the new situation created as a result of the radical reductions of strategic offensive armaments of the USSR and United States. Here the Soviet side proceeds from the assumption that the result of such talks would be the adoption of further measures to strengthen strategic stability and to prevent an arms race in space.

The most serious importance in the Soviet proposals is also being ascribed to problems of verification [kontrol], up to and including inspections.

The new Soviet initiative, said the Soviet representative in conclusion, is dictated by our aspiration to also achieve a decisive breakthrough in such an important direction of the negotiations as space armaments. It will be possible to judge from how the U.S. side reacts to this proposal of the USSR whether the United States is truly striving to achieve accords that would serve to strengthen the terms of reference of the ABM Treaty and to prevent an arms race in space, and consequently to implement the principle of 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive armaments by the sides.

Then A.A. Obukhov replied to numerous questions from journalists.

U.S. Eyes Proposal 'Carefully'

LD292312 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2030 GMT 29 Jul 87

[Text] Washington, 30 Jul (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports:

U.S. State Department Spokesman Charles Redman reported on Wednesday that the United States was "carefully studying" the draft agreement on space armaments put forward by the Soviet Union and was "impatiently awaiting a detailed exchange of opinions in Geneva."

He did, however, immediately express his disappointment at the fact that the Soviet side was "just as before striving to impose additional restrictions" on the "Strategic Defense Initiative," which purportedly go "far beyond the framework of the limitations contained in the ABM Treaty." Nor is it a secret to anyone, moreover, the SDI itself is aimed at developing weapons in space as soon as possible -- something categorically forbidden by the ABM Treaty.

The State Department spokesman also confirmed U.S. reluctance to remove major obstructions to the successful completion of the talks on medium-range missiles and to agree to eliminating U.S. nuclear warheads for the 72 Pershing-1A missiles handed over to the FRG by the United States.

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CSO: 5200/1604

USSR ARMY PAPER DENIES ABM CLAIMS ON GLADIATOR MISSILE

PM181115 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jun 87 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Yorkin "rejoinder": "Still No Holding Back the Liars"]

[Text] A normal person would hardly like to be called a liar. But, New York psychology professor R. Goldstein believes, contrary to logic there are some people who are nonetheless not sickened by it. According to the data of a study he has carried out, Washington politicians undoubtedly take the laurels in the United States in the unseemly rivalry to spread lies. They regularly and generously issue various promises, perfectly well aware that most of them will never be fulfilled.

But the American leaders in lies and deception have now found highly agile rivals from the ranks of so-called "experts" maintained by the military-industrial complex. They verbally claim to stand guard over the Soviet-U.S. strategic arms limitation accords but in fact they foam at the mouth as they defend the White House's "right" to implement the "star wars" program. These "specialists" recently announced in the WORLD AEROSPACE WEEKLY "the Soviet Union's flagrant violation of the ABM Treaty," citing figures drawn from the murky waters of U.S. intelligence sources.

They speak of the Soviet ground to air class missiles which, according to NATO classification, are called SA-12 Gladiator missiles. Some alleged "concern" is voiced--the "specialists" say they are not asserting but, you see, it seems to them that the Soviet Union is "completing" the SA-12 missiles and "giving" them the ability to resolve the tasks of fighting "some types of ballistic missiles." Perhaps strategic missiles too. There is no proof, but... Indeed, without batting an eyelid, for the sake of greater conviction, the "experts" have even indicated the region where it has seemed to them that the Soviet Union is deploying these missiles with a view to creating an ABM defense for the country's territory--the Carpathian Military District.

To be fair it must be said that the stories about the SA-12 missiles have substantial "whiskers" on them. They were first circulated by the Pentagon back at the dawn of the emergence of the notorious "strategic defense initiative." It was then that the champions of "star wars" saw in the ABM Treaty an obstacle

to the transfer of the arms race into space and began to prepare to break it up. And for that what yarns did they not spin about alleged "Soviet violations" of the Soviet-U.S. agreement which is the foundation of the entire process of strategic arms limitation and reduction! What perfidious designs did they not ascribe to the Russians!

The Soviet side, citing specific facts, has repeatedly explained that there has never been and is not the slightest grounds for any concern on the West's part. Nonetheless we are obliged to remind the American "specialists" yet again that the ABM Treaty (Article II) clearly stipulates that an interceptor missile (ABM missile) can be considered a component of an ABM system if it is constructed and deployed for an ABM role. Or if an interceptor missile is of a type tested in an ABM mode. But the SA-12 air defense missile complex has never been intended for fighting strategic ballistic missiles. It is not given this capability and no work incompatible with the ABM Treaty is being formed on it. All this is subject to verification by U.S. national technical means.

Everything would seem to be clear. But there is still no holding the anti-Soviet liars. They are convinced that in the United States today you can lie openly and cynically while remaining a "perfectly respectable" member of society. It is merely necessary that the lies should have an anti-Soviet tinge.

So they are slandering the Soviet Union in an attempt to explode the ABM Treaty. After all, if there is no ABM Treaty there will be no brake capable of holding back the arms race and preventing its transfer into space.

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CSO: 5200/1577

SOVIET SPACE SCIENTIST FAVORS SETTING UP WORLD SPACE AGENCY

PM061619 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jun 87 Second Edition p 6

[Interview between Academician R. Sagdeyev and Correspondent A. Lyutyy under the rubric "Problems Worrying Mankind": "Looking at Our Future in Space" -- date and place not specified -- first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] "Mankind will not stay on the Earth forever... At first he will timidly go beyond the atmosphere, then he will conquer all of solar space." Those words were spoken by K.E. Tsiolkovskiy at the dawn of space science. It was not really all that long ago. Note, too, that he was speaking about mankind and dreaming about space serving the entire human race.

Here is a different comment, however. "Space belongs to no one," U.S. Lieutenant General Daniel Graham, retired, stated a few years ago, meaning that near-earth space will be possessed by the country which proves strongest. Recently Graham told me, not without pride, that it was he who suggested the SDI idea to Reagan back in 1980. Don't you see, the former general repeated: The insoluble political and ideological contradictions between the USSR and the United States preclude effective peaceful cooperation between them in space. Rivalry in near-earth space, including military rivalry, is inevitable.

[Lyutyy] People who hold such ideas are surely capable, aren't they, of nullifying the cooperation in developing space which all mankind needs? It was with that question that I began my conversation with Academician R. Sagdeyev, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Space Research.

[Sagdeyev] I believe that there are no insuperable political and ideological barriers to successful cooperation between different countries in space. We already have examples of close cooperation, including cooperation with the United States. There was the Soyuz-Apollo joint flight in 1975, for example. Soviet and American radio astronomers recently cooperated successfully on the Vega project. Airships have been placed in the atmosphere around Venus. The movement of craft of this kind, which are so unusual for space flight, can be monitored with great accuracy only by joint efforts using radio antennae on different continents. Cooperation continued during the brief but intense meeting with Halley's Comet, when the Vega craft plotted a course toward its nucleus, and afterward, when information was transmitted for guiding the European Giotto probe. Cooperation among earth tracking stations, including some NASA stations, played an important role in this multilateral collaboration.

I hope that the views expressed by Graham do not extend to all U.S. military men. For instance, we are now collaborating closely with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena (California). A few days ago a group of Soviet scientists returned from a conference there on prospects for studying the Solar System. It was pleasing to hear at the final session the optimistic assessment of the prospects for international cooperation in this sphere expressed by former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Lew Allen, the laboratory's director, and another retired general. I believe that other people are interested in international cooperation in space, apart from those who have quite definite military plans for its use.

[Lyutyy] Last April in Moscow, USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State G. Schultz signed an agreement on cooperation in the exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes. In what ways can this cooperation be most effective? [paragraph continues]

U.S. scientific circles are talking, among other things, about the possibility of a joint expedition to Mars. Some believe it perfectly realistic, others think it technically infeasible because there is no reliable protection against increased radiation resulting from solar flares and cosmic rays. What is your view on this?

[Sagdeyev] The agreement is an important document. It revives collaboration opportunities comparable with those which existed during the Soyuz-Apollo project. It must be given specific new content. One of the most promising plans discussed in Pasadena was the scenario for unmanned Mars space probes to carry out a comprehensive study of that planet and to send back samples of Martian material to earth. Everyone agrees that this would make it possible to unravel mysteries which have concerned people about the origin of Mars and its geological history, including the history of water on Mars. Perhaps light will also be shed on the hypothesis of the existence of specific Martian life forms, albeit in the distant past.

As for manned flight to Mars, paradoxical though it may seem the radiation situation is more favorable in space and in solar wind currents than in low near-earth orbit. The experience of long flights by orbiting stations shows that the problems of protection against radiation during solar flares can be resolved. A flight to Mars by an international crew would be an enormous scientific triumph. However, most scientists believe that it must be preceded by unmanned expeditions to that planet.

[Lyutyy] When I called on you I heard English spoken in the corridor. I was told that this was the latest delegation of U.S. specialists. Do you often receive foreign visitors?

[Sagdeyev] Not a day passes without some visitors. Dozens of scientists come here. In our way we are an informal international association of space researchers. For many years now the USSR has in fact opened its doors to international scientific experiments using our space apparatus. We actively collaborate with socialist and developing states as well as Western countries. Their cosmonauts have traveled aboard our spacecraft. Here are some more examples. There are still instruments from nine countries in flight aboard Vega, and there are scientific instruments from The Netherlands, the FRG, Britain, and the European Space Agency aboard the Kvant module, which has begun its vigil in space. Dozens of foreign scientists will take part in the testing of the Phobos scientific complex, which it is planned to launch into orbit around Mars next year, and instruments created by specialists from 14 countries will travel aboard it. The natural laws governing the movement of bodies in space orbit cause apparatuses to circle the earth. There are no national borders for them. In the same way nature urges us toward international cooperation.

[Lyutyy] The recently published yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute says that there is a possibility of collisions because of the growing number of microscopic fragments in space formed, for example, as a result of the U.S. ASAT system tests. Does not the need arise to talk right now about protecting the space environment against pollution?

[Sagdeyev] This problem must definitely be considered in the not too distant future. In terms of operational life, satellites can continue rotating for a very long time if they are in a fairly high orbit of, say, 600 km or more. As a result of tests of antisatellite and other types of weapons, targets launched into space are being deliberately destroyed, producing hundreds, sometimes thousands of fragments of debris instead of a single body. And a collision with a fragment with a mass of just a few dozen grams promises trouble. The alarm which people are beginning to express on this score is perfectly understandable. Questions of treating the space environment solicitously as the asset of all mankind can be resolved if the political will exists.

The organizational framework for resolving these questions should be sought within the United Nations, for example, or a world space organization such as our country has proposed setting up.

More and more questions are now arising which need to be resolved jointly. I believe that our proposal to create a world space organization will be adopted sooner or later. The view of space as an asset for all mankind is gaining ground.

[Lyutyy] What practical results of space research can you name which have already influenced our lives?

[Sagdeyev] We no longer notice that in television programs every day you can find items transmitted across great distances by space communications satellites. This also applies to such everyday matters as telephone conversations. Computer links via satellite will become increasingly widespread. In time news features resulting from the existence of space equipment will appear in everyday life. In the next few years materials with special characteristics which cannot be produced in conditions on earth will be produced in orbiting laboratories. Encouraging results and even examples of practical use already exist in these spheres. Furthermore, the solution of tasks connected with space equipment — the creation of durable heat shields, for instance -- sometimes leads to unexpected innovations elsewhere, even in everyday life -- for example, teflon-coated heat-resistant frying pans...

There are many useful by-products like that which could be mentioned. But the development of the main, major areas of space activity will be all the more successful and the benefit derived from the conquest of space all the more complete, the sooner the threat to militarize space is removed. Space must remain peaceful not only to preserve and expand the potential for scientific research but also to protect life on our planet Earth.

...Tsiolkovskiy's words, with which this article began, are inscribed on the wall of the auditorium at the Institute of Space Research. When I left Academician R. Sagdeyev's office I saw another group of foreign visitors in that same auditorium. The words "informal association of space researchers" came to mind. Yes, those people, from countries with different political systems and committed to different ideological views, are united not from need but from the calling of their profession and their conscience. They are united to ensure that space remains peaceful and that it works on behalf of all the peoples and for all people.

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CSO: 5200/1593

TASS ANALYST: U.S. PREPARING TO TORPEDO ABM TREATY

LD101758 Moscow TASS in English 1640 GMT 10 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 10 TASS -- Follows commentary by Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS military news analyst:

As a spokesman for the U.S. Defense Department said, the Pentagon's council for military purchases is prepared to sanction the transfer of the whole or a part of the SDI program to the state of "demonstration and appraisal." Thus the U.S. military-industrial complex is continuing its attempts at laying the groundwork for the speediest official endorsement of the so-called early deployment of the SDI's first stage. Meanwhile, judging by the special report sent by the Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger in May this year to the U.S. President, the experiments planned for the next few years under the "Star Wars" program are in conflict not only with the real meaning of the ABM Treaty, but even its distorted representation by the U.S. Administration, which as found its expression in the so-called "broad interpretation" of the treaty.

All this underscores the irresponsible attitude of some circles in the USA to international security. Since now, as was pointed out at the Berlin meeting of the Warsaw Treaty member states, an opportunity has appeared to carry out a whole number of practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament in order to stop humanity's slipping down to a nuclear catastrophe. Among such steps could be an agreement on a radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons with a simultaneous strengthening of the regime of the ABM Treaty.

Yet this prospect does not suit the book of the U.S. military-industrial complex. By its current moves it actually leads things to guaranteeing the continuation of the "Star Wars" program irrespective of the results of further research; to "stake out" the outer space Klondike, so that the SDI could not be "broken" by the future U.S. Administrations; to put up a cut in the strategic nuclear arsenals; to achieve as soon as possible the positions of strategic superiority, by building a "shield", albeit it may have lots of holes in it, in addition to its first-strike nuclear potential.

This means that those who are found of "outer space adventures" do not wish to face the realities of the nuclear space age, which clearly demonstrate that nobody's security can be ensured through military methods. Trying to resolve the problems of international relations using the old methods, on the basis of the way of thinking and actions, which shaped for centuries, means deceiving not only world public, but also their own selves. Under these conditions the only possible way that would ensure the preservation of human civilization is the one that would make it possible to reverse the arms race on earth and to prevent in in outer space.

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CSO: 5200/1577

MOSCOW RADIO CONFIRMS WORK ON SOVIET SPACE SHUTTLE

LD220925 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 11 Jul 87

[From the "Moscow Mailbag to North America"]

[Text] The first question comes from (Ed Allen) of Baltimore, Maryland: Are Soviet engineers designing a space shuttle?

Yes, they are, Ed. We're working on a space shuttle, but we are not going to give up our reliable carrier rockets, which have proved their worth and which will be used to transport freight into space. Now our space shuttle is being designed on somewhat different lines from yours. Did you know that far from all the elements which make up the shuttles in the States, such shuttles as the Atlantis, Challenger and Columbia, far from all the elements are reusable? We're working on the — if I may put it that way — we're working on the reusability of the units and elements of the shuttle. And I want to stress that our shuttle will be used for peaceful purposes.

Now, it's been said in the West that a satellite has made a photograph of the Baykonur cosmodrome from which we launch our spaceships, and on the photograph there's a landing strip for space shuttles, and that landing strip is clearly seen. Well, there are several such strips capable of landing, well, anything you want.

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CSO: 5200/1593

TASS NOTES BROOKINGS INSTITUTE MEMBER'S BOOK ON SDI

PM211433 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russia 17 Jul 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Baneful Consequences of SDI"]

[Text] Washington, 16 Jul -- Developments in the "Star Wars" program will inevitably lead to the creation of a new generation of antisatellite weapons, which in turn poses the threat of a new and dangerous spiral in the arms race and its extension into space. This warning is given by the author of a book recently published here, "Space and National Security," one Paul Steyrs [last name as published], who is a member of the Brookings Institute.

What is more, the expert notes, the means to destroy satellites could make their appearance long before ABM defense with space-based elements has even been created. The borderline between the defensive and offensive potential of the ABM defense system conceived and being implemented by the Reagan administration is highly notional. The "Star Wars" program provides for the development of technology to destroy targets in space that could be used for aggressive purposes.

Steyrs also draws attention to the fact that the present ban on testing antisatellite weapons on real targets in space cannot prevent the creation of these weapons unless tough restrictions on work on the SDI program are introduced. The real threat of the militarization of space must be counteracted by a ban on the testing and deployment of any combat means in near-earth space. Only this approach can ensure the stabilization of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and become the basis for peaceful cooperation in space. Otherwise, the author believes, the beginning of another round of the arms race at a qualitatively new level will become reality, which will cause irreparable damage to international stability and security.

The present situation primarily requires the USSR and the United States to strictly abide by the ABM Treaty to which they are signatory.

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CSO: 5200/1593

USSR'S A. ARBATOV, ACDA'S EMERY DEBATE SDI CONCEPT

PM190929 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Unattributed report on "IZVESTIYA Roundtable Discussion": "SDI: Argument Against Nuclear Deterrence" -- first paragraph is an IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] This meeting around the IZVESTIYA roundtable was between a Soviet academic and a U.S. policymaker -- specialists in nuclear weapons problems who hold different views on them. Taking part in the discussion were A.G. Arbatov, chief of the Disarmament and International Security Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences World Economics and International Relations Institute, and D. Emery, deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The dialogue was chaired by an IZVESTIYA correspondent.

[Question] The Soviet Union and the United States are conducting intensive talks on the reduction of individual types of offensive nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this is the only way to approach the task of ridding the planet of nuclear weapons -- gradually. But this ultimate goal must be the one that is borne in mind first and foremost, right?

D. Emery: It is unlikely that a radical and final solution to the problems existing in the sphere of nuclear weapons balance will be found in the immediate future. This is why it is necessary to think primarily of how to make the world safer at the present historical stage, while there still exists a possibility that force or the threat of force could be applied against a potential enemy.

Now the Soviet Union and the United States are dealing with questions concerning the reduction of different types of nuclear weapons. It is important that their quantity should remain within a reasonable framework, thus maintaining stability in relations between states by preserving the level of deterrence. *

Under such conditions neither side would dare take advantage of its superiority, fearing the loss that would be caused by countermeasures. The concept of nuclear deterrence has justified itself since World War II. Despite the fact that both sides have increased their nuclear potential, there has been no conflict between them.

A.G. Arbatov: I have to say that my U.S. colleague and I have different perceptions of the ultimate goal of the nuclear arms reduction process. It is very important to distinguish between an ultimate goal in the form of general and complete nuclear disarmament and an ultimate goal in the form of some indeterminate nuclear balance. Rejecting complete disarmament dooms us to follow along in the wake of military technology. Under this alternative, we abandon the conscious control [upravleniye] of military equipment -- its limitation, the control [kontrol] of the process of its improvement, and ultimately its reduction; and we seem to admit being able only to lay down the ground rules for the continuation of the arms race.

[Question] As time goes by, the question of the impermissibility of transferring the arms race into space becomes increasingly acute. Particular attention in this regard is attracted by the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative," more widely known under the symbolic label of the "Star Wars" program. But our assessments of SDI seem somewhat contradictory: First we claim that its implementation is impossible, and then we sound the alarm and warn against the danger inherent in it. How can the impossible be dangerous?

A.G. Arbatov: If we were to examine the essence of the matter, we would see no contradiction in such a presentation of the issue. When we speak of the impossibility of the creation [sozdaniye] of a space antiballistic missile defense [ABM], we bear in mind primarily two aspects. First, it is impossible to create [sozdat] a space-based ABM system ensuring 100-percent defense and impenetrable by nuclear missile weapons. This is in no way unprecedented -- not a single weapon system can be absolutely reliable, just as there can be no perpetuum mobile. But when we talk about defense against nuclear weapons, this axiom acquires a different meaning: Any defense whose reliability indicator is not close to 100 percent is incapable of performing the tasks assigned to it. The destructive power of even a small quantity of nuclear weapons, say a few dozen nuclear charges, is sufficient to cause catastrophic damage not only on the country that is the target of attack but also to the whole world.

This is where the danger lies. While being incapable of defending the state from a nuclear first strike, such a system could create the illusion that it may be possible to provide effective defense against a counterstrike weakened and disorganized by a surprise nuclear attack. It thus increases the possibility of launching a nuclear war, since it encourages the delivery of a surprise nuclear strike in order to boost the reliability of one's own ABM.

D. Emery: The objective of SDI is not to create an "impenetrable dome." I agree with Mr Arbatov: Such defense is evidently impossible, especially in our age.

The SDI concept consists primarily of the need for research in the sphere of technology in order to determine its potential regarding defense against nuclear weapons.

We cannot simply brush this technology aside and bury heads in the sand. Approaching the 21st century, we must bear in mind that we will have to live with nuclear technology and space technology. We cannot hope that progress will halt and that some new technology will not emerge to challenge us. We must learn to live with it; we must learn to control [kontrollirovat] it -- otherwise we will find ourselves under its control [kontrol].

It is sufficient to recall the mid-forties, when the United States presented the "Baruch Plan" — the strategy of developing nuclear technology under international and supranational control [kontrol]. If only we had managed then to place nuclear technology under international control [kontrol]! But that plan was turned down. And here we are again at a crossroads, but this time on the threshold of space.

This is not at all a matter of the Soviet Union allowing the United States to deploy a new defense system which would give the United States unilateral advantages. On the contrary, we are offering a joint and thorough examination of all questions involving strategic defense in order to make correct decisions concerning the control [kontrol] of this technology in the interests of preventing a nuclear catastrophe. If strategic defense is to become reality, the United States and the USSR must cooperate in it.

[Question] And how is this idea regarded in Soviet scientific circles? Does it not contain a grain of rationality?

[A.G. Arbatov] It has indeed been proposed that we engage in the joint development of military space systems. Mr. Emery cited a historical example when he recalled the "Baruch Plan." This is a brilliant example, but it is more true to say that it refutes my colleague's point of view. If, in the mid-forties, we had embarked on the joint development of nuclear technology, we would have achieved very good results if we had directed this research along peaceful lines. But to pool our efforts to create nuclear weapons? The idea is absurd! And to be used against whom? One another? Or together against other countries? Or out of pure curiosity?

We are told that space technology cannot be avoided, that we cannot hide our heads in the sand. One can agree with this. Indeed, space represents the next logical frontier in man's development. If it is a question of cooperation in the peaceful development of space we are wholeheartedly in favor of that.

But if we are talking about the joint development of space weapons (defensive or offensive, it is all the same), it is as absurd as suggesting that we combine our efforts to create a nuclear bomb. Imagine neighbors who each fear that the other will break into their home and so they begin to put their heads together to think up a bolt for their doors. But if their fears are well founded, the same lock will be more likely to increase the likelihood of breaking and entering.... And if their fears are in actual fact exaggerated, the lock becomes all the more unnecessary.

[Question] Yes, and to be perfectly honest, one finds it very hard to believe that the United States would really be prepared to share the results of its latest developments in the space technology sphere with us, especially developments in the field of military space technology. If it comes to that, in fairly routine scientific and technical exchanges, the U.S. Administration imposes tough discriminatory restrictions, so what would it do if we were talking about space? And what of missiles, if there is a prohibition even on trade in series-produced equipment?

[D. Emery] Cooperation can take various forms.... I do not agree with Mr. Arbatov's graphic comparison that we are proposing to engage in the joint development of locks in order to facilitate premediated breaking and entering. The pace of development of space technology is always increasing and is sometimes very difficult to control [kontrolirovat], including from the security standpoint. We ask the question: Is it possible to use this development to make nuclear weapons less dangerous? We are trying to establish, for example, whether space-based defense would serve as an instrument to rectify an accidental error -- an unsanctioned missile launch, say. We believe that the answers to these questions in the SDI context must be given serious thought, serious joint thought.

[A.G. Arbatov] All the arguments presented by my American colleague regarding the expediency of creating a space-based ABM system are founded on recognition of the need to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons being used, lessen the probability of a nuclear first strike, and so forth. In my opinion, this shows that in the sphere of nuclear deterrence, of which he is so much in favor, matters are not as favorable as they would like to have us believe. And so should we not look for another basis for a security system? Especially as we would not have to look very far -- many elements of this system have already been formulated in the proposals of the USSR and its allies, particularly at the Berlin conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. Of course, a comprehensive security system cannot be limited solely to disarmament; it also requires a fundamental restructuring of the political, economic, and other aspects of international life. But with regard to the military aspect of the problem, the Berlin conference documents and primarily the exposition of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine create a firm, constructive basis for making a move toward real disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/1593

SOVIET CRITICISM OF NEW U.S. RADAR IN GREENLAND

Danish Paper Cited

LD191552 Moscow TASS in English 1439 GMT 19 Jul 87

[Text] Copenhagen Jul 19 TASS — A most up-to-date radar station at the U.S. Air Force Base in Thule, Greenland, which is included in the Danish Kingdom as an autonomous region was put into operation on June 24. This has been reported by a commander of the base in an interview with the newspaper LAND OG FOLK.

The putting into operation of the new U.S. radar station in Greenland evokes serious concern of the Danish public. Many specialists believe that its creation violates provisions of the Soviet-American ABM treaty. They point out that the radar station can be used within the framework of the implementation of the "Star Wars" program. This runs counter to a resolution adopted by Danish parliament which denounced plans of the militarization of space.

Foreign Ministry Press Briefing

LD211918 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 21 Jul 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] At a briefing at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center today, Soviet and foreign journalists were familiarized with the main content of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's reply to a recent message from U.S. President Reagan in connection with the Iran-Iraq conflict. [passage omitted]

The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman noted that the United States has violated the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on limiting antimissile defense systems in commissioning a new U.S. phased radar station in Greenland. The Soviet Union, he stressed, has frequently warned about the incompatibility of work being conducted in Greenland with the provisions of the treaty. Nonetheless, the United States has gone ahead with completion of the unlawful deployment of this station. Such actions cannot be regarded other than as an intentional step toward undermining the ABM Treaty.

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CSO: 5200/1593

SDI, SPACE ARMS

TASS COMMENTS ON PENTAGON SDI REPORT

LD292149 Moscow TASS in English 2117 GMT 29 Jul 87

[Text] New York July 29 TASS -- The group of authorities experts set up by the U.S. Defense Department has expressed serious doubt about the feasibility of the plans for an early deployment of anti-ballistic defense system with space-based elements, which the Pentagon is so stubbornly pressing through.

The rough version of the report prepared last month, the newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES said, stresses that the Pentagon has no sufficient information to establish with precision how effective such a system will be, how much it will cost and when it can be deployed. The document says that the creation of the components and systems of SDI is based on guesswork and calculations, that the whole "Star Wars" programme is rather a list of components than a clear technological flow chart.

The Pentagon has been worried by the appearance of such a document, since it apparently hoped that its authors would support the idea of an early deployment of the space shield system. An official spokesman for the Defence Department was in a hurry to assure the journalists that the report does not reflect the final conclusions of the group.

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CSO: 5200/1604

SOVIET RESPONSE TO JAPANESE-U.S. AGREEMENT ON SDI

Prospects Viewed

OW121056 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 10 Jul 87

[Kalinin commentary]

[Text] According to KYODO, during a period between 14 and 17 July U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Japanese Ambassador to the United States Matsunaga will sign in Washington a government-to-government agreement on Japan's participation in SDI. In this connection, commentator on military affairs Kalinin writes as follows:

Judging from various reports, Japan's public opinion now entertains deep fears regarding the planned signing of an agreement on Japan's participation in SDI or the Star Wars plan. The question is not only Japan's concessive consent to offering the right to use the results of the SDI research to Washington. What really matters is the fearful results space militarization will bring about.

In an attempt to appeal public opinion, those who argue for Japan's participation in SDI are trying to create the belief that the upcoming step will contribute to consolidating world peace. They cite several principles to justify Japan's support for the U.S. military space program. What are these principles? Among them is the assertion that SDI is totally defensive in nature. Some people who do not know Japan well may believe this, but the exact opposite is true.

Former U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel (Bowman), who fulfilled an important role in realizing the space militarization plan, clearly said: SDI represents an open U.S. attempt to attain military supremacy through development of new types of attack weapons. It should be noted that he mentioned the United States was developing attack weapons, not defensive weapons. We cannot but agree with this conclusion by former Air Force Lt Col (Bowman). It is because this conclusion was made by an expert directly engaged in SDI [word indistinct].

Let us take homing nuclear missiles now being developed within the framework of SDI as an example. These missiles are designed to destroy not only other missiles but also other space flying objects. This means that they can fulfill not only defensive but also offensive functions designed to fight for control of space. In this connection, it is clear that development of such weapons to attack space objects will soon be followed by the appearance of weapons that can be used from space to destroy ground objects.

A blow from space is considered the most effective surprise attack. In this respect, Air Force Lieutenant General Abrahamson in charge of SDI admitted that a space laser weapons under development could be used for attacks on cities. It is thus clear that a scheme to produce offensive space weapons is hidden in the call for a space shield.

There is another principle Japan is using to justify its support for SDI. It is the position that SDI is aimed at a large reduction in attack nuclear weapons. However, it is no secret that the Soviet Union has proposed complete abolition of nuclear arms by the year 2000. It is crystal clear that if there are no nuclear arms, it is not necessary to make defensive devices to protect against them. Nevertheless, the U.S. leadership thinks differently.

Along with the realization of SDI, the United States has been accelerating its development and deployment of various attack nuclear weapons, including MX and Minuteman ICBM's Trident nuclear-powered missile submarines, and B1B strategic bombers. In other words, it has been working to increase--not reduce--attack nuclear arms. SDI is not preventing [words indistinct]. SDI's true purpose is to supplement the existing strategic arms with attack space weapons and, thereby guarantee the United States the potential for the first nuclear strike against the Soviet Union without threat of retaliation. In essence, multilayer missile defense is designed to deprive the Soviet Union of an ability to make retaliatory blows.

(Shalas), a U.S. expert in the space militarization field, openly admitted that the U.S. development of space weapons would be meaningless if it did not have a plan to begin nuclear war by launching a first strike.

As clarified above, the principles Japan has been using to justify its participation in the Star Wars plan are sheer lies. Of course, SDI supporters also found their arguments on some other premises. However, these premises are equally false and deceptive. In this connection, we should note the following remark by former U.S. Air Force Lt Col (Bowman), whom we already mentioned above: The Star Wars plan is a great deception of the U.S. people. It represents an attempt to make them regard actually aggressive weapons as defensive ones. In connection with this remark, I would like to say that this deception is not merely directed at the U.S. people. This is why General Secretary Gorbachev described SDI as a huge deception of various peoples.

Violates Nonnuclear Principles

PM241455 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jul 87 Second Edition p 5

["Commentator's Column": "Fifth Accomplice" by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov]

[Text] Defense Secretary Weinberger and Japanese Ambassador to the United States Matsunaga have signed an intergovernmental agreement in Washington on Japan's participation in the American "Star Wars" program. Thus, the Land of the Rising Sun is officially becoming the fifth U.S. accomplice in the militarization of space after Britain, the FRG, Italy, and Israel.

Although Nakasone assured Reagan as much as 2 and 1/2 years ago that he regarded SDI "with understanding," for a long time Tokyo did not venture openly to subscribe to that program because participation in the development [razrabotka] of space strike arms runs counter to the Constitution (under which the Japanese people renounced the use of military force for all time), the "three nonnuclear principles" (not to produce, acquire, or station nuclear weapons in their country), and also the parliamentary resolution on exploring and opening up space exclusively for peaceful purposes. However, precisely for the aforesaid reasons Washington was particularly interested in persuading Tokyo to participate in its schemes. Since, it was said, even Japan with its "nuclear allergy" does not disdain to participate in SDI, what doubts can there be about the "defensive" nature of this program? Further, the U.S. creators of space arms are eager to secure the services of Japan's scientific and technical potential, particularly its achievements in electronics, laser equipment, and fiber optics. Finally, people across the ocean reckon that Japan's involvement in SDI will make it possible finally to cancel out the "three nonnuclear principles" and site on Japanese territory the communications, tracking, and guidance facilities necessary for combat operations in space.

The Japanese Government gave its consent to participate in the American "Star Wars" program as long ago as last September. However, the elaboration of the specific terms for this dragged on for an entire 10 months. Tokyo spent a long time trying in vain to secure what had been denied the other SDI participants: the right to use for commercial purposes the research and development [razrabotka] which the partners will carry out within the framework of the American program. The anti-Soviet hysteria over the notorious "Toshiba Kikai affair" confirmed the suspicions of Japanese employers that the Americans will monopolize the results of the work on the pretext of "preserving secrecy."

The groundlessness of the arguments that participation in the "Star Wars" program will supposedly accelerate scientific and technical progress and prevent the country from lagging behind American and West European competitors has been exposed. Japan's postwar history attests to the exact opposite: The country's scientific potential develops far more efficiently if not linked to military ends.

The agreement signed in Washington attests to Japan's further involvement in U.S. military-strategic plans and runs counter to statements by official Tokyo circles of their readiness to help strengthen peace and reduce international tension.

'Irresponsible Action'

OW231203 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 22 Jul 87

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Text] According to a report from Washington, Japan and the United States have signed a government-to-government agreement on Japanese enterprises participation in SDI research. In this connection, commentator Dmitriyev makes the following comments:

The decision has finally been made. Despite serious warnings from the opposition camp, experts in various fields, and people representing various circles, the Japanese Government has finally put itself into the hands of the U.S. military-industrial complex. How will the signing of an agreement between the Japanese and U.S. Governments on Japan's participation in SDI affect Japan?

Japan's frontier technology is becoming an eyesore to major U.S. businesses; however, it is now quite clear that through the recent agreement between the Japanese and U.S. Governments, the United States has seized a new chance to strictly control Japan's frontier technology. On the grounds of this government-to-government agreement, the U.S. leadership will be able to step up its interference in the affairs of Japanese private enterprises through the Japanese Government. For example, although the COCOM -- the Coordinating Committee for Export to Communist Countries -- does not have punitive regulations, the United States was able to force the Japanese Government to take stern measures against Toshiba Machine simply because Japan is a member of the COCOM.

I have just referred to how the signing of the agreement will directly affect Japanese interest. By signing the agreement, the Japanese Government has caused Japan to bear all burdens in connection with important questions regarding space militarization. One of these questions is whether the Star Wars plan really represents a defensive system, as claimed by the U.S. Government. In his speech the other day, Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney expressed his apprehension that U.S. offensive nuclear weapons and SDI may jointly form a first-strike force.

Anyone with common sense will understand his apprehension, not to mention the fact that experts have pointed out from the very beginning that SDI will raise doubts with some.

By signing the agreement on its SDI participation with the United States, Japan now has imposed on itself the obligation to participate in the development of the new-generation nuclear weapons. Under the pretext of SDI, what the U.S. military-industrial complex is attempting is nothing but the development of new-generation nuclear weapons. In promoting SDI, at least five types of the so-called directional energy weapons that are capable of concentrating nuclear energy on one point are being considered at present. The Japanese Government should clearly understand that by participating in such a program, it will also be forced to share the responsibilities brought about by the implementation of the program.

Excuses such as Japan's participation being limited only to research work are nothing but vain consolations. THE NEW YORK TIMES reported the other day that a secret plan for early SDI deployment had already been worked out in the United States. When this plan is put into practice, Japan will automatically become an actual conspirator in the space militarization program. Since SDI will upset the strategic balance, Japan will thereby be involved in the global strategic confrontation.

No matter how Star Wars should be carried out, it remains unchanged that the program has been planned from the very beginning with the USSR as its attack target. The implementation of this program will become another new major factor for causing military confrontation. This military confrontation will become more serious and more dangerous. In that case, there is no denying that Japan will not be forced to take merely moral responsibilities.

Japan's SDI participation is an undisguised unfriendly action toward the USSR, and it will only serve to further the deterioration of the overall atmosphere of relations between the two countries. It is hoped that Japan, as the first nation to have experienced an atomic bombing, would at least refrain from lending a helping hand to the escalation of the nuclear arms race. However, Japan's official decision to take part in SDI has indicated just the opposite. In consideration of Japan's national interests and of Japan's political role in the current world, Japan's decision must be termed as an irresponsible action.

Toshiba Refuses Participation

LD240452 Moscow TASS in English 0439 GMT 24 Jul 87

[Text] Tokyo July 24 TASS -- The Japanese Toshiba concern has decided not to take part in the implementation of the notorious American "Star Wars" programme.

Reporting this, KYODO Tsushin Agency refers to some "diplomatic problems" that one of the leading high-technology manufacturers in Japan and in the entire capitalist world, refuses to take part in SDI projects because of the campaign of hounding started against it by Washington with the support of official Tokyo. According to the terms of the deal between Tokyo and Washington Japanese companies are practically denied the right to use the results of joint research for commercial purposes under the pretext of "safeguarding the security" of the United States.

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CSO: 5200/1604

USSR: FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN HITS JAPANESE SDI CONTRACT

'No Technological Advantage'

AU161316 Paris AFP in English 1310 GMT 16 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow, 16 Jul (AFP)--The Soviet Foreign Ministry Thursday said that Japan would be responsible for spreading the arms race into outer space by signing an agreement on Japanese participation in the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative.

A ministry statement, read at a news conference by Deputy Foreign Ministry spokesman Boris Pyadyshev, repeated Soviet opposition to the SDI contract to be signed shortly between Japan and Washington on participation in the multi-billion dollar project for a space-based anti-missile shield.

Japan must "take upon itself responsibility for the spread of the arms race into space," the statement said.

Noting that Tokyo had not heeded an earlier warning from the Foreign Ministry against following the "militaristic" path of the United States, the statement said it was completely wrong to suggest that Japan would gain any technological advantage from the programme.

"The whole of history since the Second World War shows that scientific knowledge advances more rapidly if such developments are not connected with military aims," it said.

Japan's 'Large Responsibility'

OW170447 Tokyo KYODO in English 0428 GMT 17 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow, July 17 KYODO -- The Soviet Foreign Ministry Thursday attacked Japan's decision to participate in the research phase of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Ministry spokesman Boris Pyadyshev told reporters Japan must bear a large responsibility for spreading the arms race in outer space through a Japan-U.S. agreement allowing Japanese firms to participate in the space-based missile defense program, known as "Star Wars."

He said the Soviet Union last September condemned Japan's readiness to participate in the program.

It is regretful that the Japanese Government is so eager to ingratiate itself with Washington by preparing to participate in the program, instead of heeding calls for caution, the spokesman said.

He said SDI is a pretext for Japan to obtain technological benefits by participating in the program.

Japan's postwar history shows that Japan's scientific potential is more effective and more economically beneficial when unrelated to military aims, Pyadyshev added.

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CSO: 5200/1577

SOVIET REACTION TO U.S.-JAPANESE AGREEMENT ON SDI

Foreign Ministry Statement

PM201121 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

["Statement by USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman"]

[Text] An agreement is due to be signed in Washington within the next few days between Japan and the United States on the terms of Japanese firms' participation in the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" program. The program officially seals Japan's joining in the practical implementation of the U.S. plans for the militarization of outer space.

In upholding that step, Japanese official circles furnished arguments about the allegedly "defensive" and "nonnuclear" character of SDI. It is well known, however, that the U.S. "Initiative" is a large military program for the development and deployment of strike weapons in outer space, an attempt at turning outer space into a potential theater of war.

Also groundless are references to the possibility that Japan will obtain some "technological benefits" from the participation in implementing U.S. military plans. The experience of the postwar Japan itself is proof that that country's research potential develops far more effectively and is more beneficial to her economy if it is not geared to military aims. [paragraph continues]

It is also obvious that the U.S. side clearly does not intend to generously share its potential achievements in this development program with its partners. Thus, the United States gets another very powerful lever for subordinating the development of science and technology in Japan to its selfish interests.

In September 1986 the Soviet side gave a principled assessment of Tokyo's decision approving Japan's participation in SDI as evidence of its further involvement in the military-strategic plans of the United States and running counter to the Japanese Government's statements on preparedness to act for strengthening peace and lessening international tensions.

It is deplorable that the Japanese Government has not reacted to the call for showing appropriate attention to the question of participation in SDI. Instead, Tokyo deemed it necessary to act so as to meet Washington's demands and practically join in preparations for "Star Wars."

By signing the above mentioned agreement with the United States, Japan will take no small part of responsibility for whipping up the arms race and spreading it into outer space.

'Open Hypocrisy'

LD222249 Moscow TASS in English 2120 GMT 22 Jul 87

[Text] Washington July 22 TASS — By TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko:

An agreement and secret protocols to it on Japan's participation in developing space weapons systems within the framework of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" were signed between the governments of the USA and Japan here on Tuesday. Thus, Japan has officially joined in the effort of escalating the arms race into outer space, which is a lethal danger to the whole humanity.

As a spokesman for the Pentagon said, the secret protocols list the specific measures within the framework of research and other work and name the Japanese firms that will implement them. This agreement, as a spokesman for the Pentagon said, is an important contribution to ensuring the security of the USA and Japan.

Yet, it is well-known that the militarisation of outer space, which is the aim of the SDI, will lead to an endless spiralling of the weapons race, which is increasingly getting out of control. This will critically increase the threat to the security not only of the USA and Japan, but also of all countries of the world.

On top of that, by officially joining in SDI the Japanese Government has crudely violated not only the international agreements banning the use of outer space with military aims, but also the resolution of the Japanese Parliament of 1969 permitting the exploration and use of outer space only with peaceful aims, the laws providing for a ban on the export of arms and military technology.

The Japanese Government has pointedly abandoned its stand which it took by voting at the U.N. in 1984 for a resolution calling for the prevention of militarisation of outer space and confirmed in the statement of Prime Minister Nakasone at the jubilee U.N. General Assembly session in October 1985 that the prevention of weapons race in outer space is one of mankind's most important aims. Japan's officially announced decision to participate in SDI is evidence that such assurances were nothing else but open hypocrisy.

As far as the U.S. Administration is concerned, in drawing Japan into the SDI agreement, it set the aim of broadly using Japan's technological potential for the speediest implementation of its designs for a militarisation of outer space. Simultaneously the USA has made Japan a direct accomplice in the attempts to torpedo with the aid of SDI the ABM Treaty, without whose strict observance any effective measures of control and a cut in strategic nuclear weapons are impossible. The creation and deployment of the SDI "defence systems," says the research published in the official "CONGRESSIONAL RECORD" of the USA, will untip the strategic balance between the USSR and the USA.

Japan Confirms Agreement

LD211450 Moscow TASS in English 1217 GMT 21 Jul 87

[Text] Tokyo July 21 TASS -- The Japanese Government today confirmed its agreement with the United States on terms of Japan's participation in the U.S. "Star Wars" programme.

The NHK Television Company reported that the agreement would be signed by Japan's Ambassador to the United States Nobuo Matsunaga and U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger in Washington on Wednesday. The agreement was drawn up on the basis of Tokyo's "political decision" to participate in the SDI made last September.

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CSO: 5200/1593

JAPAN: TOSHIBA MAY WITHDRAW FROM SDI RESEARCH

OWO81157 Tokyo KYODO in English 1155 GMT 8 Jul 87

[Text] Tokyo, July 8 KYODO — Toshiba Corp. is prepared to withdraw its bid to participate in research on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to ease U.S. criticism against the company over illegal exports of high-technology products to the Soviet Union by its subsidiary, company officials said Wednesday.

Such a possibility is one of several "drastic measures under consideration" by the company, the officials said. They said the measures include a total suspension of exports to the Eastern bloc by the company and its affiliates.

The officials expressed serious concern that a ban on sales of Toshiba products in the United States would cost some 10 percent of its total turnover, having a serious impact on its business.

Toshiba's trouble stems from U.S. charges that sales by its subsidiary, Toshiba Machine Co., of sophisticated propeller milling machines to Moscow hurt Western security. The export breached rules of the Coordinating Committee for Export Control (Cocom), a Paris-based Western group regulating sales of sensitive goods to the Eastern bloc.

Japan and the United States are expected to exchange official notes on details of Japanese participation in the SDI research work by the end of this month.

If a withdrawal by Toshiba from technological cooperation in SDI research would help calm criticism in the U.S. Congress and avert sanctions, the company would do so, the officials said.

Toshiba also is considering dismantling and absorbing Toshiba Machine, in which it holds a 51 percent equity stake, they said.

Toshiba has launched its own investigation on the case to prevent a recurrence of similar incidents.. The officials said the company would implement all possible measures in consultation with the government as some of them require official endorsement.

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CSO: 5260/119

BRIEFS

TASS: TRIDENT TEST 20 JULY--New York, 21 Jul (TASS)--The United States conducted on Monday the test firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile Trident-2 as part of its nuclear build-up programme. According to a spokesman for the U.S. Navy, the missile armed with a dummy warhead was launched from a launch pad at Cape Canaveral, Florida, in the direction of the Atlantic Ocean. According to AP news agency, the Pentagon intends to deploy Trident-2 missiles on American submarines in 1989. Before, it intends to carry out 15 more test firings from ground launch pads and 10 test firings from submarines. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0604 GMT 21 Jul 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1594

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: CRUISE MISSILES SEEN AS ESPECIALLY DESTABILIZING

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 3 Jul 87 pp 1-3

[Article by Alexandr Ignatov, APN, under the rubric "News and Views":
"The Fourth Leg of the Nuclear Triad"]

[Text] Usually, the nuclear triad means ground, air, and naval forces equipped with strategic nuclear weapons. Now cruise missiles have appeared in each of these three legs. High accuracy and yield, a considerable range (up to 2,600 km), and an ability to approach targets secretly at very low altitudes are the general characteristics of the cruise missile regardless of its basing mode.

In other words, cruise missiles are offensive weapons which can be launched against the enemy in a surprise and dangerous attack. Indicatively, as the Mexican El Dia observed, on its way to Moscow the West German Cessna sporting plane had imitated, as it were, the flight of the cruise missile. This missile flies at tree-top level, following the terrain, and so its detection is a difficult task for radars. Military experts believe that the survivability of the cruise missile is even higher than that of the Cessna, for it flies at an even lower level, and is smaller in size.

The cruise missile is a very dangerous weapon. When nuclear-tipped, it carries 20 Hiroshimas in one charge. These flying monsters, which were called Tomahawks with good reason, have already been adopted by the U.S. Army, and are deployed in all media--on the ground, in the air (on planes), and in the high seas (on surface ships and submarines).

Much has been written about American cruise missiles sited in Europe, and let's hope that success of the Soviet-U.S. talks on medium-range weapons will rid us of them, at least in Europe. But what about those cruise missiles which are launched from the air or sea? Nothing is said in the West about this part of the nuclear force, although its importance is hard to underrate.

Since the difference between cruise missiles starting from submarines, planes or the ground is not big, I'd call them a kind of "fourth leg" of the nuclear triad. Both American and Soviet experts, including young analyst on strategic problems Alexei Arbatov, list them in the category of destabilizing weapons.

Why? To begin with, cruise missiles are very numerous. The United States has 350 launchers on 50 ships, while the Pentagon is planning to deploy 4,000 missiles on 200 ships. In the U.S. Air Force 132 B-52 bombers are equipped with cruise missiles, and they are to be installed on another 62 aircraft. In addition, new, B1-B planes will be fitted out with 3,000 cruise missiles.

Secondly, as any new weapon, the cruise missile is the generator of fresh ideas in developing arms, and in revising the attitude to old weapons. Cruise missiles using the Stealth technology are already being developed, and the discarded destroyers of the New Jersey type, with Tomahawks on board, are making their comeback.

Thirdly, it is impossible to tell whether a cruise missile is equipped with nuclear or conventional weapons. The ships which carry cruise missiles are also the same. This means that all ships with missiles on board create a threat to the other side. Here is a new channel of the race for weapons which can replace other means of attack, and increase the destructive capacity many times over. Moreover, the new weapons will make verification all but impossible.

So, cruise missiles can impede, wreck or bring to nought the process of disarmament. They have already started to play their destabilizing role. By adopting the 131st and 132nd B-52 bombers with cruise missiles on board, the Pentagon destroyed the bilateral SALT-2 Treaty, which limited strategic arms on both sides.

If cruise missiles were not dangerous, W. Mondale, who ran for the Presidency, would have hardly promised way back in 1984 to propose a Soviet-U.S. moratorium on their deployment and testing if he had been elected.

International experts who prepared a report on the naval arms race for the UN also spoke with concern about Tomahawks. They believe that sea-based cruise missiles with a long range would create additional obstacles in the way of nuclear disarmament talks.

From the very outset the Soviet side opposed the production and deployment of long-range cruise missiles, but to no avail. Then Moscow proposed limiting their number. In May 1987 in Geneva the Soviet delegation came up with the idea of restraint in the field of all strategic offensive arms, including long-range sea-based cruise missiles pending the talks with the United States. In other words, the sides should refrain from building up their current levels. This would create a favourable climate for the work of the delegations, and for the drafting of new agreements. But Washington has not responded to these proposals yet.

(APN, 2 July. In full.)

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CSO: 5200/1604

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET PAPER HITS U.S., NATO 'UNCONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH'

PM171341 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Jul 87 Second Edition p 1

[Yuriy Gavrilov article under the rubric "Our Dialogue": "Disarmament: A Lack of Realism"]

[Text] The letters arriving in our editorial office show that readers are most interested in the topics of restructuring, the revolutionary renewal of all aspects of our life, and the preservation of world peace. This is not surprising -- the one is most closely linked with the other. One can also understand correspondents' concern that the knots of complex problems involved in ensuring international security are not being undone as swiftly as might be wished.

"I think that many people are perturbed by a situation which is, in my view, paradoxical," Muscovite M. Yermakova writes. "Our country proposed to destroy medium-range missiles in Europe, and the United States and its allies supported this initiative, even though they did not do so at once. [paragraph continues]"

"This seems to call for immediate action, since it concerns the security of all. But time is passing, and an agreement is yet to be reached. What is happening?"

The answer to this question is largely linked with the course of the Geneva talks. They center on the problem of eliminating missiles in two categories: medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. And even though the talks are being held between the Soviet Union and the United States, their outcome depends to a considerable extent on the stance of West European countries.

Our country approached these talks in a highly responsible fashion. It displayed the utmost readiness to seek compromise solutions and to take into account the interests of both the United States and the other NATO states. Work is now under way in Geneva on formulating a joint draft agreement, with the points on which the sides have failed to agree listed within parentheses. A quest is under way for solutions to the complex questions involved in verification. It looks as if progress has been made and an opportunity has emerged to take the first step to conclude an agreement offering prospects for other important actions in the disarmament sphere.

But this requires goodwill from both sides. And that has not been displayed by the United States and its NATO allies, at least not to date. Evidence of this can be seen in the various conditions and artificial barriers they have raised in the way of agreement.

First, Washington is trying to exclude from the calculations and from destruction the U.S.-owned warheads for the 72 FRG Pershing-1A missiles. They belong to the category of operational and tactical missiles, with a flight range of up to 740km. The yield of each one of these warheads is approximately 10 times greater than the yield of the bomb that reduced Hiroshima to ashes.

What is the U.S. side's reasoning behind this approach? The fact that the topic of discussion around the negotiating table in Geneva concerns exclusively Soviet and U.S. weapon systems and not systems belonging to third countries. Bonn also insists on this point. An absurd and inconsistent argument. After all, if the warheads belong to the United States, they automatically become subject to the agreement's effect, and if they are meant to be used by the Bundeswehr, that is a blatant violation of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear weapons by both the U.S. and the West German sides.

Second, Washington intends not to eliminate but to modify the Pershing-2 medium-range missiles into operational and tactical missiles and hand them over to the FRG. The appropriate technology making it possible to complete this entire operation or reverse it within a matter of hours has already been created. [sozdana]. "The United States," U.S. State Department spokesman Oakley declared at a briefing for journalists in the U.S. capital, "agrees with NATO military authorities that Pershing modernization would maintain and strengthen NATO's nuclear deterrent and flexible response capability." "Smart" tricks are also being devised regarding U.S. cruise missiles. To put it briefly, Washington and Bonn have taken a stance which, as FRG President R. von Weizsaecker was told during his recent visit to the USSR, "could spoil the good work -- the ship may be wrecked even before it is launched." After all, this stance is based on desire to gain unilateral advantages and dictate their own will. The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that there must be no double standards on the question of eliminating nuclear missile weapons, in the same way there must be no exceptions for one side to the detriment of the other side's security.

The unconstructive approach adopted by Washington and its Atlantic partners to the historic opportunity to break the dangerous trend in the world resulting from the unbridled arms race -- an opportunity which has emerged thanks to the Soviet peace initiatives -- is provoking growing protest in Europe and throughout the world. This approach is condemned not only by broad circles of the peace-loving public but also by eminent sober-minded politicians.

Let me cite just one typical statement. It was made at a recent West German-U.S. conference on security questions in Bonn. H.-J Vogel, chairman of the FRG Social Democrats, called on Western leaders to abandon the "obsolete and morally absurd strategy of deterrence" and switch from arms buildup to disarmament, stressing that the peoples cannot tolerate this strategy for much longer. It must give way to the concept of detente and to security ensured jointly, not through military-technical but primarily through political methods. It is indicative that the leader of the Social Democratic Party of Germany moreover spoke in favor of taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the Soviet leadership's dynamic policy and the initiatives put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. As a result of these initiatives, Vogel said, a "specific breakthrough in the nuclear disarmament sphere" has become possible.

Any unbiased person can see who is upholding peace and who is only posing as peacemaker, and this is why Washington propaganda, in the words of the British newspaper THE INDEPENDENT, resorts to a "feverish quest for an acceptable answer that would make it possible to avoid the West's being accused of attempting to sabotage the arms control process." The U.S. Government's mouthpiece, the VOA, could find nothing better than to resort to disinformation and to blame the lack of progress in arms control on the Soviet Union. And official spokesmen in Washington even declare that the Geneva talks have supposedly slowed down because the Soviet delegation is almost deliberately applying the brakes on discussion and, in many instances, even retreating from its positions.

What answer can be given to these fabrications? It would be appropriate to cite an opinion recently expressed by the U.S. journal BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS: Lies and distortion of facts have become customary for the Washington administration and to justify various political actions the White House has created "a whole collection of myths it tries to sell to the public." In particular, "the Reagan administration claims that it is serious about arms control. Meanwhile, however, a whole series of administration officials have been consistently against it for a long time."

This is how matters stood at the start of Reagan's Presidency, and this is how they stand now. It is no accident that, throughout its term in the White House, the present administration has not concluded a single arms control agreement. The influence of militarist circles, which call the tune in the country's political arena, is strong on the other side of the ocean. Their destabilizing influence on the entire spectrum of international relations is well known. It was their efforts that wrecked the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, which was based on the principle of equality and identical security. In May of last year they succeeded in making the United States refuse to continue to observe in practice the Soviet-U.S. legal treaty documents on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons -- the same SALT II treaty and the 1972 Interim Agreement. It is these same circles, upholding the "Star Wars" program, that also torpedoed the opportunity to reach accords on a broad spectrum of disarmament questions that emerged in Reykjavik, succeeded in making the United States embark on a new round of military preparations, and are now striving to sabotage the AMB Treaty.

This is the reason why the agreement of which you, Comrade Yermakova, write has not yet been reached.

One could legitimately ask: Do the transatlantic militarists and their NATO fellow-thinkers in Europe have any constructive conception of the "peace challenge" from the USSR? Judging by everything, the answer is no.

The Warsaw Pact countries recently proposed to NATO that we come to the negotiating table and discuss questions concerning the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. In response, NATO launched a campaign for the further deployment of conventional arms. There has been no specific answer to the proposal to discuss the blocs' military doctrines. All this indicates just one thing, namely: the absence of a realistic policy in the West and a lack of sincere interest in building relations with the USSR while rejecting the course of confrontation.

People in the West who have spent too long in the cold war trenches still draw consolation from illusions that it is possible to talk to our country from positions of strength and gain concessions from it. They still nurture vain hopes of "dismantling the Soviet system." The "Red threat" scarecrow is again in circulation, even though today they find it increasingly difficult to scare people and justify the arms race. Evidently to keep up with the Pentagon, H. Teltschick, adviser to the FRG chancellor on foreign policy questions, gave voice to anti-Soviet fabrications in Bonn a few days ago, going all out to promote the thesis that Moscow pursues a "policy of threat" toward Bonn. The most reactionary circles in the West, clearly scared that the peace initiatives and the process of changes would enhance the USSR's prestige, are frightening ordinary people with tales that restructuring supposedly serves to strengthen Soviet military might and renders Europe and the entire Western world "defenseless" before it.

But the Soviet Government's flexible and dynamic policy in the international arena engenders enormous sympathy among the public in the most diverse countries. Despite opposition from imperialist circles, the trends toward disarmament and peace on the planet are strengthening. The peoples are entitled to expect that realism will gain the upper hand in the corridors of power in the West and that the chance to take steps along the path of disarmament will not be missed.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW BROADCAST TO NORTH AMERICA ON INF TALKS

LD190208 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 17 Jul 87

["Top Priority" program presented by Vladimir Pozner with Dr Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the United States of America and Canada Institute]

[Text] [Pozner] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. This is Vladimir Pozner presenting "Top Priority." With me on the panel, as usual, Drs Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov. The subject today: the INF talks.

Not long ago, in fact, quite recently in the United States we were all presented with a very rosy view. The idea was: agreement is around the corner; agreement is just a pen stroke away; there will be a summit in the fall; and everything looked wonderful. Now, suddenly, a blackout, no news. And then a change of pace and we are told that the Soviets are foot-dragging on the issue. There was a very tough-worded statement made by Kenneth Adelman. He said: There is no way we are going to have a summit in the autumn to sign an INF accord with the Soviets retaining 100 missiles, that is 100 warheads, in Asia. There have been all kinds of signals to the effect that the Soviets for some reason are pulling back. What's happened?

[Bogdanov] I believe that really we have to handle a very difficult, very sensitive question because we -- not only we sitting around this table but a number of people, a substantial number of people at our end -- are really puzzled: What's going on in Geneva? Why there is such a change of climate, of mood? One day you have a very rosy picture, as you put, the other day you have something very pessimistic, and the third day you have statements like you have mentioned just now.

And I would prefer, you know, to find out an answer in the American domestic situation. And I believe that all the forces within the administration and outside the American Administration, traditionally against any deal with the Soviet Union, may be fighting their last battle, trying to sabotage the INF agreement which is very much within the reach because they understand if we strike a deal -- I mean we, American and Soviet sides, we strike a deal -- that will be really a new chapter in the arms control business and the next presidency; whoever comes to the White House will have to deal with qualitatively new situation. They are very much against that. That's my theory. Maybe I'm wrong, but as a student of the American scene I come to that conclusion. And you have a very big, you know, activization of factions within the administration fighting against that. Otherwise you cannot explain why they have on the table a draft treaty, and if you judge by four or five problems lying on the table, four or five difficulties, you can come to the conclusion that they are not ominous difficulties that you cannot overcome. They are just to be handled as they are soluble, if you...

[Pozner, interrupting] All right, well let's look at those difficulties. What exactly is the argument about, supposedly? Dr Plekhanov? What are the problems that are suddenly holding up what seemed to be an almost guaranteed agreement?

[Plekhanov] Well, there are two aspects here. As far as the 100 missiles in the Asian part of the USSR...

[Pozner, interrupting] You're talking about 100 warheads?

[Plekhanov] A hundred warheads -- that's right, I'm sorry -- which Mr Adelman has mentioned. That represents a reopening of an issue which seems to have already been settled between the two sides; that is, the elimination of medium-range missiles from Europe would leave 100 warheads in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and 100 such warheads on the American territory. That was the agreement which was reached 2 years ago, I mean...

[Pozner, interrupting] In other words, the initial proposal would be a zero option in Europe...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Yes. And that does not foreclose the elimination of the remaining missiles, those in Asia and the ones in the American territory, at a later stage. But at this stage, so far, the understanding was between the two sides that we just concentrate on the European part.

[Pozner] So now these 100 warheads...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] That seems like a backtracking...

[Pozner, interrupting] Have been brought back into the discussion.

[Plekhanov] That's right, that's right. As far as other issues are concerned, the Soviet Union has been very active in formulating specific proposals, meeting the concerns on the American side to the extent that that is possible. And in that sense I think that there is no need for such a pessimistic assessment on the part of the Americans that are saying that the Soviet Union is foot-dragging. What the Soviet Union is doing is trying to work out conditions which would be acceptable to both sides. Unfortunately, the American side -- and I'd hate it to sound like haggling over details, but there are certain elements in the American position, and I agree with Dr Bogdanov that that does reflect the domestic situation in the United States and the unwillingness in some parts in the administration to really work seriously for an agreement -- there some elements in the American position which really preclude progress toward an agreement.

[Pozner] For instance?

[Plekhanov] We are hopeful that they will be overcome. For instance, an insistence by the Americans that when the withdrawal of missiles begins, that the Soviet Union starts withdrawing its missiles while the United States for a while keeps its missiles there. [sentence as heard] I don't see any reason why that should be, there should be such...

[Pozner, interrupting] A difference in the timetable.

[Plekhanov] Yes, Yes. Then another one is that the United States insists on the right to turn the Pershing-2 missiles, which are to be eliminated, into a new type of missile which would be stationed in West Germany. Now, that would be a very scary thing, because the technology for remaking a Pershing-2 into an operational missile, to the extent that it has been developed, the technology would be very smooth and that technology also makes it possible to turn an operational missile back into a Pershing-2 missile, a medium-range missile.

[Bogdanov] Some people say that that [transformation] can be made within few hours.

[Plekhanov] Yes, Yes.

[Pozner] All right then. Correct me if I'm wrong. I was under the impression that the agreement as it is being developed and the Soviet proposal was not simply to withdraw the INF's...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Yes.

[Pozner] ...but to destroy them...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Exactly.

[Pozner] ...to eliminate them physically.

[Plekhanov] Yes.

[Pozner] Now if the Soviets are going to eliminate them physically under the international control then shouldn't the United States be expected to do the same thing?

[Plekhanov] Absolutely.

[Pozner] So what you are saying, then, is that the United States proposes not to physically eliminate its missiles but to take the Pershing-2's and turn them into something else?

[Plekhanov] And not only that but also withdrawing the land-based cruise missiles and putting them on ships, turning them into sea-launched cruise missiles which you can deploy in any aquatorium [as heard], in any, at sea, which would, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned it doesn't really matter whether they are based on a ship in, say, the Baltic or in the North Sea or on the territory of, say, Belgium or West Germany.

[Pozner] It's almost as if the Soviet Union suggested, if it were possible, to take its SS-20's and put them on some sea-based carriers in the European seas and say: Okay, now we've eliminated them from Europe.

[Plekhanov] Yes, that would be exactly..

[Bogdanov, interrupting] It sounds, it's really like that. So what we have just been discussing here, it reflects the very artificial kind of objections from the American side, artificial in the way, in the sense that they can, if you have no political will to strike a deal you invent another, you know, hundred or set of objections of the same kind just to sabotage the agreement.

[Pozner] Dr Plekhanov?

[Plekhanov] Yes, I agree with that. There is one issue which I have not mentioned and that has to do with the 72 operational-tactical missiles which are stationed in West Germany.

[Pozner] Yes, I wanted to bring that up.

[Plekhanov] Yes. The missiles are controlled by the Bundeswehr, by the West German Army. The warheads are controlled by the United States.

[Bogdanov] They belong...

[Plekhanov and Bogdanov, interrupting] They belong to the United States.

[Pozner] But that's part of the general agreement, nonproliferation and so on, that the United States cannot give its warheads to any other nation.

[Plekhanov] That's right. Now that we're discussing the double zero for Europe -- that is, elimination not only of medium-range missiles but also of operational missiles -- obviously the question of those 72 missiles crops up and the United States (?says): No, no, you can't touch that, because...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] Sergey, not missiles -- warheads, warheads.

[Plekhanov] Well, yes, but missiles also have, yes...

[Pozner, interrupting] But we're not -- as far as I know -- the Soviet side is not saying anything about the West German missiles. What it's talking about is the American nuclear warheads that tip those missiles.

[Plekhanov] Absolutely; of course. But, you know, a warhead can't fly without a missile.

[Pozner] True, but you can take them off and put on a nonnuclear warhead...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] That's right, that's right.

[Pozner] ...Which is a different story.

[Plekhanov] Yes. Anyway, we're talking about those missiles, and the Americans say, no, no, you can't touch those because they are with the West Germans, which raises a whole number of questions. If those warheads are controlled by the United States, if they belong to the United States, then obviously they should come under the cuts under the agreement with the Soviet Union. If they are not controlled by the United States, if they really belong to the West Germans, then that raises a question of whether the United States is honoring the Nonproliferation Treaty, because the West Germans are not supposed to have control over any nuclear weapons. So it's either this or that, but the position that those 72 warheads -- and each of them is about 10 times as powerful as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima -- so what we are talking about is a potential of about 700 Hiroshimas stationed on the West German soil.

[Pozner] Now all of these so-called problems — and I say so-called for a definite reason — have suddenly appeared as if no one thought of them before and now here they are on the stage, blocking progress. One would tend to think that this reflects, as Dr Bogdanov indicated, an effort to stymie if not torpedo the agreement. And I recall when we were sitting at this table a couple of weeks ago, perhaps a month ago, we were talking about the reality of reaching an agreement on INF and of having a summit in the fall, I thought you, Dr Plekhanov, were somewhat upbeat and optimistic about it; I certainly was, and our friend Dr Bogdanov was not. He was saying: Well, I'll believe it when I see it and it's very difficult to deal with the present administration. He was somewhat pessimistic. I have the feeling now that perhaps his pessimism was more well-based than my optimism at least. Dr Bogdanov, how do you feel in the sense of being clairvoyant?

[Bogdanov] I feel not well at ease, frankly, because I would like very much this deal to be really reached, because it is so easy for us in that, I prefer to forget about my, you know, my personal assessment, forget about it, and I, frankly, I prefer you were right, not me.

[Pozner] Yes.

[Bogdanov] But you have a very typical picture of the American domestic politics. Every day brings America closer and closer to the election, presidential election, and people in the White House, around the White House, in the parties, get more and more busy with the election calculations than with some other problems. And now, now, for instance yesterday, if I'm not mistaken, NEW YORK TIMES published an article that summit is such a distant, become such a distant possibility that we could even forget about it. The time is running out, time is very short. You cannot reach an agreement, strike a deal, tomorrow, you will have to work on that for so many months to put it in details, on paper and things like that.

So that kind of pessimism reflects not only tactical moves — some people say they are so nearby the treaty that they are trying to trade off now at the last minute to get more and more concessions. I was to believe in that maybe a week ago, but now I'm afraid that things are more serious than just tactical moves. And, after all, there is a basic problem, which is for me, as a student of American political life, is: Is this administration able to deliver? That's my question. And, unfortunately, my answer to it after the hearings and all that what happened in America, my answer is half no. I emphasize: Not full no, but half no; maybe more than half no. They are not able. But let's see, let's see.

[Pozner] Well, that certainly is a difficult situation for the world, because, in my opinion, if the INF talks fall through, if there is no agreement, it's going to make it extremely difficult to move ahead in any other area. I think that we all tend to believe that INF is a relatively — relatively, I repeat this — simple issue to solve, much more so than strategic offensive weapons, let alone a whole area of other ones. So if this does not work it may turn out to be a block for many, many other agreements.

[Bogdanov] You're quite right, Vladimir. That's another tragedy of the whole story. I wouldn't like to blame anybody. I wouldn't like to pinpoint that — that's the enemy of the treaty, that's the enemy of this and that, no. But really I hate to believe that we again become a hostage of the American domestic situation. It is not fair. The world community is bigger than America, the world community and world community's interests is more deep than any other interests in this world. That's my point.

[Pozner] I think it's an important point, especially considering that the tone has been, now recently, that if the Soviets do not agree to this, that and the other then — and I quote — Moscow will not have a summit in the fall. [no unquote as heard] It's almost seen as if Moscow needs the summit more than Washington.

[Plekhanov] That's the usual trick that the American media plays, you know. I think that...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] Sergey, I'm afraid that Americans, I would like to protect in this case American media. They say what they have been supplied with...

[Plekhanov] Yes, well, of course...

[Bogdanov] ...supplied from some quarters, from the administration with that trick, what you call quite rightly trick, that we need, Moscow needs that summit, is dying to have that summit [chuckles], which is not the case, I'm sorry, to put it mildly.

[Pozner] We have only about 30 seconds left, so, Dr Plekhanov, if you want to sum up, please go ahead, but keep in mind our time limit.

[Plekhanov] Well, I feel very much hopeful that there will be some new factors on the scene in the United States which would help overcome the difficulties, because if that does not happen then we will be all thrown back until 1989 and we will have the same issues on the table, maybe even new problems, more difficult problems, than now.

[Pozner] Well, I'm sure that Dr Bogdanov joins you in that hope; I know I certainly do.

[Bogdanov] I'm more pessimistic.

[Pozner] I know, you always are, but still you hope that it happens. At least it is clear that the Soviet intentions are for reaching an agreement. And now on behalf of Top Priority, we invite you to join us a week from today at the same time for another panel discussion. I won't be with you; I'll be on vacation, but you'll be hearing my colleague Pavel Kuznetsov. Until then, on behalf of the panel and myself I wish you all good listening.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR MILITARY BULLETIN: U.S. 'UNJUSTIFIED CLAIMS' ON PERSHING'S

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 12, Jun 87 pp 1-2

[Article by "Analyst": "On the Problem of Drafting an Agreement on Medium-Range Missiles"]

[Text] The first joint draft agreement which brackets the positions of the USSR and the U.S. has been compiled on medium-range missiles at the nuclear and space weapons talks. Now the delegations have started to discuss it in detail.

A number of obstacles which stem from unjustified claims of the U.S. side will have to be overcome in order to harmonize the text.

The United States still insists on the reduction of Soviet medium-range missiles in the first stage. The U.S. does not give up its intention to site 100 Pershing-2's with nuclear warheads within reach of Soviet territory. It is trying to reequip Pershing-2's and land-based cruise missiles in Europe into shorter-range Pershing 1B's and sea-based cruise missiles with conventional warheads, respectively, rather than liquidate them.

So far it is difficult to qualify the ultimate meaning of this position, Washington hardly wants the Soviet side to reequip its SS-20's, because it demands that we should destroy land-based cruise missiles. At the same time, having violated the SALT-2 Treaty, and having physically exceeded its ceilings on strategic weapons, the Americans actually untie the hands of the Soviet side, even if we do not accept this invitation to settle accounts in view of long-term considerations. But, understandably, unilateral restraint has its own limits. As for the reequipment of Pershing-2's, among other things, it would mean a substantial increase in the threat posed to the Soviet allies in the Warsaw Treaty, and would contradict the main goal which is to lower the level of armed confrontation across the board. Of no smaller importance is the question of American warheads on Pershing-1A missiles deployed in West Germany and belonging to the Bundeswehr. A precedent for the future is being created--it is enough to place a warhead, controlled by the U.S. de jure, on a delivery vehicle which is at the disposal of another state, for this warhead to be excluded from the Soviet-U.S. balance. This leads to the emergence of a kind of mixed nuclear forces uncapped by the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and other potential agreements. If the U.S. is steering the course in this

direction, it will have to throw up its cards for all to see what kind of "zero" it finds attractive,

One could suppose theoretically that the Soviet allies in the Warsaw Treaty, say, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, will ask the USSR to place under their control delivery vehicles of SS-12 short-range missiles, while reserving for itself the maintenance of nuclear charges. Other Soviet allies could prefer SS-23's as delivery vehicles.

The questions of verification are especially complicated in the package of problems on medium-range missiles. We have explained more than once that the USSR stands for the most rigid, far-reaching verification, including on-site inspections. Naturally enough, U.S. military bases in third countries should be also subject to verification. It would be logical to demand that verification by challenge should extend not only to enterprises which are directly producing medium-range missiles under contract, but also to firms where their production can be organized secretly.

Evidence of how far the Soviet side is ready to go in the questions of verification is given by the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. They provide, among other things, for an obligation to give inspectors free access to the site mentioned by the inspecting side, and to set up an institute of international inspectors.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS ASSAILS U.S. STATEMENTS ON SOVIET STANCE

Redman on FRG Pershings

LD171534 Moscow TASS in English 1446 GMT 17 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 17 TASS — Follows commentary by Vladimir Bogachev, TASS military news analyst:

Addressing a briefing in Washington, Charles Redman, a spokesman for the U.S. State Department, told newsmen that the U.S. Administration was preparing a paper on its stand at the Geneva talks and voiced hope that the Soviet news agency TASS, IZVESTIYA, and other Soviet mass media would make it accessible to Soviet public.

While displaying "touching concern" with how Soviet public is informed, the Washington officials have been deliberately misleading American public from day to day, claiming, in particular, that the Soviet side at the Geneva talks insists on the elimination of the West German "Pershing-1A" missiles. These West German missiles can be both nuclear tipped and carry conventional warheads.

The spokesman for the U.S. State Department is supposed to know that the Soviet proposals deal only with the elimination of the arsenals of the participants in the talks, i.e. the USSR and the USA, including the U.S. nuclear warheads to the West German delivery vehicles. Yet addressing the briefing, Redman found it apt to reiterate the inventions about the weapons of the third side, which are allegedly touched upon in the Soviet proposals.

It would be good, if for a start, the State Department admitted in public that its representatives have for a long time distorted the Soviet Union's stand on shorter-range missiles, while the U.S. mass media have for some reason been passing over in silence the Soviet side's explanations.

It must be noted, for that matter, that the Soviet readers have the possibility to familiarize themselves regularly with articles by U.S. officials on problems of arms control, which are published in the Soviet press.

NEW YORK TIMES 'Fabrication'

LD210618 Moscow TASS in English 0616 GMT 21 Jul 87

[Text] Washington July 21 TASS — The Soviet Embassy in Washington has strongly refuted the fabrications in the newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES concerning the Soviet Union's stand at the Soviet-American talks on arms control, in particular, on the question of elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

On July 19, the newspaper carried an article by Michael Gordon presenting the Soviet Union's stand in an absolutely distorted light. The article claimed that the USSR is allegedly "protracting the talks", references, that are absolutely irresponsible and have nothing to do with the real facts, were made to some "statement by USSR Ambassador in Washington Yuriy Dubinin to diplomats of East European countries."

The author of the article was trying, in particular, to claim that he had learnt that the Soviet ambassador told East European diplomats that the USSR saw no point in giving political support for President Reagan at this stage.

The USSR Embassy issued the following statement in Washington: "In connection with the article by Michael Gordon in THE NEW YORK TIMES quoting pronouncements allegedly made by the USSR Ambassador in Washington Yuriy Dubinin to 'West European diplomats', the USSR Embassy declares that all of that information is absolutely unfounded, and is nothing else but a pure invention. As before, the Soviet Union strives to conclude with the United States agreements on nuclear and space weapons. The Soviet Union is making most vigorous efforts in the interests of the speediest attainment of that aim. As before, the Soviet Government is ready to resolve these problems with the Administration of the United States."

Kampelman on FRG Pershings

LD230834 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1930 GMT 22 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow, 22 Jul (TASS) — TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev writes:

Max Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, maintains that the United States is invariably maintaining the position worked out in 1981 when Soviet-U.S. negotiations on medium-range nuclear forces in Europe began. Without denying that new obstacles have arisen on the way to attaining agreements on medium-range missiles, the U.S. diplomat insists that they all arose not because of changes in Washington's position, not because of the U.S. departure from previously agreed approaches, but by virtue of an "inexplicable Soviet decision to play for time."

In an article, "Answer to Moscow on Medium-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations," published in THE NEW YORK TIMES, Kampelman appraises in a highly original manner the "new obstacles" to the attainment of an agreement and even fabricates problems that just do not exist.

"In the 5 years of negotiations the Soviets did not once propose to limit the German Pershing missiles or their warheads. Now, when an agreement is within reach, this demand is suddenly put forward. Who, it may be asked, is creating obstacles to an agreement at the last minute?"

Unfortunately, this statement by Kampelman is full of inaccuracies, incomplete presentations, and half-truths. He is right only in that the Soviet Union really did not previously suggest "limiting the German missiles." Yet, for some reason, Kampelman does not spell out that, even now, the Soviet side is not putting forward any such demand. Needless to say, the U.S. diplomat did not cite, nor could he cite, any Soviet proposals about "third-party" missiles. His statement can be seen as a deliberate attempt to mislead the readers of THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Kampelman feigns "amazement" at the USSR's "unexpected" demand for the elimination of all U.S. nuclear warheads for operational and tactical missiles, including those of the FRG. Yet there is nothing here to be amazed about. The point is that prior to this spring missiles with the range of less than 1,000 km belonging to the USSR and the United States and the nuclear charges for them were simply not to be discussed, in accordance with the mandate for the talks. During the 5 years referred to by Kampelman the talking was about medium-range missiles.

When the question of operational and tactical missiles (in the United States they prefer to call them shorter medium-range missiles) was raised at Geneva on the initiative of the United States and other NATO countries, the problem of eliminating all Soviet and U.S. nuclear charges for them also arose. It was then that the Soviet Union asked what was to happen to the U.S. warheads for the FRG's Pershings too. Incidentally, the West German Pershing-1A's are "dual-purpose" delivery vehicles. They can also take nonnuclear warheads. The elimination of the U.S. nuclear warheads does not mean that the FRG's missiles will become "powerless."

Needless to say, Kampelman knows the whole history of this issue. There is the suspicion that the head of the U.S. delegation in Geneva is deliberately distorting the facts to muddy the waters, to abandon his own proposals on weapons with a range of less than 1,000 km, and ultimately to retain U.S. nuclear charges for the Pershing-1 missiles. Incidentally, such delivery vehicles exist not only in the FRG but also in the United States (108 units).

Even more rational are Kampelman's "arguments" supporting the U.S. intention to convert the U.S. Pershing-2's into Pershing-1B missiles, and the U.S. land-based cruise missiles into sea-based ones. Yet it is precisely on this issue that the true aims of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks are most clearly revealed. Washington, contrary to the previous assurances of President Ronald Reagan, has no desire to "destroy the whole class of medium-range nuclear arms." The present U.S. Administration is willing, at most, merely to replace one set of weapons of mass destruction with others no less dangerous.

It is noticeable that Kampelman did not explain what he meant when he proposed that the treaty should allow both sides to convert their medium-range nuclear weapons to other classes of systems rather than destroying them. Surely he is not advising the Soviet Union to convert its SS-20 medium missiles [sredniye rakety] into SS-16 strategic delivery vehicles [sredstva dostavki] in the conditions created by the scrapping by the United States of SALT II, which banned intercontinental missiles of this class?

Kampelman began his NEW YORK TIMES article with assurances that the United States remains loyal to its unchanging principles of honest disarmament. All his subsequent propositions and arguments, however, in defense of rearmament [perevooruzheniye], rebut that thesis, including the description of the U.S. proposals in Geneva as "an honest and balanced considering the rights and interests of both sides."

It ought to be noted that the United States is still unable to give an intelligible explanation of how the retention of 72 U.S. nuclear warheads can be reconciled with Washington's concept of a global "double zero."

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS' COMMENT HIT

Woerner on Missile Modernization

PM161257 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jul 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report under the "What the Papers Say" rubric: "M. Woerner's Missile Plans"]

[Text] The latest issue of the influential West German magazine STERN carries an article exposing FRG Defense Minister Manfred Woerner's missile modernization plans.

The article says, among other things, that while the great powers are drawing closer and closer to disarmament in the nuclear sphere, Defense Minister Woerner is planning to employ a new generation of medium-range missiles.

"Air Force Commander Eberhard Eimler," the magazine points out, "keeps an explosive document under lock and key: His safe contains the 'tactical requirements' of the next model of those same West German Pershing-1A missiles which are causing so many disputes between East and West in the disarmament struggle. Officially, Bonn is still thinking about it, but preparatory work to create the new system has been in full swing since at least 1985.

"While Moscow and Washington are discussing disarmament at the negotiating table Defense Minister Woerner has shed his mask in the draft treaty with the Americans. While formerly supporters of missiles on both sides of the Atlantic constantly sought to disguise their craving for those weapons with soothing references to the siting of allegedly defensive weapons, the draft treaty now specifically points out precisely what is involved in the still-secret missile plan: missiles with conventional warheads capable of hitting enemy airfields."

The article goes on to note that "A timetable was mapped out in the Federal Security Council, one of the most secret bodies in the Federal capital, on 24 July 1985. The meeting participants approved (what was conspiratorially called) a 'long-term technological and experimental program in the sphere of high-risk ballistic missile system technologies designed to hit a wide range of targets using conventional armaments.' In a strictly confidential 'ministerial circular' of 7 October 1985 Lothar Ruehl, state secretary in the Defense Ministry, left no doubt as to what the modification of the Pershing-1A system involved. As Ruehl pointed out in the circular, the new system must have a range of 700-800 km and be manufactured, with the participation of German industry, by 1991 (when the Pershing 1-A missiles are due to be decommissioned).

"Woerner wants to site new short-range missiles. This is put as follows in the latest circular: The inspector general of the Bundeswehr (initially Wolfgang Altenburg, now Dieter Wellershoff) must take care to ensure the retention of the Lance system and also adopt a definite position in the need and potential for subsequent modification. The range of the lance battlefield missiles is around 120 km. The next system, however, is to have a range of up to 320 km. The targets of this new generation of missiles being developed at Woerner's wish are thus quite clear: The GDR, western Poland, and the CSSR."

In conclusion STERN stresses that a propos the Soviet-U.S. talks, "Franz Joseph Strauss, chairman of the Christian Social Union, now admits defeat. The 'deal' struck between the great powers in the disarmament sphere will hardly come unstuck because of opponents in Germany. However, this defensive fire is quite capable of delaying things. True, this does not bother Woerner. He has always demanded the replacement of the medium-range missile destined for scrapping with a 'system of similar deterrent effect.'"

Biehle on SS-24's, SS-25's

PM211319 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jul 87 First Edition p 3

[Major General Yu. Lebedev article: "Clumsy Hypotheses: What Lies Behind Herr Biehle's Groans"]

[Text] Bundestag Defense Commission Chairman Alfred Biehle recently published an article in the West German newspaper BAYERNKURIER. In this piece of propaganda he leveled a number of charges against the Soviet Union, alleging that it is in breach of the SALT II treaty, and urged "gullible" Western representatives at the Geneva talks "not to succumb to illusion." Biehle warns that, whatever happens, it will not be possible to get rid of the "Soviet military threat." Even if a Soviet-U.S. agreement to eliminate medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe is concluded, the author frightens his readers, "any euphoria about the progress achieved would be impermissible and dangerous."

What is Herr Biehle accusing the Soviet Union of? To answer that question it will be necessary to quote quite a long extract from his article: "During the Geneva talks, which have been going on for several years, the Soviet Union has not sat back idly but has had a careful eye on the future. It has designed [konstruirovat] and partially commissioned new missiles to which the provisions of the treaty under discussion in Geneva do not apply. That could well be the precise reason why the Soviets, judging by all accounts, are now so easily agreeing to give up their SS-20 missiles. Moscow's new missiles -- the SS-24's and SS-25's -- belong to the category of intercontinental strategic weapons with a variable range of roughly 1,000 to 10,000 km. These missiles can consequently be used against both the United States and West Europe."

No one disguises the fact that the SS-24 is the new type of ICBM the Salt II Treaty allows to be built. But why then does Herr Biehle, when maintaining there is a growing Soviet threat to the West, coyly keep silent about the new MX ICBM's that have been built and tested and already commissioned? Presumably he is also aware of the full-scale development of another new type of ICBM in the United States -- the Midgetman -- which, incidentally, in no way comes within the SALT II treaty.

As for the Soviet SS-25 missile, it is not a "new Moscow missile" at all but merely a modernized version of our old RS-12 ICBM. For the information of the Bundestag Defense Commission chairman, such modernization is not prohibited under SALT II and has been carried out in strict accordance with its provisions.

It should be said that Herr Biehle's thoughts are not original. As long as a year ago President Reagan, announcing America's refusal to observe the SALT II treaty in the future, made a clumsy attempt to categorize the SS-25 ICBM's as "new." His purpose was clear. The United States had been working on the creation of a truly new type of ICBM, the Midgetman. The President somehow had to justify America's "right" to have a second new type of ICBM and the U.S. side's breach of the treaty's limit on strategic MIRV's and heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 km. It is now clear that in attempting to denigrate the USSR as a negotiating partner the U.S. Administration was preparing the ground for abandoning its commitment to observe agreements in strategic arms limitation.

Biehle's contention that the USSR's possession of SS-24 and SS-25 ICBM's, which are allegedly suitable for use as medium-range missiles, is the reason for the Soviet proposal to eliminate Soviet and U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles on the European Continent is absurd. Anyone with the slightest competence in military-technical matters knows how great the difference is between ICBM's and operational and tactical missiles. They belong to different classes. You do not have to be particularly bright to appreciate that it is, to say the least, foolish to use intercontinental missiles to hit targets at relatively short distances or, putting it figuratively, to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Herr Biehle's amateurish contentions do not stand up to criticism.

Can the missiles he is using to frighten the citizenry be quickly and easily converted into medium-range or operational and tactical missiles? Specialists answer this question unequivocally: The conversion of ICBM's into medium-range missiles, still less operational and tactical missiles, is virtually impossible without fundamental design changes, without replacing the missile guidance system, and without building a new warhead and completely different booster motors. It is far easier to build a new, short-range missile than to convert ICBM's into medium-range or operational and tactical missiles.

Since discussion has already turned to the possibility of converting one class of missile into another it is appropriate to look at a question Biehle deliberately overlooked in his article: the question of the Bundeswehr's Pershing-1A missiles and their U.S. nuclear warheads, which the FRG is clinging to with astonishing tenacity. It transpires that the Bonn Defense Ministry has already prepared plans to replace Pershing-1A complexes with new Pershing-1B complexes, which in terms of equipment are similar to the notorious Pershing-2 medium-range missiles. The differences are minimal. Essentially the Pershing-1B is a one-stage version of the Pershing-2. The operation to convert one missile into another, which has long been worked out in every detail, takes about 48 hours. Bonn is thus trying to secure a loophole for "upgrading" the Bundeswehr with improved operational and tactical missiles capable of being easily and quickly converted into medium-range missiles. At the same time it can please the United States, which wants to keep nuclear weapons in Europe on the false pretext of "meeting its NATO allies' needs."

Biehle's moans are designed to justify U.S. warheads for West German missiles and prevent their elimination. Surely they do not think in the West that we are such simpletons?

With the aims of achieving an accord on operational and tactical missiles the Soviet Union has put forward a number of constructive proposals designed to eliminate the obstacles that have arisen in negotiations and has made major compromises, seeking to expedite a positive solution. These steps are evidence of our country's great sense of responsibility for the fate of the peace and are not a retreat under pressure. When we agree to the "double-zero option" on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles we want to rid the European Continent of nuclear weapons.

The unceasing attempts by Bonn and its transatlantic partners to carry out diversionary maneuvers are bound to cause alarm. It is reasonable to ask: Why have the Western mass media and high-ranking statesmen and politicians suddenly begun talking recently about new "linkages" and warnings, "prescriptions," and "hypotheses"? There is just one aim to this: If a decision on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles cannot be blocked completely, then at least its adoption can be delayed. A. Biehle is clearly among those who oppose an agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe. Otherwise he would not have joined in the campaign by the unscrupulous interpreters of events and facts of which, all the indications are, he has a very foggy but extremely biased notion.

All the preconditions now exist for a Soviet-U.S. accord on eliminating medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe. The conclusion of such an accord would not only mean a breakthrough in the crucial sphere of security but also would improve international relations as a whole. This must be promoted in every way, not hindered, and there must be no yielding to the temptation to buttress one's own negative position with the customary anti-Soviet rhetoric.

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CSO: 5200/1589

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: FRENCH STATEMENTS ON PROSPECTS FOR U.S.-USSR ACCORD HIT

Giraud Statement

PM140819 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jul 87 Second Edition p 5

[Yuriy Zhukov "Political Observer's Notes": "What Is Mr Giraud Frightened Of?"]

[Text] French Defense Minister Andre Giraud has lost his calm and his sleep. Any telegram from Geneva about the progress of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear arms reduction makes him shudder: Will an accord on the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles suddenly be achieved? He speaks again and again at various meetings and gives interviews to newspapers and magazines in an attempt to prove what cannot be proved: Any accord on arms reduction is mortally dangerous!

Recently Mr Giraud once again sounded the alarm. Speaking at the joint seminar of the French Army and the West German Bundeswehr High Command in Paris, he once again attacked the Soviet peace initiatives.

"Giraud warned," West Germany's DPA reported 7 July, "that one can lose (!) sight of the true purpose behind the avalanche of Gorbachev's disarmament proposals published by the mass media: the strengthening of peace." "Disarmament is still not peace," he stressed.

He returned once again to his favorite theme: In the face of this new Soviet "threat" France and the FRG must strengthen their military collaboration, but, of course, it must develop "not contrary to the North Atlantic alliance, but within its framework." (On familiarization with this statement, you may involuntarily conclude that the French defense minister has forgotten that France is not a member of the NATO military organization! -- Yu. Zh.) "It is precisely the Soviet-U.S. talks on disarmament issues," Mr Giraud explained, "that have shown France and the FRG how close their solidarity must be."

As is well known, the French defense minister and his Bonn counterpart Woerner have been busying themselves for a long time with the military integration of France and the FRG. A month ago the magazine PARIS MATCH published a lengthy report on the joint exercises by the French Army and the Bundeswehr, accompanied by a symbolic photograph in which the French minister was brandishing a pistol while the Bonn minister standing by his side was smiling contemptuously.

Soon, as is well known, a campaign began to create joint French and FRG Armed Forces, which Mr Giraud is particularly active in advocating. Moreover it is stressed that these joint forces must be advanced nearer to the GDR border. Incidentally, Giraud states meaningfully — I quote him from the 3 July issue of the Paris magazine L'EXPRESS — "We cannot think of leaving French soldiers without the protection of the nuclear deterrent." No! Really?

Some people in Paris tried to interpret the plans for this military integration as a measure which would lead to independence from the United States and NATO. But Mr Giraud has now demolished this version. The FRG and France, he said, must "instill in their U.S. friends the conviction that they will best defend the camp of freedom (?) if they retain their own conventional and nuclear (!) forces in Europe."

What about disarmament? Mr Giraud wants one thing: for the socialist countries to disarm. Yes, he stated directly that the Warsaw Pact member states must unilaterally reduce their armaments.

You are simply amazed at the nonsense this figure can bring himself to utter in his mortal fear of the possibility of an agreement on the elimination of two classes of Soviet and U.S. nuclear armaments, especially since, as Mr Giraud said himself, the Soviet proposals have evoked a "wide public response in the West."

Chirac Statement

PM101306 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Jul 87 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "J. Chirac on France's Stance"]

[Text] Paris, 9 Jul — French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac has spoken out in support of the conclusion of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe. In an interview published in LE MONDE he noted that France approves the idea of disarmament in principle and is interested in the current talks on this subject, adding that they should promote the strengthening of universal security. He said that Paris approves the position taken by France's Western allies on this issue.

At the same time the French head of government stressed that the Soviet-U.S. agreement on which talks are now taking place will not affect the French nuclear forces, since France does not belong to the NATO military organization and has no foreign nuclear missiles on its territory. The attainment of accords on disarmament will not prevent us from modernizing our nuclear deterrent forces, he noted. Moreover J. Chirac claimed that in the present situation France needs to gamble on nuclear weapons more than ever.

It is also clear from his words that he is in favor of continuing efforts to organize a joint defense of West European countries on the basis of the idea he put forward in the Western European Union last year on drawing up a "European security charter." The prime minister also came out in support of the idea of creating a joint Franco-West German brigade.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIAL VIEWS DISARMAMENT

DW240711 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Jun 87 p 10

[Article by State Secretary in the Defense Ministry Lothar Ruehl: "Well Calculated Moves in the Missile Chess"]

[Text] The United States wanted to create a security margin for NATO's nuclear armament and in particular its armed forces in Europe, so as to counterbalance the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority to a certain extent at least and to keep a vestige of nuclear flexibility. In return, Soviet superiority in nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and able to hit targets in West Germany, Denmark, Austria, and some border areas of Belgium and the Netherlands were not to be reduced. The disproportion of 1,365 to 88 nuclear weapons delivery means in that category (100-500 km range, not including the 33 French "Pluton" missiles) to the advantage of the Warsaw Pact would -- and will for the time being -- be maintained.

That concept, which also is called "fire wall," was designed by its architects in Washington as an instrument to limit damage and provide reinsurance against the negative consequences of their own arms control policy. It can also be interpreted as an attempt to end the past sectoral negotiations on nuclear weapons, in other words, prevent Europe from being gradually "denuclearized" and thus the European NATO area from being turned into a theater of war for conventional armed forces. Upon his return from Moscow, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz pointed to NATO's 4,600 nuclear warheads in Europe and to the United States' strategic nuclear weapons as an additional support.

So far, all nuclear weapons control accords have neither constituted disarmament steps nor moves for reducing the respective nuclear weapons covered by them. They have always only limited weapons increases or at best been more or less deep incisions in selective operational fields, according to the principle that those types of nuclear weapons which in each case are considered "the most serious threat" should be quantitatively limited, reduced, or removed.

From SALT to START -- from the strategic arms limitation talks to the strategic arms reduction talks (since 1981) -- the U.S. negotiators have always tried to implement that concept, for example by urging a lower upper limit for the heaviest Soviet intercontinental missiles of the SS-18 type which are considered a special threat to the U.S. missile silos.

However, the assumption on which that principle is based, that thereby more security and a stable strategic relationship would be created, is unproven. The missile silos in the United States can not only be effectively attacked by the heavier SS-18S but also by the lighter SS-19S. Yet, the mere assumption has influenced the U.S. negotiation policy on nuclear weapons and in addition the whole of the West's arms control policy in the past 2 decades. Since the summer of 1986, the problem has been whether that basic assumption should continue to be valid and determine western negotiation offers, or whether it should be reviewed with a critical mind and revised, if necessary.

The new sectoral weapons control is not only fragmentary because it seeks to sever elements from a solid system, but it also is illusory and misleading because it overestimates the positive effects on the whole system from which such specific elements are severed, and ignores the fact that on both sides other elements can function as replacements in the whole system of armed forces and armaments.

An example of that are the negotiations on longer range intermediate-range weapons. The objective the West has set since 1981 is the elimination of all land-based missiles with ranges of between 5,500 and 1,800 km (recently extended to 1,000 km). Part of the tasks of such Soviet missiles in Europe can be taken over by missiles with shorter ranges. That consideration then led to the demand that those weapons systems should also be reduced. Under their new leadership the Soviets, demonstrating flexibility, responded by suggesting that they should be totally removed, after Moscow for many years had rejected any limitation of that weapons category. In that way a process was started that in 1987 has led to the "double zero solution."

The main objective of Soviet negotiation policy is and remains preserving conventional superiority of Soviet military power in Europe as the strategic instrument of Soviet foreign policy. So this end, conditions of military conflict in Europe have to be created that reliably rule out the possibility for NATO to resort to its nuclear weapons with the aim of deterring an attack.

The political demand to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons serves that purpose. Owing to its conventional superiority, the Warsaw Pact does not depend on a first strike in Europe. Since the Brezhnev era, that demand has been capped by the illusory idealistic idea that all nuclear weapons should be removed. Gorbachev has set a deadline for that illusion -- the year 2000, the millennium of everlasting peace. That vision which Reagan shares with Gorbachev -- and his predecessor, Jimmy Carter -- has an influence on the nations who are mesmerized because they are psychologically fixated on the

dangers of the nuclear age, and molds public opinion in the western countries. Thus that vision can be offered in attractive negotiation proposals. Whether any agreements on the removal of nuclear weapons are really concluded and whether they are observed, is a problem of secondary importance for Soviet policy.

What is even more interesting for the Soviet Union's political strategy, however, is its intention to destroy NATO's capacity of escalation in Europe by removing the longer range intermediate-range nuclear weapons able to reach the Eastern European operational theater.

Limiting NATO's regional nuclear armament in Europe to the battlefield in the narrower sense and, if possible, removing all nuclear weapons delivery means able to hit Soviet territory or at least the Eastern Bloc countries, the Soviet Union's military glacis, are logical objectives of that strategy to dominate Europe.

After long hesitation, Gorbachev also sacrificed the longer range intermediate-range missiles of the SS-20 type, in his offers at least. He revised the policy of his predecessors who in accordance with the various Soviet proposals wanted to keep at least 120-160 SS-20S with 360-480 nuclear warheads facing Western Europe by 1983. That made it clear that Gorbachev would be in a position also to offer the other Soviet land-based shorter-range missiles in Europe for a bilateral renunciation of such weapons. Compared to the 270 "European" SS-20S, 120 missiles with ranges of between 1,000 and 500 km are a negligible quantity. To that effect, Gorbachev offered the removal of all "Operational-Tactical" missiles in Europe in the context of the Warsaw Pact's "Budapest appeal" in June 1986 for a conventional troop reduction.

Asked where Europe's security would be guaranteed in the scope of SALT, Gromyko said in Vienna in 1976: Where geography is offering it, in other words, side by side with the Soviet Union. In the chess game of missiles control, the Soviet Union has not only offered to sacrifice pawns, but also highly valuable figures in the form of SS-20 missiles which for Europe have the strategic qualities of castles and bishops. But the shorter range missiles that have now become the object of the "second zero solution" have from the start been nothing but pawns in the forefield of Central Europe.

However, even the SS-20 intermediate-range missiles with a range of roughly 5,000 km able to reach targets beyond the European continent, which were very important in Soviet strategy as long as they could not be replaced by other weapons, can today be replaced in all their functions by other, more modern missiles. That also holds true if the strategic capabilities (intercontinental missiles) are reduced by 50 percent, as planned.

In the foreseeable future the Soviet Union will have its variable range SS-24 intercontinental missile with 10 warheads to replace the SS-20 and the obsolete SS-4 missiles. Nine-hundred-and-twenty warheads on the old

intermediate-range missiles can be replaced by as many as only 92 SS-24S, and that in areas outside the European scope of the agreement. It is easy to deploy up to 100 SS-24S with 1,000 warheads, without violating the upper limits of 3,600 warheads on land-based intercontinental missiles and 1,600 strategic weapons systems -- as suggested by Gorbachev since 1986.

But the Soviet Union will presumably not reserve as many as 90-100 SS-24S with 900-1,000 warheads for options of attack in Europe only to replace its intermediate-range missiles that are to be reduced, because compared with the number of "primary targets" in Western Europe, their number is much too large anyway. Six hundred warheads would be enough to cover NATO's 200 most important military centers in Western Europe threefold. Thus, there are yet other target options.

This is an example of Soviet manifold options thanks to great quantity even after agreed arms limitation for certain weapons. In view of such exchange possibilities the exclusive dealing with intermediate-range missiles of a shorter range seems to be of limited interest -- aside from the found armament policy solution.

The policy pursued by the Federal Government on 1 June 1987, after the somewhat confusing public discussion, takes such realities into consideration. Without conditions and linkages between the various negotiations, the attempt is to be made to give Western arms control policy again a conceptional system and orientation toward success in strategic stability in the general frame of European security.

The stock of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe is not an intangible basis that must be absolutely preserved. Therefore, the idea of a "fire wall" regarding the 500 km range is useless as an expression of "sectoral" arms control. Particularly because weapons of that range in central Europe are mainly concentrated on German territory, and because their effect would hit Germany the more the shorter the range of the weapons is, negotiations must deal with short-range nuclear weapons in Europe when the prerequisites have been created. Priorities must be set in this respect. Nuclear potentials for battlefields in central Europe serve security as little as a greater number of nuclear weapons that can hit targets only in the GDR and western Czechoslovakia.

The preservation of NATO's reaction and escalation ability with nuclear weapons vis-a-vis the Soviet Union from Western Europe with other offensive means is strategically necessary. This European security demand results from the many nuclear options of the Soviet Union against western Europe. In addition there is the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority, the basis of its ability to invade western Europe. All that necessitates the availableness of nuclear reaction means even if the Soviet Union renounced its nuclear missiles in Europe and abolished them in a verifiable way.

In the European and national German interest NATO policy must not follow the inflexible alternative of reverting to nuclear battlefield weapons or massive nuclear weapons of the strategic forces. The weapons technology of the nineties offers for both weapons categories more flexible and accurate options than 10 or 15 years ago. But on the European battlefield nuclear weapons would be always used on the territory of the attacked countries, and strategic weapons always signal transition to global nuclear warfare. The question about the purpose of nuclear arms control can be answered only in connection with the strategic armed forces and the conventional armed forces if the answer is supposed to inform about crisis stability in East-West relations. The example of the Soviet SS-24 missile as a replacement for the SS-20 and older Soviet intercontinental missiles is an example of that lesson.

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CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET CHEMICAL FORCES COMMANDER ON VERIFICATION OF CW BAN

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 12, Jun 87 pp 3-5

[Article by Col Gen Vladimir Pikalov, USSR Ministry of Defense Chemical Forces commander: "The Soviet Union Favors Most of a Chemical Weapons Ban"]

[Text] At the talks on banning chemical weapons in the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference the Soviet delegation suggests that the contracting parties should make declarations about the presence of facilities for chemical weapons production 30 days after the convention's entry into force. They should specify the location of such enterprises, no matter whether they are state- or privately-owned. Every participating state should pledge to discontinue all chemical weapons production as soon as the convention becomes valid, and to close down the relevant facilities in three months. All this should be subject to rigid verification, including systematic international on-site inspections to verify the correctness of declarations, installation of seals, and the latter's periodical check-ups until the facilities start to be eliminated. To ensure the effectiveness of verification the USSR has proposed that international inspectors should attend all important operations on the destruction of facilities.

The USSR suggests similar procedures for the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. We want each participant in the convention to make a declaration specifying the sites at which chemical weapons are stored both on national territory and abroad, if they are under its jurisdiction or control, including the precise location of each depot. This declaration should be made during the 30 days after the convention's entry into force. Over the same period every participating state should take measures to close down depots and prevent any transfer of chemical weapons stocks, except for the purposes of their elimination.

The USSR has made proposals to verify the non-use of commercial (civilian) industry for the production of chemical weapons. They provide for the establishment of different regimes for monitoring the permitted production of highly toxic chemicals which are dangerous for health.

Thus, the Soviet position provides for a differentiated mechanism of international verification:

--permanent presence of inspectors at a single small-scale specialized facility for the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals and incapacitants whose action is similar to that of combat toxic agents, and of their key components for permitted purposes and in limited number,

--presence of inspectors at the facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons and at the facilities for the production of chemical weapons which are being destroyed throughout the active phase of the process of their destruction;

--systematic check-ups at chemical weapons depots barred from any operational use;

--systematic check-ups at facilities for the permitted production of super-toxic lethal chemicals whose action is not similar to that of combat toxic agents, and of key precursors in commercial industry;

--inspections by challenge at the enterprises which produce dual-purpose chemicals.

We believe that a package of Soviet-proposed verification measures does not leave any loopholes for circumventing the convention. As we see it, the U.S. proposals do not guarantee that, because in effect they lead to dual-standards in verification,

On the one hand, the United States insists on obligatory verification, without any right to reject it, of any military installation on foreign territory which is owned by a participating state or controlled by its government. On the other hand, the Americans suggest a formulation which allows a participating state to refuse inspection at any privately-owned chemical enterprises.

It is public knowledge that a program for binary rearmament which is being implemented in the U.S., relies on the plans to transfer the production of precursors for binary warheads into private hands.

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CSO: 5200/1586

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET ACADEMICIAN ON CD DISCUSSION OF BW CONVENTION

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 12, Jun 87 pp 5-8

[APN MILITARY BULLETIN interview with Academician Petr Burgasov, date and place not given: "It Is Necessary To Strengthen the Regime of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons"]

[Text] A conference of scientific and technical experts of the countries--parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was held in Geneva within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. Academician of the USSR Academy on Medical Sciences Pyotr Burgasov, a prominent Soviet epidemiologist who directed the elimination of the outbreak of anthrax in the city of Sverdlovsk in 1979, participated in the conference from the Soviet side. Pyotr Burgasov answers the questions put by Military Bulletin.

Military Bulletin: What caused the convocation, so unusual in international practice, of a special conference of experts?

Pyotr Burgasov: The conference was convened in keeping with the resolution of the second conference for considering the operation of the Convention with a view to mapping out political and technical confidence measures. The need in it was dictated by many factors, including the fears of some countries that the achievements of virological science, biotechnology and gene engineering could create conditions for circumventing the Convention provisions. The participants in the conference tackled the sole task of mapping out specific confidence measures which would make for the development of peaceful international cooperation in the sphere of biological science.

Military Bulletin: What confidence measures could be sufficient for effective observance of the Convention provisions?

Pyotr Burgasov: Above all, it is mutual information on all national laboratories which have a high level of protection and work with the pathogens of the infectious diseases having direct relation to the Convention. Second, it is provision of information on all unusual outbreaks of infectious diseases, for instance, such as the appearance of Marburg fever in Belgrade, the outbreak of Dengue fever in Cuba, and so on. Encouragement for extensive press

coverage of the works relating to pathogenes of diseases and wider exchange of scientists to carry out joint research could be a third confidence measure.

Military Bulletin: Why did the conference discuss confidence measures but not guarantees?

Pyotr Burgasov: Control must be the guarantee completely ruling out violation of the Convention. But the experts admitted that control now cannot be fully effective in revealing the work relating to bacteriological weapons because it is extremely difficult to distinguish development and production of such weapons from the production of protective preparations and vaccines. That is why at the current stage we are talking about the honesty and responsibility of the states—parties to the Convention, as well as of the scientists working in the respective fields of research.

Military Bulletin: All the states which have assumed obligations on observing the Convention should be interested in observance of it. Was such consensus demonstrated at the conference of experts?

Pyotr Burgasov: Regrettably, no. Many states, among them the USSR, proposed a wide exchange of information on the work of all research centres and laboratories irrespective of their departmental subordination which work with pathogenes and toxins that are dangerous to people's life and to the environment. By contrast, the USA tried to limit the exchange of information to the institutions of the Ministries of Defence which have a high degree of protection. This would have excluded all civilian centres and labs at which sizeable amounts of particularly dangerous microbes, viruses and toxins can be both developed and produced. The stand taken by the American delegation was not supported even by the U.S. allies. It was only at the final stage of the conference that a compromise formula was agreed upon. It provides for including into the exchange of information all laboratories having the maximal, P-4 degree of protection and a part of the laboratories with a smaller degree of protection, P-3, which specialize in research or development aimed at providing protection against possible hostile use of bacteriological agents or toxins or preventing such use. The names of such institutions, their location, their departmental subordination, the main fields of their work, and the sources of financing, including financing by a Ministry of Defence, will have to be indicated.

Military Bulletin: What is, in your view, the root cause of such a stand of the USA?

Pyotr Burgasov: One of the causes is the unwillingness to disclose the volume and number of the laboratories working with biologically dangerous materials. But I think that the most important is that such a formulation would have rid the U.S. administration of the need to provide information on the civilian laboratories, including those which are situated beyond U.S. territory, the work of which is financed by the Pentagon. Such practice exists in the USA, and this is proved specifically by the fact that several combat bacteriological recipes the work on which was made secret after 1975 have been phased into service in the U.S. Army after the Convention came into force and the U.S. Government made an official statement on the destruction of all stockpiles of bacteriological weapons.

USSR: U.S. BW EXPERIMENTS IN ARGENTINA ALLEGED

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 12, Jun 87 pp 8-9

[Article by Professor Petr Filippov: "American Bacteriological Experiments on the Territory of Argentina May Lead to New Non-Typical Diseases"]

[Text] The U.S. Army Institute of Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick, Maryland, has launched on Argentine territory massive experiments to test a live vaccine against Argentine hemorrhagic fever. The Argentine authorities have not been briefed on the vaccine-making technology and supply American army medics only with test volunteers.

The developers of the vaccine believe that the test subjects, apart from allergic diseases, may develop nausea, diarrhea, muscle pains and skin diseases typical of hemorrhagic fevers. The remote consequences of vaccination are not known. It is not precluded that the attenuated virus contained in the vaccine may transform itself in the most unpredictable way, giving rise to an ailment not like hemorrhagic fever. To deal with such a contingency the organisers of the experiment have no adequate means to help victims. The virus itself--which is responsible for hemorrhagic fever and which is present in the vaccine--has a mutagenic effect and can cause chromosome aberrations.

This is not the first case involving breaches of safety regulations by Americans working with bacteriological formulas in Argentina. Everyone remembers the notorious tests of a live vaccine against rabies obtained by genetic engineering. The tests were conducted by Americans at a veterinary station in the village of Azul, 180 miles south of Buenos Aires in 1986. The experiments were stopped amid scandal. A commission of Argentine scientists who visited the station found that the tests were carried out in breach of safety rules adopted both in Argentina and the U.S. itself. The American specialists failed to inform the authorities of their experiments, let alone to obtain permission. They violated local legislation which in 1903 banned the import of exotic pathogens into Argentina.

The 20 cows which the Americans had vaccinated were not isolated from the rest of the herd and milk from them was consumed by station personnel and their families without pasteurisation. All that posed a grave threat of the rabies virus spreading uncontrollably. It may be noted that in the U.S. outdoor experiments with viruses produced by genetic engineering methods are forbidden.

These two examples show that such an open disregard for the rules of handling dangerous pathogens outside the U.S. and violation of the laws of the host country obviously cannot be accidental. Participation in bacteriological experiments of military experts from Fort Detrick--the main U.S. centre developing biological weapons--must cause concern.

The fact that American bacteriologists are conducting such experiments outside the U.S. confirms the guess about the particularly dangerous nature of these experiments.

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CSO: 5200/1586

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET ALLEGATIONS ON U.S. 'ETHNIC' CBW AGENTS DEFENDED

PM181223 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 24, 14 Jun 87 p 6

[Interview with APN Chairman Valentin Falin by Yuriy Bandura: "Let's Be Businesslike"]

[Excerpt] The other day, the VOICE OF AMERICA reported that while on a visit to Moscow, Charlew Wick, director of USIA, was interviewed by Valentin Falin, chairman of the APN Board. According to OVA, Charles Wick found the APN chairman's statements offensive to the United States and consequently interrupted the meeting. "MN" correspondent Yuriy Bandura asked Valentin Falin to comment on the said report by the VOICE OF AMERICA.

Question: It is most unusual for the head of a major press agency like APN to act as an interviewer. How can you explain your wish to interview Charles Wick?

Answer: Naturally, I had no intention to interview Mr Wick, and I didn't. Director of USIA had expressed a desire to be received at APN, and his request was granted. The APN Board assumed that such a meeting would make it possible to discuss a wide range of issues in the interest of a more balanced and objective information exchange. It would be more correct to say that we hoped it would be so, because it was hard to predict the attitude of the person calling himself the "arsenal in the battle of ideas."

Question: Did you manage to discuss the issues APN was interested in discussing?

Answer: Unfortunately, we did not. Charles Wick opened the business part of our meeting with a tirade in which he alleged that APN was engaged in disinformation inimical to the United States. To justify that, he quoted a certain telegraph dispatch quoting (or rather summing up) a signed report circulated by APN about the CIA subversive activities against the developing countries.

Such a beginning did not augur well for our meeting. The director of USIA had apparently decided that, in his situation, attack was the best means of defence.

To leave USIA director's attacks unretaliated would mean to acknowledge, directly or indirectly, their truth. Therefore, although I was not at that moment familiar with the text quoted by Mr Wick I deemed it necessary to state my

attitude to the facts as such, without reference to the report in question. These facts are sufficiently well known from foreign, and specifically American, publications. For instance, the existence on the U.S. territory of state-owned and private training camps and schools for terrorists employed against other countries was reported by the ASSOCIATED PRESS in mid-July 1985; by the Japanese state-owned NHK TV network (in late September 1985), and THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (the issue of February 12, 1987).

American instructors in Pakistan have been training mercenaries of various national extraction to be sent to neighboring Afghanistan. Information about that, including samples of chemical weapons manufactured in U.S. labs and smuggled to the People's Republic of Afghanistan along with bandits trained by U.S. "experts", has been repeatedly brought to light by the Afghan authorities. How can one deny such facts?

It is no secret that the United States has been working on various "exotic" weapons, including the so-called ethnic ones. These are biological and chemical agents with selective action against people of different races, populating the same areas yet having different genetic susceptibility or vulnerability to these agents. Such facts are widely known, too. Take the report, circulated back in 1974, by Dr Hammerschlag, an expert of the National Medical Center in Duarte, California, which he delivered at the symposium held in Los Angeles by the American Chemical Society, and the materials published in the journal, ABSTRACTS ON HYGIENE (No. 55, 1980).

As for misinformation, it is the weapon regularly used by the American side, and specifically, by its government agencies. Not to mention the present administration, let me recall the shameful lies Washington told about the Japanese Squad No. 731. Those monsters had been preparing for bacteriological warfare and conducting criminal experiments on people, including U.S. prisoners of war. Yet they found shelter in the United States in exchange for the information they agreed to hand over. At the government level, it was publicly declared that reports about Japan's bacteriological warfare research were "communist propaganda".

I also stressed that ANP has been taking pains to avoid publishing unverified information. Yet we believe it is right to make use of serious press reports, the opinions of scientists and experts, even if they don't fit in with the established patterns. When a signed report is circulated through APN, it is primarily the author who bears responsibility for the accuracy of reported facts. Authenticity has always been and is the general principle of all APN activities.

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CSO: 5200/1592

MOSCOW PAPER CITES BRITISH SOURCE ON CW EXPERIMENTS

Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Jul 87 p 4

[Article by TASS correspondent Yu. Levchenko: "The Secret of Porton Down"]

[Text] The British Ministry of Defense is carrying out experiments on people aimed at studying the effect of chemical weapons on the human organism. The newspaper MAIL ON SUNDAY came out with this disclosure.

According to its evidence, the experiments are carried out at the military base in Porton Down. "Volunteers" from all categories of forces are subjected to the effect of combat poisonous substances with nerve-paralytic action, such as sarin [a nerve gas] and soman. Under the pressure of evidence, the British Ministry of Defense was forced to acknowledge that such experiments are being carried out. However, justifying the inhuman experiments as necessary for developing antidotes for combat poisonous substances, a spokesman for the ministry claimed that the doses of gas were "insignificant" and supposedly did not represent a danger to health. Citing reasons of national security, he refused to say how many people were subjected to these inhuman experiments and how long they are continuing.

In an editorial the newspaper described as "shocking" the British government's position, which "permits the use of soldiers as experimental rabbits" in violation of all norms of international practice and law. The article demanded the immediate cessation of the experiments.

The news evoked sharp criticism in scientific circles of the country. Professor Steven Rose, a specialist in the area of chemical weapons, stated that even small concentrations of poisonous substances can cause irreparable harm to man's central nervous system. Alistair [Hay], a member of the department of chemical pathology at Leeds University, said that he could not imagine that such experiments on people had been carried out in Great Britain.

CSO: 5200/1598

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET CSCE DELEGATE CRITICIZES NATO SECURITY DOCUMENT

PM171425 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "All-European Meeting in Vienna"]

[Text] Vienna, 15 Jul — At a plenary session of the all-European meeting currently being held in the Austrian capital the Warsaw Pact delegations evaluated the NATO countries' proposal on military aspects of security in Europe.

While making the point that the very fact of the document's appearance, albeit very belated, could be regarded positively, Ambassador Yu. B. Kashlev, the head of the USSR delegation, stressed that it contains no adequate response to the complex of proposals previously submitted by the socialist countries.

The NATO document has a whole series of vital shortcomings. It primarily reveals a desire to remove disarmament issues from the agenda of the next stage in the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and debar neutral and nonaligned countries from participating on an equitable basis in the process of discussing and resolving European disarmament problems from the Atlantic to the Urals. The document clearly reveals attempts to avoid any real reduction in armed forces and arms in Europe and exclude discussion of tactical nuclear arms at future negotiations.

The heads of the Hungarian, GDR, and CSSR delegations also said that the NATO countries must show their willingness in deeds rather than words to promote the development of mutually acceptable accords that would make it possible to conclude the Vienna meeting with the adoption of a meaningful, balanced final document.

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CSO: 5200/1591

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS REPORTS CD DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

PM201731 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jul 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Impediment to Progress"]

[Text] Geneva, 16 Jul — The conference on disarmament is continuing its work here. The plenary session Tuesday [14 July] was addressed by SRV Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Di Nien. He highlighted the problem of curbing the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament as paramount, noting in this respect the danger inherent in U.S. attempts to gain military superiority and take the arms race out into space. He pointed out that in the nuclear age it is impermissible to build one's security on the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence." [paragraph continues]

A truly safe world, according to the speaker, is a world free of nuclear weapons and other types of mass destruction weapons. In this connection the Vietnamese vice foreign minister underlined the enormous significance of the program to completely eliminate nuclear weapons and other types of mass destruction weapons proposed by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986. The Vietnamese representative also drew the attention of states participating in the conference to the need to supplement bilateral with multilateral talks and make fuller use of the disarmament conference's potential.

Speaking at the same session, D. Mellor, British minister of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, basically repeated the now traditional range of "arguments" on the need to preserve nuclear weapons, the importance of the "nuclear deterrence" concept for strengthening security, and the "superiority" of the Warsaw Pact in terms of conventional weapons. The British representative tried to shift the responsibility for the lack of progress at the talks from the West to the Soviet Union.

Yu.K. Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation, pointed to the total futility of these attempts. The reason for the lack of progress at the talks, he noted, is the NATO states' reluctance to respond constructively to the socialist states' initiatives. For example, the Warsaw Pact states have proposed to the NATO states that consultations be held to compare the two alliances' military doctrines, in the course of which the present imbalances and asymmetries in certain types of arms and armed forces could also be discussed with a view to [putem] eliminating them on the basis of reductions on the side that is found to be ahead, on the understanding that these reductions will lead to the establishment of ever lower levels. There has as yet been no agreement from NATO, however, to hold these consultations. And as far as the "nuclear deterrence" concept is concerned, it is intended to validate the arms race and increase the risk of a nuclear catastrophe.

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CSO: 5200/1591

TASS CITES POLISH CALL FOR CENTRAL EUROPE ARMS CUTS

Government Memorandum

LD201821 Moscow TASS in English 1614 GMT 20 Jul 87

[Text] Warsaw July 20 TASS — The Government of the Polish People's Republic again expresses the desire to make a specific contribution to efforts for disarmament and strengthening of international security, especially in central Europe, says a memorandum by the Polish Government on reducing armaments and strengthening confidence in central Europe, which was circulated by the PAP agency today.

The Polish Government is convinced, the document says, that at present there are conditions to lessen the danger of an armed conflict in Europe, especially to prevent a possibility of a surprise attack.

The plan of reducing armaments and strengthening confidence in central Europe, presented by the Polish Government, embraces the territories of Belgium, Hungary, the GDR, the FRG, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and Poland, including their territorial waters and airspace.

The plan provides for the gradual pull-out and reduction of the jointly agreed upon types of nuclear weapons, specifically theatre missiles, nuclear artillery, nuclear capable planes;

The gradual pull-out and reduction of the jointly agreed upon types of conventional armaments, primarily the most accurate and destructive intended for conducting offensive operations, including surprise attack;

Joint actions aimed at changing the character of military doctrines for them to be mutually recognised as exclusively defensive;

Coordination of far-reaching confidence and security-building measures and also mechanisms of strict verification of compliance with the obligations undertaken, including those which for different reasons it would be difficult to apply all over Europe.

A system for verification of the fulfillment of obligations could be established to ensure the fulfillment of concerted measures. It would be comprising the means of national and international control, mutually recognized to be effective, including on-site observation and inspections. Organs of control with the participation of the states concerned and third countries could be instituted.

The memorandum points to the opportunity of expanding with the passage of time the territory specified in the plan through other European states, including neutral and nonaligned, joining in the plan. It is emphasized that the concerted measures should be based on equal rights and equal security of all the parties.

News Conference Reported

LD202025 Moscow TASS in English 2010 GMT 20 Jul 87

[Text] Warsaw July 20 TASS -- The Polish Government's memorandum on the question of arms reduction and confidence-building in central Europe expresses Poland's national interests which coincide with the interests of European countries and the whole world, a spokesman for the Polish Foreign Ministry said today.

Poland's peaceful initiative is aimed at promoting arms reduction in the area of delimitation of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries on the basis of partial actions in the sphere of disarmament, he said at a press conference here.

The Polish Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasized an open nature of the memorandum and said that it is only by joint actions, step-by-step, with taking into account the security of all sides that European security can be created. In drawing up the proposals the Polish side took the opinion of partners into account. Everything that is of substantial importance for joint security was agreed upon in consultations with socialist states. The opinions expressed in the West were also taken into account.

After bilateral talks and consultations the authors of the document intend to submit it for discussion of a future European peace conference, the Polish Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

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CSO: 5200/1591

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK EXERCISES--Moscow, 21 Jul (TASS)--The joint military exercises of the Central Group and the Czechoslovak People's Army ended in Czechoslovakia today. Control and cooperation between various arms were trained. According to the exercises' command, the results were instructive and showed the troops' increased field training standards. The task set to the exercises were fulfilled and the troops are now returning to the places of their permanent stationing. In conformity with the document of the Stockholm conference the exercises were attended by observers of the states-participants in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1608 GMT 21 Jul 87 LD] /9738

PACT-NATO CONSULTATIONS 20 JULY--Vienna, 20 Jul (TASS)--A regular meeting was held here today within the framework of consultations between representatives of Warsaw Treaty and NATO member countries on problems connected with the working out of a mandate of forthcoming talks on reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0914 GMT 20 Jul 87 LD] /9738

SOVIET-GDR EXERCISES--Moscow, 17 Jul (TASS)--The group of Soviet troops in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the National People's Army of the GDR will conduct, under an agreement with the GDR Government, a joint troop exercise in the territory of the German Democratic Republic in the area of Gardelegen, Magdeburg, Templin, Neustrelitz and Wietstock on July 26-31. The purpose of the exercise is to upgrade the troops' field training standards. Large and small units of land and air forces are also drawn in the exercise. The total strength of the troops involved in the exercise is some 25,000. Under the document of the Stockholm conference, the GDR Government invited observers from all the participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to the exercise. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1604 GMT 17 Jul 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1591

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: U.S. 'WARNING SALVO' AGAINST ASEAN OVER NFZ

LD152111 Moscow TASS in English 1901 GMT 15 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow, 15 Jun (TASS)--By TASS political analyst Askold Biryukov:

Hardly had a conference of foreign affairs ministers from the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) opened in Singapore when a "warning salvo" was fired from Washington at the participants in the event.

Through a number of ranking American officials the U.S. Administration warned the ASEAN countries against considering a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in South-East Asia.

Richard Childress, director for Asian affairs of the U.S. National Security Council, said that the United States "would not want ASEAN to come up with a strong statement" on that matter.

Charles Schmitz, regional affairs director of the U.S. Department of State, said the U.S. did not agree with "the perception that banning nuclear weapons in the region would contribute to world security."

Karl Jackson, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense, suggested that ASEAN should instead concentrate on the "Kampuchean problem" and trade issues.

So, what is behind that massive attack launched by Washington on "its partners in the dialogue?"

Richard Childress, for instance, explained that a "strong statement" concerning the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone would put U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz--he is to arrive in Singapore in a few days' time--in "a difficult position" because the United States was conducting complicated enough negotiations with the Philippines on the agreement concerning its military bases in that country.

He said further that the time for such a zone in South-East Asia was not "ripe."

However, it is safe to assume, considering the current U.S. nuclear strategy in the Asian and Pacific region, that the time would not become "ripe" for such a zone in any foreseeable length of time. Starting from 1980 the United States deployed thousands of units of nuclear weapons there and now Washington continues building up their arsenals.

Two years ago 15 nuclear-powered submarines assigned to that region were fitted out with nuclear-tipped Tomahawk missiles.

The battleship New Jersey and the cruiser Long Beach, aircraft carriers and destroyers, plying the Pacific and Indian Oceans, are fitted out with missiles of the same type.

By the early 1990s more than 140 U.S. ships and submarines would receive 2,500 launchers and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.

At the same time the United States is using ever more widely the territory of other states in line with its strategic nuclear interests. It does not take much to notice that if something is really "ripening" as far as South-East Asia and the entire Asian and Pacific region are concerned, it is a threat posed by a dangerous concentration of U.S. nuclear weapons there.

The countries of the South Pacific which signed the well-known Rarotonga Treaty have in fact understood that.

The South-East Asian countries are also striving for nuclear weapon-free zone. Salvador Laurel, secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, said that a proposal for the establishment of such a zone was part of the 1971 ASEAN declaration which called for a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality" in that region.

"We are bound not only by our commitment to the 1971 declaration but also our constitution", Salvador Laurel pointed out. The new Philippine constitution contains a provision that it is a state policy to pursue freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

Speaking on the same subject, Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja, minister of foreign affairs of Indonesia, said it was not accidental that the ASEAN countries supported the turning of the South Pacific into a nuclear weapon-free zone, as it would make it possible to build a nuclear-free bridge to South Asia and other regions of the world.

This, however, is precisely what Washington is unhappy about. It is unwilling to give up the possibility to thrust its will on other nations. So, it alleges that South-East Asia is not "ripe" for a nuclear weapon-free zone.

Furthermore, Washington is trying to retain its military bases in other countries. Speaking in Manila, the visiting U.S. secretary of state said that he wanted the presence of the U.S. Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base to continue in the Philippines.

Isn't it the reason why one of his assistants mentioned above advised ASEAN not to be lured by "public pronouncements of support for the sea-[word indistinct] made by the Soviet Union?"

The Soviet Union does respect the wish and supports the campaign of nations for a nuclear weapon-free world. Moreover, it is taking practical steps to contribute to that noble cause. The Soviet Union's expression of support for the Rarotonga Treaty is just one proof of that.

In the end it is appropriate to ask: What does Washington have to offer the nations of the Asian and Pacific region in this respect?

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CSO: 5200/1595

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW INDONESIAN BEAM ON SE ASIA NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

BK041159 Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia 1300 GMT 3 Jul 87

[Commentary by (Sergey Borisov): "Supporters and opponents of nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia"]

[Text] At a press conference in Jakarta a few days ago, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja gave a detailed account of the proposed establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia. At the time, Mokhtar criticized U.S. Secretary of State Shultz' statement in Manila expressing U.S. opposition to the ASEAN-sponsored proposal.

The establishment of such a nuclear-free zone is purely the affair of the countries in the region and the Indonesian foreign minister stressed that such a proposal is aimed at preventing the presence of a nuclear weapons stockpile.

Washington's dissatisfaction over the proposal is easy to understand. No matter what happens, the U.S. Government is reluctant to remove from the Philippines its nuclear-laden military bases. The United States has also made efforts to regain its military presence in Thailand. This can be seen from the agreement to establish a U.S. military stockpile on Thai soil, which was signed last January. The agreement was confirmed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger during his recent visit to Bangkok.

Having carefully analyzed the U.S. Government's stance on the matter, Dr Sujati Jiwandono, director of Indonesia's Center for Strategic and International Studies, came to the following conclusion: The United States' stand is the main obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia. The United States has flatly rejected the establishment of such zone in the Asia-Pacific region because the strategic mobility of its armed forces in the region connecting the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf would be restricted.

According to the Jakarta daily ANGKATAN BERSENJATA, Washington is busily applying massive pressure on ASEAN countries by trying to force them to forget the concept leading to a nuclear-free world. However, Washington's pressure has produced no results. In a joint communique at the end of the recent

meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Singapore, the ministers reiterated their determination to continue efforts to establish a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia. The Indonesian foreign minister disclosed that the issue may be included in the agenda for discussion at the ASEAN summit meeting in Manila at the end of this year.

Observers believe that what has prompted ASEAN to push such a proposal is the signing of the South Pacific nuclear-free zone treaty at Raratonga. In that region, the deployment, production, and testing of nuclear weapons is permanently banned. The disposal of radioactive waste into the sea is also banned. Highly appreciating the significance of the Raratonga treaty, the Soviet Union signed two protocols of the treaty and at the same time called on countries with nuclear weapons to guarantee the validity of the South Pacific nuclear-free zone. One of the protocols includes the commitment not to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten to use them against the signatories of the treaty. The other protocol concerns with the commitment not to test any nuclear device in the said zone. As such, the Soviet Union has confirmed its support for the proposal to establish nuclear-free zone, which is in line with Mikhail Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region.

In his proposal to include the Asia-Pacific region into the international peace and security program, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed the importance of establishing nuclear-free zones in the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Korean Peninsula. The Soviet Union's constructive initiative--and concrete moves have gained understanding and support from Asia-Pacific countries. For example, speaking to newsmen last April, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja noted that he had detected a new trend toward the realization of peace in Mikhail Gorbachev's initiative. "I think we must help him in this endeavor," Mokhtar said.

It is proper to say here that the ASEAN concept to establish a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia is supported by Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. These countries will in turn put forward a proposal aimed at creating an atmosphere of good neighborly relations and turn it into a zone of peace, stability, and cooperation. Against the background of current complicated international situation caused by the aggressive nature of the U.S. Government, it is clearly not easy to establish a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia. However, the convergence of views between socialist nations and Southeast Asian countries toward this issue sparks hope that the existing positive process can be further developed for the interests and security of the nations concerned.

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CSO: 5200/1595

AUSTRALIAN PAPER URGES AGAINST PRESSURING NEW ZEALAND

Melbourne THE AGE in English 9 Jul 87 p 13

[Editorial: "Keep 'alm About New Zealand"]

[Text]

IT is a matter of surprise and relief that the election campaign has demonstrated little difference between the parties on big foreign policy and defence issues. Things are likely to remain much the same after Saturday, whoever wins. There are exceptions to this unusual degree of bipartisanship. The question of what Australia ought to do about South Africa is one of them. Anzus, it now appears, is another. Both the Government and the coalition parties are agreed on the central importance of Australia's defence arrangements with the United States, which is as it should be. New Zealand's decision to place itself beyond the pale by refusing to accept American naval vessels unless Wellington is satisfied that they are not carrying nuclear weapons has, if anything, strengthened ties between Australia and the US. Anzus is a highly effective treaty for Australia and will remain so. Where the Government and the coalition parties differ, however, is on the attitude that Australia should take towards a post-Anzus New Zealand.

The two societies have much in common, even without a mutual defence treaty. Should the lack of such a formal understanding impinge on other aspects of the trans-Tasman relationship? Australia's National Party certainly thinks so if the remarks made earlier this week by its leader, Mr Sinclair, are anything to go by. Mr Sinclair said that Australia's special trade agreement with New Zealand should end if Wellington did not rejoin Anzus. The Liberal spokesman on these matters, Mr Brown, agrees. Even the Opposition Leader, Mr Howard, says that he understands why Mr Sinclair should say such a thing. In wanting to bring direct pressure to bear on New Zealand, they ignore the fact that New Zealand is a sovereign nation with the unquestionable right to decide its own affairs. It is entitled to make its own decisions about defence whether we like it or not.

Australia is understandably concerned about New Zealand's attitude towards Anzus and looks forward to the day when a future government in Wellington asks for readmittance. In the meanwhile, Canberra is obliged to tailor its defence cooperation accordingly. But for the Opposition to suggest that New Zealand should be bullied back into Anzus through the application of economic pressure is a foolish and ultimately self-defeating proposition. Even New Zealand's National Party is indicating that the ban on nuclear visits may remain if it

gains office in next month's general election. Any Australian pressure on Wellington would surely increase the desire of New Zealanders to assert their sovereign independence. The Closer Economic Relationship has proved to be a little painful to Australia in some respects. In the main, however, certainly over the long term, the CER is in Australia's best interests. Apart from anything else, New Zealand is an important customer for Australia's embattled manufacturing industry. The only responsible policy for an Australian Government to follow is one of patiently and persistently trying to show New Zealand the error of its beliefs on security in an increasingly dangerous part of the world. We will not achieve that through threats or confrontation.

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CSO: 5200/4316

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

U.S.-SOVIET TALKS RECESS--Geneva, 20 Jul (TASS)--The latest round of Soviet-American talks of experts on questions of terminating nuclear weapon tests ended here today. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT 20 Jul 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1595

'POLEMIC' CRITIQUES SOVIET ATTITUDES, PROPAGANDA ON ARMS

Moscow CENTURY AND PEACE in English No 5, May 87 pp 29-33

["A Letter to the Editor" by Aleksey Pankin under the rubric "Polemic":
"New Thinking, Openness and Soviet Peace Movement"]

[Text]

During Gorbachev's visit last year to the Volga area, a remarkable episode was shown on TV: at a meeting with workers Mikhail Gorbachev told them about the Soviet approach to international affairs, about the Soviet conception of security and the importance the USSR attaches to strengthening its defence. One of the workers present said: "That's right. Let them be afraid of us!" Mikhail Gorbachev replied that we will not forego our security, but at the same time we do not want to frighten anyone, we do not even want anyone to be afraid of us.

I was not surprised by the way Mikhail Gorbachev presented the security problem to his listeners. During my lectures on the international situation or during talks with friends I noticed more than once that public concern about the world affairs is constantly growing. Under openness, Soviet people are becoming more aware of the bitter and cruel truth about the Great Patriotic War. Lately we have witnessed a good deal of information about the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war.

Paradoxically, all this new and rather antiwar information in combination with mass media news about the aggressive actions and intentions of the Reagan administration, NATO bloc and growth in international tension create the notion in a considerable part of our public that we are living, so to speak, in a "prewar world". Many people seriously expect a surprise attack and are afraid of a repetition of 1941, and react accordingly. I, for

example, was frequently asked whether our defence efforts were sufficient if we spent 20 billion roubles, and the Americans—about 300 billion dollars? A great deal of anxiety was evoked by the prolonged unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. The Soviet proposals at disarmament talks are sometimes taken as a concession to the West. In other words, more often than not you can meet people who think "let them be afraid of us", i. e., strictly speaking, they approach "peace from the position of strength".

This way of thinking in our society is quite explainable and even natural. In the long run, we (even those who were born after the war) well remember how we were attacked and how we were unprepared... But we must understand that such notions came from the prenuclear era and are in contradiction with the new political thinking. In no way do they help remove the fear of the "Soviet military threat" in the West—the main reason why a considerable part of the people in the West still vote for an arms buildup.

In addition, this so-called syndrome of mistrust among the USSR population greatly restricts the freedom of the Soviet government's foreign policy manoeuvre. For example, it is difficult to say whether the Soviet public will support today, especially after the US refusal to join the moratorium on nuclear tests, new unilateral measures such as the reduction of Soviet nuclear arsenals or even their freezing for a certain period. Such steps,

to my mind, would favour strengthening our security since they would be the signs of the confidence in our own power and would mean a final break with the defective logic of the arms race, to say nothing of the fact that they would bring confusion in the ranks of militarists exploiting the "Soviet threat" and help strengthen the positions of the Western sober-minded forces.

What should be done with such moods? Maybe the Soviet peace movement wants less openness in order not to frighten people and even to embellish the world situation? Of course not! The answer lies not in less, but in more openness. And I want to think about this as an ordinary peace movement member and as a specialist in world affairs.

If the Soviet peace movement wants to form public opinion in the spirit of a new political thinking, the first thing it should recognize is that views in the country on the problems of war and peace are very complicated, contradictory and dissimilar. Their systematic study employing sociologists must be the primary task. Only by understanding the reason of real fears and hopes of Soviet people, their attitude to Soviet foreign policy and determination of the level of knowledge and comprehension of international problems will it be possible to cultivate a new political thinking purposefully and not at random, to provide the results sought, not those which are counterproductive. Such information is also useful for foreign policy propaganda—the West should finally understand that public opinion does exist in the Soviet Union, too, and that the peaceful initiatives of the Soviet leadership are quite a job for it.

Of course, the degree of understanding or incomprehension of nuclear-age realities by the population can be revealed only by concrete researches, but even indirect signs can show that "nuclear illiteracy" in the country has not yet been overcome. Let's remember the documentary "Parity" shown just before the Gorbachev-Reagan summit in Geneva. Most of the people polled by the authors of the film could not say what military-strategic parity is. Note how "people from street" speak keenly and interestingly on the TV

programme "Vremya" (Time) about home affairs and how dull they are about, for example, the moratorium.

But parity, as well as the moratorium, are the key notions of the nuclear age and present historical situation. These words are used dozens of times over radio, on TV, in newspapers and magazines every day. I noticed that speeches by Soviet analysts in international affairs addressed to a mass audience about a new thinking, security concept, parity and even denials of some Western fabrications are very often carried out in a general way. That means that it is directed at an audience that does not possess proper knowledge, and this is quite natural, of problems and concrete realities used for generalizations, is frequently conducted in the manner which the audience does not understand. And this happens not because our analysts in international affairs are bad (on the contrary, I think that almost all of them are more qualified and have a broader outlook than their counterparts, say, in the USA) but for other reasons. Let me tell you about my experience. When I am asked during my lectures on the international situation about military parity, it is always difficult for me to find a proper answer. There is not much official data about the Soviet Armed Forces (though, the volume of the published military statistics has increased during the last 5-7 years). Of course, there are Western evaluations, but, first, are they correct, and, second, have I the right to reveal them to a broad audience? (In general, sometimes the matter in this sphere runs into absurdity: We better know Soviet missiles by names given to them by the West). As for me, I as a rule answer cautiously and in a general way.

I think there is another reason of our tendency for general, and that means not very convincing, talks. The matter is that when we begin to ground the correct principles of a new thinking, we discover that maybe our country's leadership did not always proceed from them. But it is not yet a custom to recognize our mistakes. In 1983 the USSR left the negotiations on the reduction of medium-range missiles in Europe and began the deployment of an additional number of SS-20 missiles in

response to the appearance of American cruise and Pershing-2 missiles in Western Europe. Some time later we renewed the negotiations and dismantled the additional number of missiles. One question suggests itself: does this mean that retaliatory measures proved to be unnecessary? Now the USSR has agreed not to take into account for a relatively long period of time the nuclear weapons of Great Britain and France and conducts talks on removing American and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe, i. e., in fact, on returning to the situation existing in the middle 70s, before beginning the deployment of SS-20 missiles. But were these missiles so necessary at that time? Whatever the answers, it is illogical not to pose such questions.

I think greater openness in discussing Soviet defence and foreign policy will make a new thinking more convincing and understandable to the broad public, and our home discussion will become more mature. In addition, Western analysts, whose task is to guess about Soviet military capabilities and who use this widely for anti-Soviet aims, may lose their jobs.

Mass media play a great role in cultivating peaceful notions in the Soviet public. We see now the beginning of the process of the revaluation of some methods in the work of international journalism in the USSR and the appearance of criticism of covering foreign events. Most often we hear reproaches in thematic monotony of materials. That is true, but I believe that excessive attention to the homeless and hungry in Western countries is not the chief drawback of our journalists. In the long run, we have in this case only an exaggerated attention to existing problems. A worse thing is that we often receive rather inaccurate covering of important international events in the press.

Some time ago I listened to the commentary on the Korean war of 1950-1953 in the "Chronicles of the Crimes of Imperialism" on the radio programme "Mayak" (Beacon). All the time the commentator spoke about "American aggression" against KPDR and did not say a word about the fact that the invasion was per-

formed under the UN flag and military units (though symbolic) of England, France, Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Canada, Ethiopia, Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Luxemburg and South Africa took part in it. Why did he ignore these facts essential for understanding the situation? Was he lazy to consult the textbook of history? Or did he consider that their mentioning would justify the crimes of imperialism? In that case it would be more honest to speak his doubts. It was said so many times that history must not be corrected by discarding the real facts. Just imagine the perplexity of a Soviet person, who after this commentary will hear, for example, over "Voice of America" that the Korean aggression was a "UN international mission".

Or take the burning events of today. I cannot understand, reading the Soviet press, although I want to very much, the role of Libya in Chadian affairs. . . .

TASS interpretations of many important foreign policy statements of Western leaders sometimes resemble the vast polemic commentaries to difficult-to-read texts from which only few lines were left. From year to year we read about the "US uncontrollable increase in military expenditure" and about the excessive swelling of its military budget although it reduces it in real terms during several years. Is it not worth mentioning to the broad public that the considerable part of the American military budget is used for salaries of servicemen, pensions for the retired and veterans? The knowledge of this fact makes it possible to look somewhat calmly at the gigantic figures of US military spending.

Another example: the press writes widely about the growing aggressiveness of American imperialism and analyzes militaristic statements of President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger. At the same time, it practically does not say anything about the fact that the greater part of energy of the present administration, according to my observations, is spent for "whistling" and that it is more decisive in words than in deeds. Much talk about striving "to put socialism into a dustbin of history" ended in its small-

scale and cowardly actions, if compare them with the general scope of preparations, like the occupation of Grenada or the bombing of Libya.

I, naturally, do not call people to portray the Reagan administration as a peaceful one, in fact it is really the most extremist American government of recent decades and, apparently, for many years ahead. But the reduction of military budget, its structure and heavily restricted capabilities are also facts. Well, an interesting thing is that nobody restricts their coverage. Soviet scientific journals write about them and they are analyzed in Soviet books. But the fact that their way onto the pages of the mass press is quite difficult is the result, to my mind, of some instinctive inner orientations of many journalists dealing with international affairs which impel them to edit the real picture and display the inertia accumulated in past years from which they free themselves with more difficulty than journalists writing about home affairs.

I believe that the Soviet peace movement is vitally interested in supplying people with varied international information based on a true complex of facts. This will greatly help remove the inner tension from the conscience of many people, unfounded fears and establish the true scope of real threat. To improve the positive processes in international journalism, the peace movement could act as an organizer of a programme for a regular critical analysis of covering world events in our mass media.

Another sphere which the Soviet peace movement can and must use more effectively the spirit of openness.

One of the dangers of the aggravation of international tension and increase of confrontation between capitalism and socialism is that the moods of "cold war" fanned by imperialists in Western societies can to some degree poison us and draw us into the race in this direction.

There are already examples of this. Some of our film makers have responded to the films in the "Rambo" and "Red Dawn" ilk with "Single Cruise". Today it has become popular and even fashionable to criticize this film which depicts quite far-fetched and unreal situation when Soviet people kill Americans rather naturally and in great number (by the way, I personally do not know such examples in history). But where were we when the film was just released on the screen? Did we protest and call on the public to boycott it?

The duty of Soviet peace activists is to display vigilance so that no one in the Soviet Union should stoop to such polemic and waste our moral capital gained lately.

To sum up, I should like to say that a new thinking presupposes the existence of the old one. Old thinking, like all phenomena in the sphere of social consciousness, has a strong inertia. It should not be taken for granted that the truly revolutionary views of our political leadership on the problems of security, war and peace, and on global problems will be understood and accepted by the masses immediately. Soviet people are disposed to a new thinking. Nevertheless, its dissemination and propaganda is not an easy matter. It requires the revaluation of many values, revision of habitual notions, in other words, there is a need for reconstruction. This process has already begun, it is gaining momentum and Soviet peace activists' moral and political duty is to make their own contribution to it and make it irreversible.

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SOVIET, WEST GERMAN DISCUSS 'NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENSE'

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 23, 14-21 Jun 87 p 7

[Text]

What is implied by the Soviet concept of reasonable sufficiency of military potential? What is meant by the concept of "non-offensive defence" put forward by a number of opposition Social-Democratic parties of Western Europe? What is the relationship between these two ideas?

These questions were central to the discussion on problems of strengthening international security held in Moscow attended by Soviet scientists and public figures and representatives from a number of European countries and the USA.

Some key questions of the discussion are reflected in the dialogue below between two participants in the meeting: Andreas von BÜLOW, member of the West German Bundestag, Chairman of the SDPG Commission on Defence, and Lev SEMEIKO, Vice-Chairman of the Commission on Disarmament at the Soviet Peace Committee.

A.B.: I believe that Europe cannot be considered safe today either politically or militarily. Of course, Europe is not on the brink of war. But neither is there a guarantee that the huge military potential stockpiled on the continent will never be used. Fewer and fewer people today think that nuclear deterrence can play the part of a "safety guard". But reliance on the offensive potentials of conventional weapons is also risky inasmuch as it generates mutual mistrust and the arms race, and consequently increases the risk of war. There is a need to look for new ideas in security.

L.S.: There is an urgent need for this search because the situation is threatening to become uncontrollable. The need to restructure the military mentality predicated on the restructuring of political mentality has been grasped by far from everyone like the fact that it is now possible to ensure security primarily by political means. As to military-technical measures, they must not only cease to dominate, but also undergo such changes under which the arms race would simply become an anachronism.

A.B.: An understanding of this is being gradually achieved in the West as well, although estimates of this kind have not yet become the dominant ones. But the search for new ideas is underway. Just look at the advancement in the

West of the "non-offensive defence" concept (also known as "defensive defence", "unprovocative defence", "alternative defence"). This concept boils down to the establishment of purely defensive structures of conventional armed forces and armaments - smaller in numerical strength, without preplanned offensive tank and aviation groupings, and also without patently offensive armaments (the defensive ones can be improved). There is also a need to achieve a troop dislocation which would rule out not only a surprise attack but also - considering other limitations - the holding of in-depth offensive operations. We consider it important to compare this concept with the Soviet approach, to find out what they have in common and how they differ, and on this basis to try and determine the ways of carrying this idea to fruition. Even if this may be done so far on the level of public opinion.

L.S.: "Non-offensive defence" is an unofficial concept. We in the USSR also believe that this is a search in the reasonable direction. Its realization would in many respects change the politico-military situation in Europe, and in the rest of the world at that, for the better because it would afford a practical instead of verbal proof of the defensive nature of the NATO alliance.

The Soviet Union has made its choice in favour of the need to go over to a nuclear-free world with reliance on the reasonable sufficiency of conventional military potentials.

Other variants cannot dependably ensure strategic stability. It cannot be secured either by increasing the offensive potentials of nuclear and other armaments or even if the conventional armed forces and armaments are subjected to a restructuring in the defensive direction, but the nuclear potential has been preserved or even inflated. Real stability on the military plane is only possible under the extremely low levels of non-nuclear military confrontation when the sides do not threaten each other with mutual attack.

Special stress must be put on the non-nuclear structure of security because many of those in the West who accept the need for radical changes in the military doctrine are still reluctant to part with nuclear weapons altogether. Let there be "just a little" of them, they say. But is it possible for a woman to be "just a little" pregnant?

A.S.: We favour a repatterning of military strategy and the very structures of armed forces in a truly defensive direction. We favour mutually assured security. This cannot be achieved without cooperation based on mutual understanding.

L.S.: As things stand now, mutual suspicion reigns supreme. We see signs of aggressiveness in the policy pursued by the USA and NATO. We are accused of the same....

A.S.: There are no grounds for assuming that the Western alliance is aggressive. But in the West there are apprehensions that the Warsaw Treaty Organization surpasses NATO in some armaments.

L.S.: Both sides have "surpluses" - quantitative advantages in particular kinds of armaments. One gets weary from discussing them. "Surpluses" must be cut off.

But this is not enough. There is a need to radically lower the level of military confrontation, with each of the sides possessing only the minimum of defensive forces. In this case it would be irrelevant what comes first - the chicken or the egg: that is, a reduction of the armed forces or a major repatterning of their structures with orientation towards strictly defensive functions. I believe that the best variant lies in parallel measures: reduction plus repatterning. This is what the Soviet concept of reasonable sufficiency of military potentials is geared to. If you like, our stake is on "minimum deterrence" in a nuclear-free world. But this would be a deterrence not by threatening the assured nuclear destruction of the aggressor, which, incidentally, does not assure peace. The restraining factor would not be the risk of one's own inevitable destruction, but the uselessness of an attack, as well as a complex of political, economic and humanitarian factors. Militarily, this uselessness would be determined, by the

fact first, that the sides have a sufficiently effective conventional defence, second, that none of them would have threatening offensive capabilities, and third, that the very possibility of a surprise attack would be ruled out.

A.S.: We believe that both sides should eliminate their weapons intended for attack and penetrating deep into enemy territory. This would be a major element of repatterning military strategy itself. It is all the more possible and advisable since the West is quite well equipped with conventional armaments and in its numerical strength NATO is no inferior than the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Regarding tanks, there is a need to abandon them. Even given their 1:1 ratio, they do not assure security. We should give up faith in tanks as an inalienable means of defence.

A revision of the entire strategy is all the more necessary because the questions of a reliable and indispensable nuclear defence of Western Europe by the United States have by no means been taken off the agenda. A majority in Western Europe is opposed to first use of nuclear weapons. Protests against nuclear weapons are heard even in the armed forces. Reliable security can be assured only if both alliances purposefully renounce not only the potential of nuclear deterrence, but also the potential of preventive strikes.

L.S.: We look upon this approach with understanding. The concept of reasonable sufficiency envisages: not to give the other side reasons for concern over its security, and to be rid of the grounds for such concern.

These criteria could determine the course not only of the Soviet Union but also every other state in the field of developing its armed forces. In other words, the Soviet politico-military concept, proclaimed at the 27th CPSU Congress, lays the foundation for a joint search for new ways to security.

The unofficial concept of "non-offensive defence", put forward in the West, also merits broad discussion by international public opinion. The joint elaboration of particular approaches to the realization of a really defensive military doctrine could evidently become a subject of discussion between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO.

This is only a wish, of course. For the time being NATO has neither a positive attitude to both concepts, nor a political will to back up with deeds its declared desire for defence and nothing but defence. There is no consent, for example, to the Warsaw Treaty Organization's proposal on a 25 per cent reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe by the early 1990s. There has been no reply to the Soviet proposals on commencing large-scale negotiations on a radical reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, armed forces and conventional armaments, and on a withdrawal of the more dangerous offensive types of armaments from the zone of immediate contact between the two military alliances.

SOVIET GENERAL VOLKOGONOV ON MILITARY DOCTRINE, 'NEW THINKING'

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 25, 29 Jun 87 pp 14-15

[Article by General Dmitry Volkogonov, doctor of philosophy]

[Text]

As one looks through the pages of history, one finds ample evidence of force of arms having been the main argument in interstate disputes, social, national, racial and religious conflicts. The 14,000 wars recorded in the annals of history claimed over four billion lives, which is about the size of the world population today. There were big and small wars, seven-year, thirty-year and even a hundred years' war. The two world wars have left indelible scars. But all this pales before the threat of a nuclear holocaust. Today even if you reduce your enemy to ashes, you will not emerge victorious from the war.

Dialectics of defence

Official views on the objectives and character of a likely war and plans for its preparation and conduct make up a state's military doctrine. There is hardly a state without a military concept of its own. Military doctrines have always taken into account not only the capabilities of a given state (and its potential enemy), but geographical, spatial and temporal factors. In World War II Nazi Germany, for instance, relied on the tactic of blitzkrieg; Britain attached special importance to the "strategy of indirect action," and France was guided by considerations of defence. The United States, which pinned its hopes on its naval and air force early in the war,

was finally confronted by the very logic of the fight with the need to concentrate on ground theatres of operation.

In the second half of this century national concepts of a possible war prevalent in the West have drawn significantly closer under the influence of the United States. Doctrines (appearing in the Pentagon's political lexicon under the general title of "national" or "major" strategy) have succeeded one another. There was "massive retaliation," "realistic deterrence," "nuclear containment" and "flexible response." But these were linked by a single dominant strand: all these doctrines provided for a first nuclear strike. In his book "The Button: The Pentagon's Command and Control System - Does It Work?" (1985) Daniel Ford wrote that the Pentagon still regarded the concept of first strike as fail-safe military logic. This characterizes the aggressive essence of both U.S. and NATO doctrines. The Strategic Defence Initiative, is intended to make outer space an unlimited theatre of operations without trenches and dugouts, with all the key positions to be held by the Americans, their weapons targeted on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Such is the platform of those who are not prepared to part with nuclear weapons and discard outdated military categories.

At its Berlin session the Political Consultative Committee adopted a document formulating the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty states. Its chief distinguishing feature consists in its being geared, as the document of the Political

Consultative Committee puts it, "to the task of preventing war, both nuclear and conventional." This is a defence doctrine or, if I may say so, an anti-war doctrine. The socialist states have stressed that they "have never identified their future, nor do they now, with the military solution of international problems."

The defensive nature of the doctrine has been formalized in a number of state postulates to the effect that socialist countries will never be the first to use nuclear weapons; will never start hostilities against anyone (unless they are made the target of attack themselves); do not regard any nation or state as an enemy; have no territorial claims to any member of the world community. The meaning of the doctrine is therefore crystal-clear: socialist countries do not want greater security for themselves at the expense of others, but nor will they agree to lesser security. The doctrine is a concentrated expression of the peaceableness of the socialist states and their determination to defend their socialist gains. "The combat readiness of the armed forces of the allied states is maintained at a level sufficient to prevent them being caught unawares. In the event of an attack they will give a devastating rebuff to the aggressor."

Socialism's ability and readiness to protect its security constitute an important factor for lasting peace. Our high defence potential (within the limits of reasonable sufficiency) reminds those who favour military gambles that an aggressor may try to destroy the other side by means of nuclear arms, but will be powerless to stand up to retaliatory measures. Security lies not in quests for an elusive spectre of victory in a nuclear war, but in the ability to prevent a nuclear holocaust.

The doctrine reflects the interests of all of mankind. It is safe to predict that if a global poll on the fate of the planet were held, an overwhelming majority of the vote would be for a guaranteed nuclear-free world. The emphasis is now on eternal and universal values: peace, peaceful coexistence and peaceful cooperation.

The technical aspect of the military doctrine provides for the buildup of the socialist countries' fighting capacity in such way as to keep the military balance at the level obtaining at this or that specific moment. The need to promote the progress of military science and the art of warfare and improve the armed forces within the limits of reasonable sufficiency remains. The higher the combat readiness

of the armed forces, the less likely it is that a potential aggressor will venture an attack. Such is the dialectics of the defence doctrine.

Parity

To quote Bertolt Brecht, "Great Carthage fought three wars. After the first it was still mighty, after the second it was still inhabited, and after the third it vanished without trace." The threat of a third world war, which would probably be the end of all life on the planet, lends special urgency to the need for new thinking.

It would be naively simplistic to think that of all the political possibilities to hand today the American establishment's only choice is nuclear violence. But we must take into account that for all the realistic views and judgements coming from Washington, the logic of warped political thinking has a considerable following there. This logic has its roots in anti-communism.

Of special importance, therefore, is the principle of equal security, which manifests itself today in the parity of strategic forces. The objective causal relationship between the balance of strategic potentials and a state's security is a law that governs the safeguarding of peace. In itself, military parity cannot always stop the attacking side. In a nuclear war, however, the aggressor will have to pay with suicide.

Military-strategic parity is the absolute or approximate equality of the sides in strategic arms. When assessing parity today, however, it is important to take many other factors into account: geopolitical, technical (the possibility of developing weapons based on new principles), the availability of conventional weapons possessing a destructive power close to that of weapons of mass destruction. Can we disregard, for instance, the United States' stubborn desire to deploy weapons in space, which would completely alter the global military-political situation?

The structure of military-strategic parity comprises the quantity and quality of nuclear arms carriers, the number and total yield of warheads, and their location. Now that military-strategic balance is at a very high level there has arisen a new situation where no further increase in the level of parity brings greater security. At a certain

point in the growth of nuclear potential, parity begins to lose its importance as a factor in the prevention of war.

An outwardly paradoxical situation has taken shape: although its military potential is growing, Washington is still in no position to achieve its political ends by force of arms, while the overall security threshold is getting lower.

The logic of security

Peace can be maintained, but war is, nevertheless, a probability. This should not throw the peace forces into intellectual disarray in the face of nuclear absurdity; on the contrary, they must now be more determined than ever to prevent a tragedy. The military doctrine of the socialist states asserts that it is possible to "exclude war from the life of mankind."

Let us begin with the historical aspect. Mankind is roughly a million years old, and for hundreds of thousands of years it saw no wars. The greatest danger mankind faced then emanated from the environment, which appeared as a hostile demoniacal force people could only resist by joint effort. Had they been divided then, people would simply not have survived. Intertribal armed conflicts were not of a social character - tribes fought over the best hunting grounds, pastures, and caves, or as a result of blood feud. All this refutes bourgeois historians' assertions that wars are primordial. Wars appeared in human history only in the final stages of the ascent by mankind of the pyramid of social progress, along with the emergence of antagonistic classes. Their fatal sequence can be cut short.

The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty states sets forth basic objectives, the attainment of which would exclude wars. The very character of these objectives highlights the essence of this doctrine as a state concept for the prevention of war. They are:

first, to have nuclear tests and the improvement and production of new

nuclear arms banned as the first step towards a stage-by-stage reduction and, ideally, the elimination of nuclear arsenals. This is possible only if outer space remains free of arms. The elimination of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction comes into the same category. This is effectively a question of destroying the material base of nuclear war;

second, in view of the special role Europe plays in the fate of civilization, the balance of forces and political interests, it is necessary to reduce conventional arms on the continent to a level which would rule out a surprise attack by the other side. This presupposes a complex of confidence-building measures, the establishment of zones free of weapons of mass destruction, i.e., prerequisites for the future simultaneous disbanding of the military blocs confronting each other. In this way, a political mechanism for preventing war will be established;

third, any advance along this road is impossible without creating a system of control, information exchange and consultations through specialized international agencies. Now that information is becoming more readily available, international openness is growing, and public opinion is coming to play an increasingly important role, it is necessary to get down to comparing the opposite blocs' military doctrines and casting about for ways of amplifying their defensive elements. This ideological group of aims proceeds from the need to assert new thinking to an ever greater degree. This is in fact an expression of the hope that this thinking will eventually prevail worldwide as applied to problems of war and peace.

As they formulated the objectives of their doctrine, the Warsaw Treaty countries proceeded from the present realities rather than from illusions. Before a political mechanism for blocking nuclear war is set up, we shall have to depend on a military one.

Before the onset of the third millennium we can achieve a feat of historic importance, i.e., set the stage for a future without wars and arms. This is a realistic proposition, given joint efforts towards what can be described as an anti-war mechanism.

PRAVDA WEEKLY REVIEW ON CSCE, INF TALKS

PM191500 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

["International Review" column by Igor Melnikov]

[Text] Let Us Not Blow Up the World [subhead]

"...Surely we are wise enough to find mutual understanding and not to blow up the world because we are different?" These words, uttered by M.S. Gorbachev the other day in a conversation with the Latin American writer Gabriel Garcia Marquez, could be the epigraph to the many hundreds of articles, scientific tracts, and reports that have appeared everywhere on the eve of the past week, when mankind welcomed the birth of our planet's 5 billionth inhabitant.

Indeed, inhabitants of all continents are asking if we have different colored skins, if the social system in our countries is not the same, if we have different views of international events, if that really is a reason why nuclear catastrophe should break out, if it really is necessary to put to the test an already fragile world? And why should mankind live in fear of the future?

The planet's best minds have long raised this question. Now, thanks to the new way of thinking, which is resolutely finding its way to the people's masses and penetrating government cabinets, the absurdity of war preparations and the shortsightedness of the position of strength policy are becoming increasingly obvious. It is no longer isolated intellectuals, but millions of the earth's inhabitants who are becoming convinced that the time has come to turn swords into plowshares and channel the resources freed into social needs and creative goals. The guarantee of mankind's survival today is the creation of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons. And nothing else.

Last Wednesday saw the publication of the answer of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to the appeal by participants in the U.S.-Soviet "Peace March". Everyone who values peace, he stressed, has in the Soviet Union a firm and unswerving ally in the attainment of these truly sacred human goals.

People everywhere are now talking about the processes of restructuring and openness in the Soviet Union. Attention is drawn to the fact that our party is transforming the new approaches in internal affairs into foreign policy initiatives. People abroad cannot fail to see that these are not slogans, but real, practical proposals submitted to the judgement of the international community. Here the Soviet side does not lay claim to absolute truth, but heeds other people's opinions.

These are the facts, and it is hard to dispute facts. So the question arises, do not international relations need restructuring in light of the progressive development and qualitative changes in the policy and behavior of states? It is noteworthy that some of the West's leading politicians verbally admit this necessity to some degree. But when it comes to real actions.... Alas, here one obstacle after another is erected in the path of progressive development.

The events of the past week clearly confirms this.

NATO's Vienna "Waltz" [subhead]

On studying recent statements by Washington officials, looking at cables from the foreign agencies, and leafing through the Western newspapers, at present you cannot escape the thought that the United States, together with the most zealous allies, is already trying on the leaders' jersey in the competition for the speediest resolution of questions of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

When you hear that, you think: Butter would not melt in your mouths, gentlemen. But how do things really stand?

First, let us look at Vienna, where the representative meeting of participants in the CSCE in Europe is in progress. Today a wind of euphoria is still blowing through the residences of the delegations accredited there from the 16 NATO states. A burst of cheerfulness is being experienced in connection with their submission of proposals on 10 July on military aspects of security in Europe.

But what cause for rejoicing is there, really? Of course, one could heave a sigh of relief in view of the fact that the NATO document has indeed been put on the conference table, albeit very late. But the sense of relief is mingled with concern: Where is the adequate response to the package of proposals submitted by the socialist countries?

The NATO document suffers from a number of substantial shortcomings. One is struck first of all by the desire to remove disarmament questions from the problems covered by the next stage of the Stockholm Conference. Why, you gentlemen from NATO? Remember: The Stockholm forum is actually called a conference "on Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe."

And another thing. This document tries to exclude the neutral and nonaligned countries of the continent from participating on an equal basis in the examination and resolution of the problem of European disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals. [paragraph continues]

Lastly, it is not hard to find in it evidence of a desire to avoid real reductions of armed forces and armaments in Europe and to preclude the examination of the questions of tactical nuclear weapons at future talks.

In a word, the NATO side has not taken off the record player the Vienna "waltz" of delays, hiatuses, and procrastinations which it knows by heart. Certainly it has plenty of experience -- a decade and a half of fruitless discussions in the Hofburg Palace on reducing the military confrontation in central Europe.

The experience of international forums on disarmament questions in recent years graphically confirms that our country does not play at politics, that its energetic actions are not aimed at pleasing anyone or winning a propaganda prize. You have to look deeper. The Soviet Union is true to its peace-loving line. It realizes that things cannot be dragged out any longer, that it is time to set an example in practice.

That is our principled position.

Shifting the Blame [subhead]

Official Washington and certain other NATO powers choose a different position. At the first opportunity (and sometimes without it) they gamble on the propaganda prize. The U.S. Administration's ardor appeared particularly indomitable last week. It chose the Geneva talks as the "battlefield."

The Reagan administration, we read in THE NEW YORK TIMES, has criticized the Soviet Union for the fact that, it says, there is a delay in arms control talks and the process of preparations for a summit meeting. The newspaper quotes a statement by State Department spokesman Charles Redman: "The impression is created that in the last week or two the Soviet Union has departed from what we could regard as a constructive or positive approach to the problem of resolving some of the most complex questions." Realizing that the verbal camouflage requires at least some degree of deciphering, the State Department official declared that the USSR is "slowing the pace of the Geneva talks, where the two sides are discussing problems of reducing short- and medium-range missiles."

At almost the same time, THE NEW YORK TIMES published a long article by Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The fervor of his "denunciations" was so unparalleled that he even -- unprecedentedly! -- quoted Marx: "The difference between an incomplete zero option and a true zero option is one of those cases where, as Karl Marx said, quantity turns into quality. From any point of view -- arms control, strategy, policy -- a true zero option would be a more successful outcome. We are ready for it. Are the Soviets ready for it?"

So what is being done in broad daylight? Through Moscow's fault, the Geneva talks have supposedly lost pace, and the Soviet delegation is deliberately slowing down the discussion and, in a number of cases, is even departing from its positions. There is something to lose your peace, sleep, and even appetite over!

But let us reassure the agitated Adelman. The Soviet Union is ready for the most radical reduction in nuclear arms. Ready -- as it was during the Reykjavik meeting -- for their total elimination.

Now, as to what is really happening in Geneva. Let Adelman learn the truth, since his officials, and their State Department colleagues, are, to put it mildly, not too objective. [paragraph continues]

The facts show that in the 3 weeks since the start of the present round of the Geneva talks, the USSR delegation has put forward seven concrete proposals. Each of them takes careful account of the U.S. side's concerns. If the elaboration of a joint draft treaty on medium-range missiles has not yet been completed, there is only one reason -- Washington's unconstructive position and its desire to write into the medium-range missiles treaty commitments that secure military advantages for the U.S. side.

So THE WASHINGTON POST observers R. Evans and R. Novak are much closer to the truth than the "naive" Adelman. "As administration officials admit," they write, "they do not know what is on Moscow's mind. Their concern is aggravated by the fact that the Kremlin has stepped up its demand for the withdrawal of the old Pershing-1 missiles within the framework of the new treaty."

Quite right. All the same, THE WASHINGTON POST observers mention only one of the obstacles created by the Americans at the Geneva talks. It is worth adding to this list and asking: Why does the United States insist on unilateral reductions in Soviet medium-range missiles at the first stage; why does it need to preserve the possibility of reequipping Pershing-2's and Pershing-1B's and turning ground-launched cruise missiles into sea-launched cruise missiles; why does it refuse to discuss the question of verification with regard to U.S. military bases in third countries, which could be associated with American medium-range missiles?

The fuss over the 72 U.S. nuclear warheads for West German Pershing-1A missiles is particularly provocative. Of course, here responsibility cannot be lifted from those circles in the FRG which entertain dangerous plans for modernizing missile weapons, looking covetously at the U.S. nuclear charges for Pershings. In a recent issue of the Hamburg magazine STERN, things are called by their names. Defense Minister M. Woerner "plans to use the new generation of medium-range missiles," while in the safe of E. Eimler, commander of the Bundeswehr Air Force, there are the "tactical requirements for the next model of the very same West German Pershing-1A missiles that are causing such a dispute between East and West in the struggle for disarmament.

It is hardly necessary to prove that such maneuvers exacerbate the situation on our continent, by no means promote the strengthening of confidence in Europe, and, frankly speaking, in terms of their potential outcome, rank with irresponsible statements to the effect that the "German question" remains open, that all is not clear regarding the "lands in the East," and that Yalta and Potsdam are "unlawful." Not for nothing did the West German newspaper STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG give its traditional foreign policy commentary a very eloquent headline: "Woerner Torpedoes the Disarmament Process."

But let us come back to the question of the U.S. side's responsibility on the question of the Pershing-1A's. It constantly declares the desirability of resolving the problem of operational and tactical and medium-range missiles on a "global zero" basis. (Let us recall, for instance, the impassioned words I quoted from Adelman, about the "true zero option.") But what kind of "zero" can it be, if U.S. nuclear warheads for the Bundeswehr missiles remain in Europe?

How short is the memory of Washington officials! They simply cannot figure out why Moscow is making a fuss about the 72 "unfortunate," almost obsolete missiles. But the whole point is that it is not a question of missiles as such, but of nuclear warheads on them. Lastly, there is the generally recognized Treaty Against Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. So why does the United States want to violate a treaty which bears its signature?

Instead of a lengthy resume, let me say briefly: It ill behooves Washington and NATO to assume the role of leader over the marathon distance of disarmament. It ill behooves them to represent the Soviet position as a brake at the talks. In Russian, we call that shifting the blame.

Lessons of the Visit [subhead]

Yesterday the newspapers published a report on the latest CPSU Central Committee Politburo session. A significant place in the report was allocated to the subject of the results of the conversations and talks between Soviet leaders and FRG Federal President R. von Weizsaecker and FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher, who were in the USSR for a visit. These contacts were assessed positively, since they made it possible to compare our countries' positions on international affairs and to focus attention on questions of ending the arms race, promoting disarmament, and fundamentally improving the situation in central Europe and on the need for a new, fresh approach to resolving today's problems.

The West German public and the country's mass media are accustomed to numerous foreign trips by their statesmen. So why have the commentaries on this visit remained in the newspapers and on television screens in the FRG for a record time, so to speak? There can be only one reason. The talks in Moscow confirmed that despite political and ideological contradictions and their different military-strategic orientations, the USSR and the FRG can be partners. As for our country, it reaffirms its readiness to develop firm relations with the FRG as a significant West European partner, relations which do not depend on changing circumstances. Naturally, Bonn in its turn must demonstrate a similar readiness and not burden it with anything.

The results of the FRG federal president's visit to the Soviet Union allow us to say that broad objective opportunities exist for our countries to cooperate in building the common European home on the basis of recognition and respect for the realities in Europe, strict compliance with the Moscow treaty, and the infusion of life into that treaty. So why not open a new chapter in USSR-FRG relations through joint efforts? A chapter meeting the interests of the two countries' peoples as well as the interests of the whole continent. It would be good if the first page in that chapter was the mutual desire to rid the European Continent of medium-range nuclear weapons and operational and tactical missiles.

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CSO: 5200/1590

RELATED ISSUES

TASS HITS U.S. STANCE ON DISARMAMENT-DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE

LD171956 Moscow TASS in English 1731 GMT 17 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 17 TASS -- TASS news analyst Ivan Ablamov writes:

Challenging the world community, the United States has announced it will not participate in the international conference on inter-relation between disarmament and development which is due to open at the U.N. headquarters on August 24. It says it does not agree with the very idea of the conference, since it does not believe that there is inter-relation between disarmament and development.

The United States so cynically treats both disarmament and problems of the developing world that it did not even take pains to look for more decent causes to explain its stand. Washington's arguments are absurd. Perhaps nobody but the American Administration has any doubts that here is close inter-relation between disarmament and development. It is disarmament alone that can release big additional resources for overcoming economic backwardness. To that score there are concrete proposals of socialist and developing countries.

The arms race swallows huge manpower, financial, natural and technical resources, it is a heavy burden on the economy of all and particularly developing countries. According to U.N. data, the developing countries spend more than a third of their national income for military needs and import every year 26,000 million dollars worth of weapons. If military expenditures grow by only one per cent, the funds of development of agriculture in those countries reduce by 18 per cent. As was noted by chairman of the Nonaligned Movement, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe, socio-economic progress is inseparable from solution of disarmament problems.

Washington's stand shows above all that the interests of development of the "Third World" are alien to it. It is exactly through its exploitation that the United States pays for its military expenditures. There is a direct link between the U.S. annual military budget of 250,000-270,000 million dollars being approximately equal to the sum which is pumped out of the developing world, and U.S. total military expenditures in the past five years -- one trillion dollars -- being equal to the foreign debt of the developing world.

The United States' attitude was also arrogant these days to the work of another big international forum -- the 7th UNCTAD session. The U.S. mission at the United Nations reported that Washington did not intend to ratify the agreement on institution of the general fund for raw material resources, drawn up within the UNCTAD framework and bound to ensure a more stable and predictable situation in world markets. This is not in the interests of the United States which waxes fat on beating down prices of raw materials, infringing upon developing countries.

Disregard for two international forums exposes (?U.S.) neocolonialism.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA ON INF, ASIAN SECURITY, BALKAN NFZ

PM281415 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[Boris Averchenko "International Review"]

[Excerpts] Loyalty to Behest

The foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, noted for its activeness and consistency, clearly and precisely expresses the peoples' vital desires -- to preserve and strengthen peace and deliver mankind from the threat of nuclear catastrophe. The world community has seen for itself many times that in the present complex and tense international situation, the Soviet Union shows the maximum concern for the fate of civilization on earth and is guided in its foreign policy, not in words but in deeds, by new thinking in keeping with the realities of the nuclear age.

Our party unswervingly follows Lenin's behest to undertake the greatest number possible of "the clearest decisions and measures that will really lead to peace."

These days a broad response throughout the planet has been elicited by the new Soviet foreign policy initiatives advanced by M.S. Gorbachev in his replies to the questions of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA. His declaration of the Soviet Union's decision to eliminate all its medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in the Asian part of the country too is at the center of international public attention. In this way we are removing the question of preserving the 100 warheads on medium-range missiles in Asia and on U.S. territory that are under discussion at the Geneva talks. In taking this step the Soviet Government primarily took into account the interest of Asian countries in the total elimination of medium-range missiles not only in Europe but also in Asia and their peoples' desire to turn that region into a peaceful, nuclear-free zone.

The world public has greeted the new Soviet initiatives with satisfaction. The leaders of Indonesia, Japan, the FRG, Australia, France, Britain, Sweden, Belgium, and many other states have expressed their positive attitude to the Soviet leader's statement. It meets with the warm approval and support of our allies -- the socialist community countries. The peoples hope that the Soviet proposal will give a new boost to the Geneva talks and that positive results will be achieved there. It is now up to the U.S. side to make a political decision.

Foreign commentators and many politicians and statesmen see the Soviet Union's new initiatives as convincing evidence of the immutability of the USSR's peace-loving course and the principled, flexible, and businesslike approach of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government to key problems of international life. They point out that the year that has elapsed since the Soviet leader's Vladivostok speech has confirmed the USSR's loyalty to its policy with regard to the vast Asian and Pacific region. Commentaries draw attention to the fact that, having advanced the program for the phased complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere by the year 2000, the Land of the Soviets is consistently and persistently seeking to implement it, displaying more and more new initiatives. The foreign press gave extensive coverage to a number of specific proposals set forth by M.S. Gorbachev and aimed at reducing military tension in the Asian and Pacific region, particularly on his readiness to pledge not to increase the number of nuclear-capable aircraft, on reducing the activeness of Soviet and U.S. military fleets in the Pacific, on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, and on prohibiting nuclear tests.

Whatever urgent problem you take today, commentators point out, the Soviet Union invariably acts from constructive positions and seeks honest and equitable accords that harm no side and consider the interests of all states.

The peace offensive of the Land of the Soviets is a consistent, long-term course conditioned also by the nature of our domestic policy and the restructuring under way in our country. We pursue it together with our friends and allies -- the fraternal socialist countries, which also have a vital interest in ensuring normal external conditions for creating a new society. And the more vigorously and enterprisingly each of these countries acts, the more successfully the socialist community achieves common goals in the international arena.

We know of the jointly advanced initiatives of the GDR and the CSSR to create a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe, the idea of Bulgaria and Romania to turn the Balkans into a zone free from nuclear and chemical weapons, and many other proposals by socialist states. This week the government of People's Poland disseminated a memorandum setting forth an integral plan of proposals on questions of reducing arms and strengthening trust at the center of Europe. It is arousing interest in many countries inside and outside the continent. Soviet people express active support for it.

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CSO: 5200/1601

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW: INF, NAVAL LIMITS, ASIAN SECURITY

LD262105 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 26 Jul 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zholkver, not further identified; Yuriy Aleksandrovich Gremitikh, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry press center; Rudolf Georgiyevich Kolchanov, not further identified]

[Excerpts] [Kolchanov] In assessing what is happening in the Soviet Union no one can really dispute the fact that the strengthening of the might of the Soviet Union, the vast creative labor that the Soviet Union and the Soviet people are engaged in, is a very durable and a very major factor in stabilizing international security—a factor in strengthening world peace.

[Zholkver] This also is confirmed by the important new peace initiative of the Soviet Union set forth by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in his interview with the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA. What is being singled out here in particular, of course, is the announcement of the Soviet proposal regarding the destruction of all medium-range missiles, not only in Europe, but also in Asia. It needs saying that our country has had to show persistence and flexibility to put the preparation of an agreement to eliminate these medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe on a practical footing. This is the subject of the present talks with the Americans in Geneva. But the question of the 100 warheads on the medium-range missiles in the Asian part of our country, and of the same number — 100 warheads — on the corresponding U.S. missiles on U.S. territory remains unresolved.

[Kolchanov] This unresolved question perhaps has been holding back, to some extent, the progress of the Geneva talks on the European medium-range missiles and the operational and tactical missiles.

[Zholkver] Apart from everything else, one also must mention that a number of the Asian countries, due to considerations for their own national security, have raised the question of the need to eliminate all medium-range missiles in Asia, too. Now the Soviet Union, in response to the wishes expressed by the Asian countries, and desiring also to make the issues at the Geneva conference easier to resolve, has declared its willingness to eliminate both the medium-range missiles and the operational and tactical missiles on the continent of Asia — if, of course, the United States does likewise. Well, I think the first reactions from the Asian countries and from other states, too, already have shown that this proposal has been received very positively indeed as an important step toward strengthening peace and security throughout the world, and, above all, in Asia, where the amount of potentially explosive material that has now accumulated is particularly great.

[Kolchanov] Positive reactions have come from across the Atlantic, too -- have been voiced, at least. But let us not be especially optimistic here, because it has happened more than once after the first positive reaction that negative real steps have followed. But, nonetheless, let us note the fact.

[Zholkver] Undoubtedly. But what I would remark on in this case above all, I think, is precisely the reaction of Asian countries, because on the Asian Continent, too, they have clearly been waiting a long time for this question to be resolved. It must be confessed that in recent years we experts and journalists have been more preoccupied with the problems of European security. Here positive experience has been amassed. Of course, it cannot simply be transplanted to the soil of Asia; but, in any case, questions of detente, questions of strengthening security, questions of setting up nuclear-free zones: These are now being very widely discussed in Asia, and here, of course, one cannot fail to note that quite a number of Asian states have been very active -- above all India, a great power which has put forward several proposals for creating a nonviolent world. An example of this is the Delhi Declaration signed during Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to India. Take even the initiatives of the small island states of the Pacific. It was on their initiative, after all, that the South Pacific was declared a nuclear-free zone. Take the initiatives of New Zealand in banning visits to its ports by U.S. ships with nuclear weapons on board. These are all initiatives relating to this vast region, which is of such colossal importance for the destiny of mankind: Asia.

[Kolchanov] You are correct, in my view, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, to single out the problem, the central problem, of eliminating nuclear weapons -- that is an indisputable fact. Povever, in his interview with the newspaper MERDEKA, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev named several other proposals which, if implemented, could strengthen peace and security in that region of the globe. The Soviet Union, for instance, is willing to not increase the number of its aircraft-carrying nuclear weapons in the Asian part of the country -- if, of course, the United States does not deploy in that region any additional nuclear weapons capable of reaching our territory. Second, Mikhail Sergeyevich once again issued a reminder of the Soviet Union's willingness to reduce the level of activity of the naval fleets of the USSR and of the United States in the Pacific. This is a vast water area, where in general, it is the fleets that have a decisive role to play; and in his interview, Mikhail Sergeyevich made detailed proposals on how that activity by the fleets might be reduced...

[Zholkver, interrupting] Incidentally, both of the surface vessels and of the submarines.

[Kolchanov] And the submarines, yes. The fleet as a whole, so to speak -- both on and under the water. Third, the UN Declaration on turning the Indian Ocean into a peace zone was adopted, as we know, more than 15 years ago. For several years, preparations have been under way for an international conference on the Indian Ocean to examine a whole range of very important and vital matters. It has been scheduled for next year, but it is not yet entirely certain that it will take place. Yet it is necessary that it should take place, and this is something that must be done by all the interested states -- of which there is a large number. Finally, the fourth thing that has been put forward in the interview of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary is the question of nuclear explosions. This, after all, is the region where the first nuclear bomb exploded, and it has been the scene of a whole series of first nuclear tests and, as it were...

[Zholkver, interrupting] On Bikini Atoll, and...

[Kolchanov, interrupting] ...And in the air and on land. Of course the people living in the area have strong feelings about this problem.

[Zholkver] I would say that if this problem is to be resolved, it is also necessary to cooperate with the United States, as a great Pacific power. This, too, cannot be left out of account, after all. No one has any intention of trying to exclude the United States from resolving or examining these problems. But, of course, it has to be on a realistic basis.

This reminds me of a book that has recently appeared in Australia by several important researchers into international relations with a remarkable title -- the book is called "The American Lake." That is what some people in the United States, from an old-established habit, call the Pacific. The American lake! No, of course, it hasn't been the American lake for a long time. But it is a problem which also concerns the United States, for a number of reasons. Well, for example, the trade turnover of the United States with the Asian and Pacific states now exceeds by a third the volume of U.S. trade with Western Europe. That must be taken into account. But, of course, to conclude from this that the Pacific is an American lake would be totally unrealistic.

By the way, Rudolf Georgiyevich, you were talking just now about our proposals for strengthening security in Asia and the Pacific. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's interview with MERDEKA also contains a whole series of proposals on strengthening economic cooperation in that region. Here I would like to cite again the positive example of our friendly and successfully developing economic ties with India. I saw a long article that appeared in the reputable Indian publication ECONOMIC TIMES, in which it is noted that since Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union -- meaning his recent visit for the opening of the Indian Festival in our country -- new areas of cooperation are being opened up on many levels -- from purely commercial exchange to cooperation in the fields of biotechnology, medicine, general public health, joint research, and joint scientific technical projects. It is proposed to staff research centers and laboratories in both countries with Indian and Soviet citizens. Well, of course, there will be a considerable growth in trade.

[Kolchanov] It seems to me that we journalists talk and write too little about the possibilities of cooperation in that region. Yet, Asia and the Pacific is a very unusual region. Here the world powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are neighbors; here is China, with its huge human potential; here is Japan, economically powerful; here, as they say in the West, the new industrial states have appeared -- meaning South Korea -- and so on. In other words, this is an extensive landscape that is very varied politically and economically. That means both possibilities are evident. Here, indeed, a very great deal can be done -- to say nothing of the fact that the greater part of mankind lives there.

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CSO: 5200/1601

RELATED ISSUES

CHERNAVIN ON NAVY'S SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY

LD262107 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1240 GMT 26 Jul 87

[Interview with Fleet Admiral Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin, commander-in-chief of the USSR Navy, deputy defense minister, and hero of the Soviet Union, by correspondent Boris Smirnov on the occasion of USSR Navy Day; conducted on 25 July; place not given — recorded]

[Text] [Smirnov] Comrade Fleet Admiral, what is special about the Navy Day celebrations this year?

[Chernavin] A noteworthy difference in this year's Navy Day celebrations is the fact that we will be celebrating Navy Day in the year of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. This anniversary, which all our people and people in progressive countries around the world are preparing to mark, gives a special resonance to our traditional holiday. Today people around the world see in the restructuring and in the transformation of all aspects of our life and work the continuation of the Great October cause. To be involved in these events in our country, to take part in them is an equally great responsibility and a great honor for us, the sailors. I would like to say that we seamen understand this great responsibility.

[Smirnov] The Soviet Navy has a rich history. What are its main stages?

[Chernavin] The Soviet Navy took over all that was best and progressive from the splendid victories of the Russian fleet. During that October the Navy proved itself to be a reliable force for the revolution. It is no accident that the image of the legendary cruiser *Avrora* is today an image of the revolution. The sailors made a worthy contribution to the defense of the young Soviet state during the civil war and the foreign intervention. The actions by Soviet seamen during the great patriotic war, when, along with our armed forces and our entire people, they defended the freedom and independence of our great homeland and saved Europe from the brown plague of Nazi obscurantism, were full of special courage, valor, and heroism.

After the great patriotic war, more or less in the mid-fifties, began the creation of the Soviet country's modern, nuclear missile fleet. That, too, was a feat, by our designers, by our scientists, by our shipbuilders and other industry representatives, who created equipment for the Navy that was mastered by the seamen. Today such brilliant cruises as that by a nuclear submarine to the North Pole under pack ice are history. Today the round-the-world cruise by a group of our submarines and other achievements in those days are history. It is no accident that the deeds by our Soviet seamen in that period and the post-war period were honored with the highest awards by the homeland.

[Smirnov] I would like to hear a more detailed description of today's Navy.

[Chernavin] The Navy is a component part of our armed forces, standing guard over the security of our socialist homeland. The Navy is constantly developing, being replenished by new generations of ships, new weapons, and new equipment. Today its main strike force is made up of nuclear submarines armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles, cruise missiles for various purposes, and torpedoes. Today our Navy is proud of its surface ships with nuclear propulsion systems, such as, let us say, the nuclear cruiser Kirov.

The pride of our Navy are the aircraft-carrying ships [aviansushchiy korabl] of the Kiev class, missile-carrying cruisers of the Slava class, and many other vessels. Our naval aviation has undergone substantial changes in the postwar years. Today it includes missile-carrying jets and long-range aircraft, shipborne and shore-based. Our coastal missile and artillery units and marines have been equipped with a great deal of new weaponry and hardware. All in all, our country today has a Navy with a duty and a capability to forestall aggression from the seas.

[Smirnov] In fact it is well known that the Soviet Armed Forces, and in particular the Navy, are not marking time. But what is it that makes our state work to perfect its systems of armed combat?

[Chernavin] The Soviet Union's work to perfect its combat resources is necessitated, I would say, by the time that we live in. The world situation today is alarming, troubled, and explosive. The material resources, intellectual effort, and creative potential of many capitalist countries and their people are devoted to building sophisticated systems of destruction, such as the MX missile, the Trident weapons system, and the space system, for the annihilation of people. The chief cause of this escalation is the high degree of aggression in the policy of the United States, the attempts to gain a unilateral advantage over the Soviet Union. We can see this aggressiveness in U.S. policy today in its preparation for armed interference in the affairs of Central American and the Caribbean basin countries and the throwing together of a military bloc in the Far East. The United States and its allies are deliberately maintaining tension in the Near East and are building up their presence in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and other trouble spots. Under these conditions, as the decisions by the January and June CPSU Central Committee plenums stressed, our country's defense potential and our armed forces' high degree of training and combat readiness must be maintained at the proper level. That is what our seamen today are doing.

[Smirnov] People around the world are becoming more and more convinced that it is the Soviet Union that is firmly and consistently pursuing a policy of peace, friendship, and cooperation in international questions, really working to achieve disarmament and the elimination of the threat of war.

[Chernavin] Yes, that is right; and today the leading role played by our country in those questions is clear to many people. This is confirmed, among other things, by public opinion polls conducted in various countries, including the capitalist ones. I would add that a vivid manifestation of the peace-loving policy of our state, not in words but in deeds, was the result of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee conference in Berlin this May. That conference adopted a historic document, On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty States. That document says quite clearly and definitely that the military doctrine of the socialist countries is of a peaceful and purely defensive nature.

[Smirnov] In our country, as we all know, there is an active process of restructuring all aspects of public life. What do Soviet seamen see as their task in light of the decisions by the 27th party congress and the subsequent decisions by the CPSU Central Committee, and how are they implementing them?

[Chernavin] Today is a time of great change, a time of new approaches and strict assessments. These words have particular significance when we speak of the Navy's combat readiness, the quality of combat training and military discipline. Today we can no longer be satisfied with what was achieved yesterday. Today's quality must be higher. Today the norms must be stricter and the assessments more exacting. That is the direction in which restructuring is being implemented in the Navy.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the many collectives of scientists, designers, and representatives of industry and the working class who are providing the navy with new ships, new equipment, and new weapons. I would also like to wish all the viewers good health, great happiness, and success in working for the benefit of our great fatherland. Happy Navy Day to you, dear comrades!

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SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER YAZOV WRITES ON PACT DOCTRINE

PN262031 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jul 87 First Edition p 5

[Article by Defense Minister Army General D.T. Yazov: "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Is the Doctrine of the Defense of Peace and Socialism"]

[Text] A document entitled "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member States" was adopted at the Political Consultative Committee conference which took place 28-29 May this year in Berlin. In evaluating highly the contents of the document, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo stated that it precisely expresses the defensive nature of the military strategy of socialism and serves the development of dialogue between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO and the strengthening of trust in Europe.

The document's fundamental propositions about the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact are an example of the manifestation of new political thinking on questions of war and peace in the nuclear age and on the problems of defense and of ensuring equal security for all states. They wholly accord with the interests of the socialist community as a whole and with the national interests of each of the allied socialist countries, and they do not contradict the interests of any other state.

Why did the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states need to be published? What are its main distinctive features? How are the provisions of the doctrine reflected in the military building of the Warsaw Pact countries? All these questions evoke special interest insofar as they reveal the aims and intentions of the allied socialist states and the essence of the new philosophy of security in the nuclear space era.

I.

The military doctrine of each state stems from its social system and policy and it determines the attitude toward fundamental questions of war and peace. Insofar as in the modern world major military-political alliances of state are a political reality and even confront each other, then along with the national doctrines of the states which make up these alliances each of these alliances can have a corporate military doctrine.

The Warsaw Pact organization is a qualitatively new sociohistorical phenomenon which arose naturally from the need to defend the working people's socialist gains against the encroachments of the aggressive imperialist forces. The entire history of the defensive Warsaw alliance proves incontrovertibly that the socialist community countries do not threaten anyone and have no intention of attacking anyone. Peace, not war, is needed for socialist and communist building. The allied socialist states'

peace-loving policy also determines the nature of the military doctrine on which the defense activities of the Warsaw Pact are based and which reflects the fraternal countries' common defensive military-political objectives.

The main propositions of the military doctrine ensue from the policy of the Warsaw Pact member states' communist and workers parties. By officially advancing a single military doctrine now, the fraternal socialist countries are pursuing the aim of once again demonstrating to the world public their approach to the problems of war, peace, and security in conditions of the realities of the nuclear age. [paragraph continues]

This approach is based on a profound understanding of the fact that in the present situation where vast arsenals of nuclear weapons have been built up, weapons which present a danger to the existence of mankind itself, a nuclear war cannot be used as a means of achieving political aims. "Now," M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, has pointed out, "it is perfectly obvious to anyone that the old notions of war as a means of achieving political aims are completely outdated. In the nuclear age these outdated dogmas nurture a policy which could lead to a worldwide holocaust."

The nuclear danger is a threat to all; the problem of survival has become mankind's main task. The allied socialist countries conclude from this reality that in the present situation there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence, equitable cooperation, and mutual understanding between all states. Objective conditions have developed in which, in the socialist community's view, the confrontation between capitalism and socialism must take the shape, solely and exclusively, of peaceful competition, peaceful rivalry.

The new situation demands a new approach to the problem of states' security. The allied socialist countries are convinced that the genuine security of all and each of us individually depends on common efforts with a view to creating a nuclear-free and nonviolent world rather than on the further buildup of nuclear potentials and the development of new mass annihilation weapon systems. However, this conclusion is not shared by the U.S. Administration. It still adheres to its policy of hegemonism; it has not given up the hope of social revenge, it continues to entertain the illusion of strong-arm confrontation, and it is putting up a fierce resistance to the socialist countries' new course. All this creates a threat of war and dangerous tension in the world.

The publication of the Warsaw pact member countries' military doctrine was brought about by the need to reduce this tension through the adoption of measures conducive to the reduction of armed forces and armaments, to lessening the threat of war, and strengthening confidence. The correct understanding of the nature of military doctrines is of utmost importance here since they embody the aims and intentions of states and military-political alliances in the military sphere. The socialist countries advocate a meeting between Warsaw Pact and NATO experts at which each side would objectively and dispassionately examine and explain to the other side the content and thrust of their military doctrines, compare concepts, and jointly study the trends of their further evolution and seek to arrive at a common view of this evolution. This is what the Warsaw Pact member states had in mind when they adopted the decision to publish their military doctrine. They are proposing that the sides should mutually convince each other of the sincerity of their aims and aspirations; they are expecting from NATO countries that the latter will, during consultations, furnish them with proof that will bear out their leaders' statements to the effect that they will use military force only in response to aggression.

In inviting representatives of NATO countries to carry out a comparison of the two military-political alliances' military doctrines, the Warsaw Pact member states have set forth the main fundamental provisions and distinctive features of their doctrine which reveal its defensive thrust.

The main feature of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine, just like the military doctrines of each of its members, is that it is subordinated to the accomplishment of the cardinal task facing mankind, the task of preventing war, both nuclear and conventional. By virtue of their social system and their peace-loving policy, the allied socialist countries have never linked their future with the military solution of international problems. [paragraph continues]

Now, in the situation of nuclear confrontation, solving the world's problems by military means is simply impermissible. Therefore they favor the resolution of controversial international issues by peaceful methods and political means alone. Our military doctrine is a system of fundamental views on how to forestall war, how to conduct military building, and how to prepare our countries and their armed forces for rebuffing aggression and waging an armed struggle in defense of socialism.

It follows from this definition that the doctrine of the fraternal socialist countries is spearheaded against war and aims at strengthening the foundations of universal security. As the classical authors of Marxism-Leninism have noted more than once, the Communists' objective is the elimination of wars from the life of society. The CPSU and the fraternal communist parties, guided by the Marxist-Leninist teaching, believe that no matter how great the threat created by the policy of the aggressive imperialist circles is today, it is possible to prevent war and to save mankind from a nuclear catastrophe. In this lies the historic mission of socialism and all the planet's progressive and peace-loving forces.

The key feature of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine is its defensive nature. How does it manifest itself? In all our practical steps, our domestic and foreign policy, and our military building.

The allied socialist states have declared before all mankind that they will never, under any circumstances, be the first to initiate military operations against any state or alliance of states whatsoever unless they themselves are the target of an armed attack, and that they will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The USSR and the other socialist countries have no territorial claims against any state either in Europe or elsewhere. The socialist community countries do not regard any state or any people as their enemy. On the contrary, they are prepared to build relations based on a reciprocal consideration of each other's security interests and on peaceful coexistence with any country in the world without exception.

The doctrine's defensive thrust is directly reflected in the sphere of the Warsaw Pact countries' military building. Thus the pledges never to be the first to use nuclear weapons and never to initiate military operations have been and remain an immutable postulate of military building of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries. It is implemented in practice in the training of staffs and troops, in the organization of the most rigorous control aimed at the prevention of nonsanctioned use of nuclear weapons, ranging from tactical to strategic nuclear weapons, in the enhancement of the combat readiness of troops to rebuff aggression, in their technical equipment, in the improvement of control and communications, and the enhancement of the moral and political standards of personnel

All these are by no means mere verbal assurances, it is a concrete program for building the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact as a whole. It is based on the principle of defense sufficiency. What does this mean? In general terms it means having precisely the magnitude of armed forces necessary to defend oneself against an attack from outside. Specifically it means that the composition of the armed forces and the quantity and quality of the means of armed struggle are rigorously measured against the level of the threat of war and the nature and intensity of imperialist military preparations and are defined by the requirements of ensuring the security of the Warsaw Pact countries and rebuffing aggression. It was emphasized at the Political Consultative Committee conference in Berlin that the Armed Forces of the allied states are being maintained at a level of combat readiness sufficient to prevent being caught unawares. Should they, nonetheless, be attacked, they will give a crushing rebuff to the aggressor.

The prevention of war and readiness to rebuff an aggressor -- these two tasks are linked and stem from the fact that the United States and NATO have not renounced the first use of nuclear weapons, are building up their strategic offensive potential on a vast scale, and are trying to achieve military superiority. In practice we constantly come up against the military strong-arm policy of NATO which is geared to the arms race and preparations for war. Practically every day, U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger is calling for a buildup of military preparations and a "struggle between the free world and communism." He is threatening the socialist countries, advocating an "armed truce" rather than peaceful coexistence in East-West relations. These are no mere words, they are backed up by mountains of weapons, programs for the production of new, even more destructive types of weapons, and directives for their implementation.

The allied socialist countries cannot but take all this into account. After all, this is a question of plans to encroach on their independence and sovereignty. Therefore, the Warsaw Pact member states consider reliably ensuring the security of their peoples their paramount duty. For this they must have the appropriate defense potential and modern armed forces and arms capable of defending people's peaceful labor and peaceful life. The entire system of the Warsaw Pact's defense readiness is built in such a way as to stop an aggressor, to thwart his criminal plans, and should an aggression against any of the pact's states occur through the imperialists' fault, to resolutely rebuff it.

Any conjectures about an aggressor possibly escaping punishment are unfounded. We closely follow the military preparations of the United States and NATO; we observe and correctly assess the dangerous trends as they appear in this process, and we take care to ensure that our defense potential develops correspondingly. When we speak of maintaining the armed forces and our military potential at a level of reasonable sufficiency, we have in mind that at the present stage the essence of sufficiency regarding the Soviet strategic nuclear forces is determined by the need to prevent anyone getting away with impunity with a nuclear attack in any, even the most unfavorable, circumstances. As for conventional means, sufficiency amounts to a quantity and quality of armed forces and armaments capable of reliably ensuring the collective defense of the socialist community. It is not we who set the limits of sufficiency, it is the actions of the United States and NATO. The Warsaw Pact countries do not aspire to military superiority, they do not seek greater security but neither will they accept a lower security or tolerate anyone's military superiority over themselves.

The decisive factor in preventing war at present remains military-strategic parity. The approximately equal correlation of the two alliances' military forces given the tremendous destructive force of modern weapons, both nuclear and conventional, makes war between them senseless. The parity ensures the possibility of retaliatory action in any circumstances, entailing the infliction of unacceptable damage on the aggressor.

Does this mean that as the level of military equilibrium rises, the strategic situation in the world will remain stable, and security will remain reliable? No, it does not. On the contrary, experience indicates that a further rise in the level of parity does not result in greater security. The continuation of the arms race inevitably increases the threat of war and can increase it to such an extent where even parity stops being a factor of military-political deterrence. This is why the task of outlawing nuclear weapons, gradually eliminating them and all other means of mass destruction, and radically reducing military confrontation is becoming more and more crucial. Proceeding from the principle of sufficiency, the Warsaw Pact member states propose to reduce, on a mutual basis of course, the military potentials to such a level where neither of the sides, while ensuring its defense, has the forces or means enabling it to mount offensive operations.

II.

Following their defensive doctrine, the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries are persistently striving to achieve goals aimed at halting the arms race, attaining specific results in the disarmament sphere, and eliminating the nuclear threat. They are trying to prove this by practical deeds.

The Soviet Union did not conduct nuclear tests for a year and a half while the United States was increasing the number of explosions in Nevada. Even now we are ready any day or any month to suspend [priostanovit] nuclear tests on the basis of reciprocity. The United States, as is known, does not want to end nuclear tests.

The Soviet Union has done everything necessary to create real opportunities for the conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. It undertook substantial compromises: It agreed not to take into account the nuclear missiles of Britain and France; it postponed the resolution of the problem of medium-range airborne means [aviatsionnyye sredstva].

Taking into account the interests of the security of the Asian states, the USSR expressed readiness to undertake the elimination of all its medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles not only in Europe, but also in Asia. Provided, of course, that the United States does the same. In so doing, the USSR is setting aside the question of the other U.S. nuclear weapons in the Asian-Pacific region. At the same time, we hope that the United States will refrain from building up its nuclear potential in that region.

Thanks to our far-reaching initiative nothing now stands in the way of taking a first step along the path toward a significant reduction of nuclear weapons which, possibly, would open up prospects for other, more major accords. The ball is now in the court of the United States and NATO.

On the negotiating table there are other constructive proposals of ours: on the radical (50 percent) reduction of strategic offensive arms of the USSR and United States with the simultaneous reinforcement of the ABM Treaty regime, including a ban on the testing of space-based ABM components in space; on the total end to nuclear tests under strict international verification, including on-site inspection; on the prohibition and elimination of chemical and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

A special place in the practical actions of the Warsaw Pact countries is logically assigned to Europe -- a region in which major groups of the armed forces of the two military-political alliances are directly confronting each other, a region where the conflagrations of world wars have twice begun. For the purposes of lowering military confrontation, the socialist countries in June 1986 at Budapest launched a proposal on a considerable reduction of armed forces and tactical nuclear and conventional armaments in Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals). Unfortunately, the NATO countries have so far given no answer to this proposal.

The socialist states proceed from the premise that the process of arms reduction must be continuous in order in the final analysis to exclude the very military-technical possibility of an attack by some parties against others. In this process any other approach is inadmissible just as it is inadmissible, while reducing some armaments, to open an arms race in other directions. The allied socialist states call on the NATO countries to display restraint in the military sphere and to renounce the use of military force on a mutual basis.

They also believe that an opportunity exists to solve a very important problem which is disturbing the European peoples -- namely, the limitation of sides' opportunities for a surprise attack. For this they are proposing specific measures: the reduction of armed forces and armaments to a minimum agreed level in the zone where the two military alliances are directly contiguous; the withdrawal from this zone of the most dangerous, offensive types of arms; the creation of a 300-km nuclear-free corridor (150 km on each side) along the line where the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO meet, from which all nuclear weapons would be withdrawn on a reciprocal basis; the creation in Europe of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons, and zones with a reduced concentration of arms and heightened confidence. To all these proposals NATO has responded with refusal.

Having promulgated their military doctrine, the socialist countries are appealing to other states, above all the members of NATO, to take a look at their own military doctrines through the prism of the Warsaw Pact doctrine. It is known that the NATO countries also present their own military doctrine -- the doctrine of "flexible response" which includes the guideline for a nuclear first strike -- as a defensive doctrine. But this is a trick, designed to delude simpletons. We can perceive the persistent desire of the United States and NATO to strengthen their security not together with others, but at the expense of others, and to ensure for themselves military superiority along the paths of the arms race, by opening up new directions in this race. Hence the renunciation of real nuclear disarmament, the refusal to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, and hence the systematic holding of large-scale exercises near the borders of the socialist countries and the enflaming of a tense situation in other regions of the world. All this naturally does not tally with the statements about the defensive nature of their doctrine.

The NATO concept of "nuclear deterrence" also bears no relation to defense. Why do we consider that to be so? Because this concept dates from the cold war and by its very essence it is contradictory and dangerous. After all, while declaring that a nuclear conflict would turn out to be a catastrophe for everyone, one cannot forcefully advocate at the same time the retention of nuclear weapons as a means of ensuring peace. The NATO concept does not make it possible to seek a solution to the nuclear problem. It encourages the arms race and leads to the further accumulation of lethal weapons, it renders military equilibrium shaky and increases the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

Responsibility for the tension in the world rests primarily with the United States. The ruling circles of that country are reluctant to renounce the arms race and are trying to make their way into space with weapons and to threaten all mankind from space. In so doing they fail to see the duplicity of their policy. In public they speak of a desire to achieve strategic stability, an "atmosphere of trust," but in practice they are making encroachments on parity and leading matters toward military superiority and to the creation of even greater asymmetry in the armaments and armed forces of the sides. The military preparations of the United States and NATO on a wide scale, the buildup of their military potential close to the territory of the USSR and other socialist states, the incessant provocative violations of their air and sea borders, the delirious plans being hatched to dismantle the social system in the socialist countries — these and other hostile actions by the forces of imperialism do not consolidate, but undermine universal peace and security.

Of late, at Washington's say-so, there have been incessant attempts in the West to pass off the shortcomings that have occurred in the organization of standby combat alert duty for the protection of airspace as a manifestation of weakness on the part of the Soviet Armed Forces and to prompt certain hotheads to test our security in other directions.

Let me say bluntly: We would not advise anyone to test our strength. The response to provocations is the strengthening defensive might of the Warsaw Pact countries and the enhancement of the vigilance and combat readiness of their armed forces. Above all this applies to the forces and means that perform standby alert combat duty. They are ready and capable at any moment and in any situation to accomplish the combat tasks entrusted to them.

The defensive military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact which is designed exclusively for parrying a military threat, by no means signifies that our actions will be of a passive nature. They will be based on the unshakeable foundation of Lenin's teaching about the defense of the socialist fatherland. In the event of aggression our Armed Forces, together with the fraternal socialist armies, will defend the socialist gains with total determination. The security of our country and of the socialist community as a whole is a sacred matter for us.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR COMMENTARIES ON ANNIVERSARY OF VLADIVOSTOK SPEECH

Deputy Foreign Minister Comments

LD281617 Moscow TASS in English 1513 GMT 28 Jul 87

[Excerpts] Moscow, 28 Jul (TASS)—The prospects of developing cooperation with the People's Republic of China in developing the tremendous expanses of the Far East and also the provinces bordering on the Soviet Central Asian republics are great, it was stated by Igor Rogachev, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR.

"The Vladivostok programme of strengthening peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region is a component of the concept of an all-embracing system of international security", Igor Rogachev noted. "It is based on recognition of the fact that in the nuclear-space age reliable security can be achieved not by military-technical but exclusively by political means. The constant strengthening of trust between states should be the core process of creating a secure and nuclear-free Asia. And this can be achieved only by concrete steps, by asserting the priority of human values".

"The Soviet initiative directed at destroying medium-range and theatre missiles in Asia is an important practical contribution to strengthening trust between states of the Asia-Pacific region".

"In the contradictory but integral world of today security is indivisible. It cannot be the privilege of nuclear or space, capitalist or socialist, big or small states." "It should be pressed for only jointly and only for everybody", the deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR said. "We hope that our ideas and practical steps together with the collective efforts of all states of the region will make a proper contribution to the creation of reliable security in Asia and the Pacific Ocean basin", Igor Rogachev stressed.

Broadcast to China

OW281033 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1200 GMT 27 Jul 87

[Station Observer Below commentary]

[Text] Dear listeners: Tomorrow, 28 July, is the 1st anniversary of the Vladivostok speech made by Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. His speech contained our country's proposal to the people and governments of all Asian-Pacific countries on pursuing peace, security, and cooperation in the region. Our station's observer, Below, writes:

Yes, it has already been 1 year since the Vladivostok speech. This has been a difficult year fraught with acute conflict and intense political struggle. However, a preliminary conclusion can now be drawn about it. I will start off with the foremost issue: the attempt to make this region nuclear-free and reduce the nuclear war threat. Some progress has been made in this respect, although not as much as was expected. The Rarotonga Treaty, declaring the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone, has gone into effect. My country, as stated in the Vladivostok speech, supported this treaty and signed the protocol agreeing to respect and observe strictly the nuclear-free zone status. So did China, and thus it demonstrated that socialist countries are of one mind on the fundamental issues in pursuit of security. However, the United States, Britain, and France refused to sign the protocol.

The USSR and China also support plans to establish nuclear-free zones on the Korean peninsula and in Southeast Asia. No progress has been made on the Korean peninsula. But certain progress was achieved in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN foreign ministers conference held in Singapore 1 month ago agreed to continue the effort to set up a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia. Recently Indonesia announced that a corresponding draft treaty had been drawn up and would be submitted for deliberation at the ASEAN summit in Manila.

The outcome remains to be seen. However, one thing is clear: Although the proposal for making Southeast Asia nuclear-free has won broad international support, it is being opposed by the United States and its imperialist allies.

In line with the principles outlined in Vladivostok, my country recently presented a new proposal on nuclear disarmament. My country's leader, Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, in answering questions of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA on 22 July, announced that the USSR is ready to eliminate all its medium-range guided missiles in the Asian part of the country, provided the United States eliminates its missiles. Once an agreement is reached in this respect, an entire line of weapons capable of mass destruction can be eliminated from the Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals.

Here I would like to point out that my country made this move at a time when the U.S. nuclear presence in South Korea and the Philippines still remains a threat to the security of the eastern part of my country. Furthermore, even if the United States agreed to eliminate its medium-range guided missiles, this threat would not disappear.

However, what the Soviet leader had in mind was not only the interests of the Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks but also the interests of the Asian countries. He took into account their concerns about the status quo. I think that all the talk about Soviet medium-range guided missiles being aimed at Asian countries has now become meaningless. My country is ready to fulfill an all-out zero option, the fate of which is now in the hands of the United States.

In Vladivostok my country made a concrete proposal for resolving regional conflicts in the Asian-Pacific region. Progress has also been made in this respect. Take Cambodia and Afghanistan, for example. Progress has only been unilateral, because foreign countries continue to interfere in these countries' affairs, hampering all efforts at mediation. What is more, every interference is being directed from Washington. Therefore, people might ask whether the situation is at an impasse. Of course, the answer is no. Regional conflicts will be settled sooner or later, since it is what every country's people want. However, the consistent resistance from reactionaries across the world makes it clear that more work needs to be done and that more efforts are needed from every country and people concerned about achieving a more stable and secure peace in the Asian-Pacific region.

In Vladivostok, and 1 year later in answering questions of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized that the pursuit of peace is a common cause and concerns every large and small country. It is impossible for the Soviet Union to undertake this mission alone. Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, in answering MERDEKA, said: As I said in Vladivostok, we asked every country in the Asian-Pacific region to cooperate for peace and mutual understanding.

PRAVDA Editorial

PM281651 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 87 First Edition p 4

[Editorial: "Vladivostok: A Year Later. The Asian and Pacific Region and International Security"]

[Text] The events taking place in the world testify to the correct and timely nature of the Soviet Union's formulation of the question of bringing the Asian and Pacific region into the general process of creating a comprehensive system of international security. Indeed, the creation of such a system is inconceivable without the participation of this extensive, most populous part of the world.

As is well known, specific Soviet proposals on this score were put forward a year ago in the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's speech in Vladivostok. In short, they amounted to the following: settle regional conflicts; place a barrier in the path of the proliferation and buildup of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific Ocean; commence talks on reducing the activeness of naval fleets in the Pacific Ocean, first and foremost ships equipped with nuclear weapons; resume talks on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace; embark piece by piece, by stages, on a radical reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Asia down to the limits of reasonable sufficiency; and put on a practical footing the discussion of confidence-building measures and the nonuse of force in the region.

The past year has confirmed the vitality of the ideas contained in these proposals. Here mention should be made first and foremost of the Delhi Declaration signed by the leaders of the USSR and India, which formulates the principles of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons. This important document is an example of the new politico-philosophical approach to the vital problems of interstate intercourse. Its significance goes beyond bilateral and regional bounds -- it expresses the aspirations of all mankind.

The intensifying desire to strengthen the cause of peace and security and to rid mankind of the burden of nuclear weapons also is indicated by many other events taking place on the planet recently, including events in countries of the Asian and Pacific region. The Rarotonga Treaty, proclaiming the southern part of the Pacific Ocean a nuclear-free zone, was drawn up. The question of creating a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia was discussed at a conference of the ASEAN countries' foreign ministers, held in Singapore recently. The supporters of this idea -- Indonesia and Malaysia -- believe that the Rarotonga Treaty could act as a model for its implementation. Demands for the Korean peninsula to be freed from nuclear weapons are growing. Communities and cities in many countries are declaring themselves to be nuclear-free zones. Whole states also are adopting this position. On the insistence of peace-loving forces, provisions were incorporated in the new Philippine Constitution to the effect that in accordance with national interests, the Philippines pursues a policy of renouncing nuclear arms on its territory. Australia and New Zealand, with the support of the broad international public, come out resolutely against French nuclear tests in the Pacific. The PRC is speaking out increasingly actively on disarmament problems.

However, on the whole, the situation in the Asian and Pacific region remains complex and contradictory. Moreover, through the fault of imperialist forces, there is a growing trend toward confrontation here, indications of a settlement of regional conflicts are still very feeble, and the situation in the Persian Gulf has deteriorated considerably.

An indication of whose policy is in accord with the desires of the peoples of the Asian and Pacific region countries and whose runs counter to them also is provided by the attitude to the aforementioned Rarotonga Treaty. As is known, the additional protocols to it contain commitments by the nuclear states to respect the status of the nuclear-free zone and not test nuclear devices in its zone of operation. While the socialist states possessing nuclear weapons -- the USSR and the PRC -- have signed these protocols, the other nuclear powers -- the United States, Britain, and France -- have declined to act in the same way.

This fact clearly demonstrates who really opposes and who favors the militarization of Asia and the Pacific region and its transformation into an arena of nuclear confrontation. Washington's attitude to the New Zealand Government's decision to ban foreign vessels carrying nuclear weapons from calling at its ports also can serve as eloquent evidence of this. When the New Zealand parliament officially declared the country a nuclear-free zone, thus investing that decision with the force of law, the U.S. Congress stripped New Zealand of the status of a U.S. ally.

It is obvious that the U.S. military is not just worried by the loss of New Zealand's ports, but also fears that the example set by that country would create a precedent for other regions considered strategically important. These misgivings are not without foundation. A number of prominent figures in the Japanese Socialist Party, for instance, have declared their intention to propagandize the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean. Washington's attempts to prevent the spread of the "nuclear allergy" by any means available are illustrated by the dramatic events in Fiji. As soon as the government of that young island state decided to ban port calls by foreign ships carrying nuclear weapons, a military coup was staged there and intercommunal strife was sparked off among the local population.

As for the Soviet Union, our country heeds the voice of the peoples and is trying to meet the peace-loving wishes of the states of Asia and the Pacific region half-way.

A few days ago, replying to questions put to him by the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, M.S. Gorbachev announced a new large-scale Soviet initiative with a direct bearing on this region.

Treating with utmost seriousness and responsibility the interest expressed by the Asian countries in having medium-range missiles totally eliminated not just in Europe but also in Asia, the Soviet Union also is ready to embark on the destruction of all its missiles in this category in the Asian part of the country, that is, to remove the issue of retaining the 100 warheads on medium-range missiles under discussion at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva -- on condition, of course, that the United States act likewise. Operational and tactical missiles also will be eliminated. In short, the Soviet Union proceeds from the concept of a "global double-zero option." At the same time, the USSR does not in this instance link its new initiative with the question of the U.S. nuclear presence in Korea, the Philippines, or Diego Garcia, although it expresses the hope that this presence will at least not be increased.

The replies to MERDEKA's questions expressed ideas on other possible measures aimed at ensuring security in the Asia and Pacific region.

The USSR is ready to assume a commitment not to increase the number of nuclear missile-carrying aircraft in the Asian part of the country if the United States does not deploy additional nuclear facilities in that region capable of reaching Soviet territory.

The readiness to reduce USSR and U.S. naval activity in the Pacific has been confirmed. After all, the line of confrontation there is where the fleets come into contact. There also could be negotiation on limiting the regions where nuclear-capable ships operate -- to ensure that they do not bring their on-board nuclear facilities within range of another country's coast. [paragraph continues]

It would be possible to limit antisubmarine rivalry and ban antisubmarine activity -- including by aviation -- in certain zones. To strengthen confidence, it would be possible to reduce the scale and number of major naval (including naval aviation) exercises and maneuvers in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, to refrain from holding them in international straits and adjacent regions, and to refrain from using combat weapons during exercises in areas of traditional sea routes. All these principles could be tested in the northern Pacific and subsequently extended to the southern Pacific and other countries of the region.

The USSR deems it necessary to break the deadlock in the matter of transforming the Indian Ocean into a peace zone in accordance with the UN declaration adopted 15 years ago and to finally convene under that organization's auspices the international conference that Washington had opposed until now. Our country proposes creating international guarantees to ensure the safety of shipping in the Indian Ocean and the seas, straits, and gulfs belonging to it, and also to safeguard the security of air routes and to formulate collective measures against terrorism in the Indian Ocean's sea and air lanes.

Paying due tribute to the Asian and Pacific countries' support for the Soviet moratorium and expressing understanding for why they felt such strong indignation at the refusal of the United States, Britain, and France to end nuclear explosions, M.S. Gorbachev confirmed that the Soviet Union will continue to wage the struggle for the banning of nuclear tests and work persistently for a full-scale agreement on this problem.

When putting forward its own proposals, thoughts, and ideas on safeguarding security in the Asian and Pacific region, the Soviet Union works on the premise that other measures to reduce military tension can be suggested by countries in the region. An important role in this matter can be played by the principles of "panche shila," [principles of peaceful coexistence endorsed by Bandung Conference in 1955] Bandung, and nonalignment referred to by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary in Valdivostok. The special nature of the world outlook adopted by peoples in the Asian and Pacific region and the political and cultural features peculiar to them may prompt new, original ideas on this issue that are intelligible and acceptable to everyone.

Of course, the Soviet Union is not against the United States' also playing an active role in Asian and Pacific political and economic processes. Moscow well understands that without a power like the United States it is impossible to resolve the problems of security and cooperation on a global scale or within this particular region. It is time, however, for Washington to realize that these problems cannot be resolved without the involvement of other countries and certainly not against their will.

A vital contribution is made by the fraternal socialist countries of Mongolia, the SRV, and the DRPK to the task of safeguarding security in the Asian and Pacific region. For example, the DPRK Government recently published new proposals envisaging a reduction in the number of troops on the Korean peninsula to achieve parity between North and South while removing all U.S. troops and nuclear arms from South Korea.

Stronger security in Asia is favored by improvements in Soviet-Chinese relations. The USSR and the PRC approach a number of key international problems from similar positions. These two neighboring socialist states have both announced that they will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. They are both opposed to the militarization of space. Both Moscow and Beijing understand the urgent need for peace to resolve their own tasks of social renewal.

The Soviet Union does not divide the principles of its international policy into European, Asian, or any other sections. It works on the basis that in today's interdependent world people on all continents share common fears and hopes. Consequently, the USSR works to ensure that peace and good neighborliness, trust and mutual understanding prevail in relations between states in the Asian and Pacific region. This is not the basic purport of the Soviet concept expounded in Vladivostok and confirmed and supplemented recently in M.S. Gorbachev's replies to questions by the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA.

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SOVIETS SUPPORT DPRK PROPOSAL FOR TROOP CUTS

TASS Reports

LD231440 Moscow TASS in English 1345 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] Pyongyang July 23 TASS -- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has put forward a new peace initiative directed at lessening tensions in the Korean peninsula. The statement issued here today by the DPRK Government points to specific ways for a stage-by-stage cut in the armed forces in that part of the world.

The North-South military parity, the statement says, should be maintained not through a mutual build-up of the armed forces but through their reduction. Guided by that fundamental principle, DPRK Government proposes that a cut in the armies of both sides be carried out from 1988 to 1991 in three stages and thus their number be brought down to 100 thousand servicemen in the north and south respectively.

As practical results are achieved in that direction, stage-by-stage withdrawal of the American troops and their nuclear weapons should be carried out from South Korea with the aim of eliminating all the U.S. military bases in the Korean peninsula, when the North and South complete the above-said cuts in the armed forces. Simultaneously measures are envisaged for broadly informing each other and international public on the steps taken.

Favouring the prevention of the danger of nuclear conflicts breaking out in the peninsula, the DPRK, the statement says, considers it necessary to turn the Demilitarised Zone between North and South Korea into that of peace, and that observers from among neutral countries be stationed there.

To discuss all issues in connection with the fresh initiative the DPRK Government proposes that multilateral talks be held in Geneva in March 1988 between the North, South and the USA on disarmament with the participation as observers of representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Sweden -- the states which are in the Commission of the Neutral Countries for the Observance of Truce in Korea. At the same time, displaying practical preparedness for lowering the level of military confrontation in the Korean peninsula, the DPRK Government declares its decision to reduce unilaterally by the end of the current year the Korean People's Army by 100 thousand.

The implementation of the fresh proposal, the statement says, will contribute towards turning Korea into a nuclear-free peace zone, open up prospects for the country's peaceful reunification, will be a weighty contribution to normalising the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Hope is expressed for a serious attitude to the DPRK'S fresh initiatives on the part of the USA and the South Korean authorities, for their positive reaction, and also an active response from the states -- members of the Commission of the Neutral Countries for the Observance of Truce in Korea.

Broadcast to Korea

SK290522 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 26 Jul 87

[Station commentator Viktorov commentary: "The DPRK Government Proposal for Phased Reduction of Armed Forces of the North and South"]

[Text] The prospective new DPRK proposal has attracted attention in the international community. This is not accidental. If U.S. troops are withdrawn from South Korea by 1992 and if the number of North and South troops is drastically reduced to 30,000 or below, respectively, this will remarkably ease the military tension on the Korean peninsula and normalize the situation in this region.

Pyongyang has continued annually to express its earnest desire, interest, and willingness to prevent the Korean peninsula from turning into one of the places where a war may break out at any moment. Since the establishment of the people's regime, the leadership of the Republic has put forth more than 200 specific proposals to the South Korean authorities to settle the Korean question in a peaceful and democratic way. Toward these proposals, however, what stand has the Seoul regime and its protectors across the ocean adopted? They have always adopted a negative stand. Washington, in trying to maintain the southern half of the Korean peninsula as its bridgehead for nuclear missiles, is directly interested in perpetuating the division of Korea. On the pretext of the threat of southward invasion, the United States and the Seoul regime are continuing to artificially create tension on the Korean peninsula.

Achieving durable peace on the Korean peninsula is inseparably linked with the question of curbing the arms race and liquidating nuclear weapons. As Soviet leader Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev noted in his answer to the questions of the Indonesian paper MERDEKA, in the Asian and Pacific region, the demand to free the Korean peninsula from nuclear weapons is growing. The urgent demand of the era is to completely liquidate the U.S. nuclear lethal means on South Korean territory and to provide conditions for the peaceful reunification of the country.

The new DPRK proposal is a realistic contribution by a socialist country to the security of Asia. This proposal must be put into practice in conjunction with the efforts of the Asian socialist countries to consolidate peace and cooperation in the region. For instance, the Mongolian proposal to conclude an agreement to refrain from using force in the Asian and Pacific region seeks such an objective. Along with Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam has proposed turning Southeast Asia into a peace zone. The Soviet Union has put forth comprehensive proposals to liquidate nuclear weapons in the Asian and Pacific region and turn this vast area on the globe into an area of good-neighborly relations. Our country fully supports Pyongyang's new proposal. The proposal is recognized as one of the important elements in establishing a security system in Asia.

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FRANCE'S GIRAUD DISCUSSES EUROPEAN DEFENSE

Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 Jul 87 p 6

[Report of speech by Andre Giraud, minister of defense]

[Text] At yesterday's opening ceremony for the first Franco-German seminar on defense at the Paris Military College and in the presence of Karl Carstens, former president of the FRG, Defense Minister Andre Giraud said that "disarmament must not be allowed to threaten peace."

"The propagandist proliferation of proposals by Gorbachev might well cause us to forget our real objective, that of strengthening peace," he said. "A disarmament measure can be considered good only if it diminishes the risk of war, not if it achieves the contrary. Disarmament as such does not mean peace. To reinforce rather than rule out peace, disarmament must be orderly. It must not be allowed to threaten peace."

Addressing 12 French officers from CHEM [Center for Higher Military Studies] and 11 German officers from the Federal Academy for Security Policy and Strategy, who had assembled for a week, Andre Giraud speculated that the Soviet-American disarmament talks had "made the Federal Republic of Germany and France realize the strength of their solidarity."

The Defense Minister declared that "cooperation should not develop against the Alliance but within it."

Giraud also said that "without asking anybody for anything, the Warsaw Pact could well reduce its conventional forces, destroy its enormous stocks of chemical weapons. The two superpowers who hold 99 percent of nuclear warheads, could well make a start on discussing the reduction of strategic weapons."

In his reply to Giraud, Karl Carstens added that "the latest disarmament proposals are not sufficiently balanced, and they will have to be complemented before we can arrive at satisfactory results."

Calling for a strengthening of the Alliance, Carstens considered that "European security cannot be assured without the Alliance." According to him, "Europe is a long way from being able to defend itself by only its own forces."

An exchange program involving officers and noncommissioned officers has been established. Giraud said "we would like that all general officers of the two countries' armies on the active list at the end of the century should have had a medium or long tour of duty in each other's country." He thought that the establishment of a mixed unit (as proposed by Chancellor Kohl) would represent "an additional step," but that the actual method for setting it up needs further discussion.

Giraud concluded by saying that "the Netherlands have already expressed a wish to join us in such an initiative. The Europe conscious of security is psychologically on the march."

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